Organizers:
Dr Ignacio Fernandez-Hernandez, EC / KU Leuven, Belgium
Dr Gonzalo Seco-Granados, UAB, Spain
Dr Rafael Terris-Gallego, UAB, Spain
Aleix Galan, KU Leuven, Belgium
Rationale:
GNSS spoofing has dramatically increased during the last year, causing major disruptions to aviation and other PNT communities. It has shown it has a much higher impact in PNT than the denial of service caused by jamming. On the other hand, anti-spoofing mechanisms are being developed by both receivers and satnav systems. GNSS authentication is a major building block against spoofing, which has shown significant progress in the last year. Galileo is starting operational provision of OSNMA (Open Service Navigation Message Authentication), after several years of stable “public observation”. Galileo is also launching the SAS (Signal Authentication Service) initial capability to complement OSNMA, and other regional systems, such as QZSS, are also offering authentication capabilities. In parallel, aviation standards are also introducing authentication (SBAS Authentication, possibly OSNMA) and most major receiver manufacturers are starting to incorporate GNSS authentication as part of their products. GPS is also expected to launch soon its NTS-3 satellite, offering authentication capabilities, among many others.
This session can cover GNSS authentication from several perspectives: navigation performance of the different authentication services, levels of protection against spoofing, implementation logic in receivers, combination of GNSS authentication (at data and spreading code level) with other spoofing detection mechanisms, etc.