

David Schweikard and Arto Laitinen

The many realisms in social ontology

Can one be a realist in social ontology while holding that social reality is not mind-independent, or not independent of social constructions? Arguably one can. In this paper, we distinguish four senses of “realism” in social ontology, and only one of them relates “being real” to independence from individual and collective minds. Even that conception of realism can be formulated so (e.g. as independence from current observers or researchers) that one can be a realist social constructionist.

In the most minimal sense of realism (R1) all cognitivists, non-instrumentalists, are realists. The second sense of realism (R2) rules out also error-theorists and eliminativists: the claims are not only to be understood literally, but some of them succeed in being true. The third sense of realism (R3) is the one that links reality to mind-independence, and rules out subjective (individual) and intersubjective (collective) dependencies. However, more sophisticated or refined versions of that criterion distinguish between various kinds of dependence, and various relata of the dependence-relation, and some of those leave room for realism about socially constructed entities. A fourth conception of realism (R4) focuses on irreducibility: something is really real only if it cannot be reduced to some lower-level entities, features or facts. For all four forms of realism, related forms of anti-realism (AR1-AR4) can be found. There are various more detailed forms of the four kinds of realism and anti-realism, so more sophisticated, refined or detailed maps of realisms can be construed, and we suggest some ways in which this can be done. We illustrate the usefulness of distinguishing senses of “realism” with reference to debates in the field.

Shalom Chalson

Not passing the Buck: Responsibility in Cases of racial Misidentification

When individuals cross or transcend racial boundaries, and these experiences are ‘named’ or ‘thematized’, the concept of ‘passing’ is said to apply (Hom 2018: 33). A competing account of passing characterises it as not just a member of a group’s assumed membership of another mutually exclusive group, but one’s allowing that they be perceived as such (Mallon 2004: 646). In my paper, I attempt to describe passing as a phenomenon which cannot occur without the awareness or consent of the individual in question. And given this definition of passing, I consider if the individual, firstly, has obligations to their formative community, and, secondly, if these obligations apply when one is provided with benefits on the basis of their ability to pass. Thirdly, I attempt to sketch what constraints such obligations may impose on the actions of those who pass. To consider these questions, I first briefly describe the concept of race. I then attempt to define racial passing, and contextualise it as both a historical and contemporary phenomenon. I then consider the role of implicit bias in instances of passing which do not involve the individual’s explicit allowance of an assumption of racial membership. The case of the passer who does not explicitly acknowledge crossing the racial boundary in a particular instance constitutes a hard case for questions about racial membership and obligations to one’s community. I argue that individuals continue to have obligations to their formative communities, even in instances where they do not ask to pass. That is, when individuals who pass are conferred benefits and opportunities by virtue of assumptions about racial membership, they have obligations to speak on behalf of their formative communities. Whether these obligations entail that individuals deny access in all instances, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

Aaron Bentley

Epistemological Problems for Class Consciousness

In this paper, I develop an epistemology of class consciousness, a theory which address the specifically epistemological problems that arise when attempting to form diverse collection of individuals into class conscious political coalitions, capable of enacting radical political change. Such political organizations require members to develop a mutual understanding of the commonalities and differences in interests, goals, and social position that hold between members of the coalition. Without such understanding, the revolutionary political potential of such organizations is greatly limited.

I start by laying out the specifically epistemological problems that inhibit class consciousness and distinguish them from related, more widely discussed motivational problems. Class conscious political action is a form of collective action and requires the formation and application of collective intentions to intervene into the political and material world. It is typically thought that certain kinds of individual mental states must be shared between collective actors before these kinds of collective intentions can form, but the heterogeneous nature of radical political coalitions and the kinds of knowledge that must be shared between their members, makes achieving this mutual knowledge quite difficult.

In particular, what I call intentional incompatibility can arise. Intentional compatibility and incompatibility are relations that hold between individual agents on the basis of what sorts of thoughts they, as individuals, are capable of having and how those sets of thoughts compare to the thoughts other persons with whom they may wish to act or communicate can have. Broadly speaking, two persons are intentionally compatible in so far as they can have thoughts with sufficiently similar contents to communicate or act together and are intentionally incompatible in so far as they cannot.

There are various potential causes of Intentional incompatibility, but for my purposes, the primary source of it will be differences in experiential history. It is widely accepted that the contents of one's thoughts are constrained by one's history of interaction with the world. The heterogeneous nature of political coalitions means that differences in experiential histories will be common, a fact with some empirical support. Further, the knowledge of interests, goals, and social position required for class consciousness to arise is far more likely than other kinds of contents to be derived from these experiential differences.

I then look to the history of the epistemology of politics to investigate how to address intentional incompatibility. I build on two related epistemological programs, dialogical strategies derived from Plato and dialectical methods found most notably in Hegel and Marx. I offer precise, modern formulations of these theories, and show how, together, they can address intentional incompatibility. I also explore empirical work that supports the idea that these strategies can be effective. I conclude by discussing how these formal epistemological results can be realized in real world political activity. Most notably, I show that this work indicates that coalition building must occur from the ground up, focusing first on acknowledging and bring to the fore, the voices and needs of the most vulnerable members of the coalition.

Ranjoo Herr

Does the Collective Right to Self-Determination Require a Group Agent?

This project will scrutinize the relationship between the right to self-determination and the international human rights system (IHRS). The first UN document to mention the “self-determination of peoples” is the 1945 UN Charter’s Article 1(2); the common first Article to the two 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights explicitly recognizes a people’s “right to self-determination.” At first glance, then, it may seem that the right to self-determination is a human right consistent with the list of individual human rights in the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Yet a closer look reveals that this relationship is more complicated than it may seem, as all human rights included in the UDHR are individual and moral rights (Pogge 2002; Donnelly 2013).

Confronted with this seeming paradox, some philosophers have argued, on the one hand, that the collective right to self-determination can still be a human right if it is conceived as a right that individuals as group members hold “jointly” rather than separately (Jones 2018, 444). According to this view, the group need not have an agential status, as it is only an aggregation of individual group members who can jointly hold this right. On the other hand, some argue that a collective right as a moral right must be predicated on an intentional group agent (French 1984; McDonald 1991; Newman 2011), which is a “conglomerate” as opposed to an “aggregate” collectivity. A conglomerate collectivity maintains its independent identity as a group despite changes in its constitutive membership and is conceptually and functionally irreducible to the aggregation of its members’ individual intentions and actions. In contrast, an aggregate collectivity is merely a collection of individuals (French 1984). A prime example of the conglomerate collectivity is a people/nation, members of which share common sympathies with one another generated by a common culture, language, history, and institutions.

Liberal philosophers have maintained that the idea of the group agent is morally unjustifiable. A defensible idea of group agents, however, does not require an ontological status of groups on a par with individuals. According to “methodological collectivism” (Tuomela 2013), however, the idea of group agents makes sense, because it has “indispensable explanatory, predictive, and descriptive usefulness for theorizing about the social world” (46). This project will consider these debates carefully in order to arrive at a plausible conclusion about what advancing the collective human right to self-determination implies for the IHRS. In particular, I will advance and defend the position that an intentional group agent, such as a nation or a people, may attain a moral status and be ascribed a moral collective right to self-determination if at least two conditions are met: First, its members operate according to what Tuomela calls the “we-mode,” at least some of the time, and, second, there is a coherent, collective, and public “decision-making procedure” that makes group decisions genuinely attributable to the group itself and not to only some of its members (Preda, 2012, 247).

Joshua Rust

Max Weber and Social Ontology

Key elements of John Searle's articulation of the Standard Model of Social Ontology can be found within Max Weber's ideal type of legal-rational authority. I argue that Weber's notion of a legal-rational status or "jurisdictional area" anticipates key features of Searle's notion of a status-function. In particular, a legal-rational status, like a status-function, is characterized by deontological powers, functions, and what Searle calls "constitutive rules." However, the fact that legal-rational authority is, for Weber, just one of three types of legitimate authority, along with traditional authority and charismatic authority, suggests limitations in the Standard Model's scope of applicability. Where Searle takes himself to be providing an account of "the structure of human civilization," Weber's taxonomy suggests that Searle has only given us an account of a way of being a civilization. I focus on Weber's account of traditional authority and defend the claim that traditional authority is an importantly distinct mode of social organization as compared to Searle's legal-rational authority. In particular, I highlight two points of distinction between legal-rational statuses and traditional statuses. First, I claim that legal-rational statuses and traditional statuses have different anchoring schemas; where legal-rational grounds are anchored in enactment, traditional grounds are anchored in tradition, which is necessarily not enacted. Second, I claim there is a corresponding difference in the character of the grounds-specifying frame principles as found in each of these modes of authority. Where the grounds of legal-rational statuses are articulated in terms of (constitutive) rules, the grounds of traditional statuses are primarily shown or demonstrated in the exemplars shared by a given population. This understanding of traditional authority also reveals why the Standard Model misconstrues the structure of ordinary, informal statuses, such as friendship.

Lucas Schwengerer

Towards Collective Self-Knowledge

We apparently ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say 'Google knows such-and-such,' or 'Amazon intends to do such-and-such.' This observation of ordinary parlance found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple explains to their shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market. But how does Apple know what it intends? How do groups get to know their own mental states? This is the question of collective self-knowledge.

I argue that collective self-knowledge is a distinct phenomenon that deserves our attention. I suggest that groups can collectively avow, which indicates that they have privileged and peculiar access to their own intentional states. I start with a rough and ready characterization of what I take a social group to be. I then introduce the phenomenon of self-knowledge before arguing that groups indeed have access to their states in a way that seems similar to individual self-knowledge.

The argument for collective self-knowledge shows that a standard line to identify privileged and peculiar access for individual self-belief is also applicable to groups. Beliefs about one's own individual mental states are said to be more likely to amount to knowledge and appear to be formed by a peculiar method of belief-formation. I am the best person to ask about my beliefs or desires. These features are established by pointing to our ordinary linguistic practice. We use a

special kind of speech act to self-ascribe mental states. Call these speech acts avowals. Generally, avowals seem to be authoritative, immediate and salient (Wright, 1998). Similar features are a starting point in Fernández (2013), Finkelstein (2003), Gertler (2011), Moran (2001). They are often the basis for an inference from features of our linguistic practice to features of beliefs and belief-formation. The idea is that the best explanation for the linguistic features are features of beliefs. Hence, self-beliefs are privileged and peculiar such that they explain the ordinary linguistic practice. I argue that we can use the same line of reasoning for collective self-knowledge. If we find speech acts of groups that are sufficiently similar to avowals of individuals we should also accept privileged self-knowledge for groups. I propose that there are such speech acts: Mission statements, press releases or manifestos of political parties are some of many plausible candidates. I argue that these group speech acts show authority and immediacy, but may lack salience.

Danny Weltman

Gender Abolitionism: Not Now, But Later

I defend gender abolitionism (also known as gender eliminativism), which is the view that we ought not to have genders (Rubin 1975, 204; Mikkola 2011, 74–75). I defend it chiefly by suggesting that many objections to the view can be defused if we argue that gender abolition should happen in the future.

First, I briefly characterize gender abolitionism by describing a world without gender, in which we do not use gender terms, sort people along gender lines, invest systemic differences between the sexes (to the extent any such differences exist) with any particular social meanings, pass laws that discriminate on the basis of gender, or carry out other behaviors that depend on and help constitute gender.

Second, I provide one main argument for thinking we should abolish gender: gender is necessarily oppressive. Gender, both as it exists today and as a concept generally, entails oppression, because gender requires us to have systemic (albeit potentially defeasible) expectations about how people will behave, and it requires us to treat these expectations as normative, such that deviation from these expectations licenses at the very least a judgment that one has deviated (Rhode 2010). (Of course, most deviations from gender norms trigger much more dire consequences, including ostracism and violence.) Because systems of oppression like this are bad, we have a reason to eliminate gender.

Third, I suggest that most objections against gender abolitionism can be defused if we realize that we should postpone abolition to some point in the future. For instance, gender is important to the identities of many people, including many marginalized people (Jenkins 2016). But, this is just an argument for delaying the abolition of gender until this marginalization has been largely rectified. Eliminating gender may require certain resources or technologies, like widespread access to birth control or even artificial wombs, so we should not eliminate gender until we have these things (Firestone 1971; Takala 2009).

Fourth, I respond to the objection that gender abolitionism is an unrealistically utopian and objectionably unpragmatic project by suggesting ways in which using gender abolition as a goal can help us make more practical decisions about how to act right now (Mikkola 2011, 75).

Paul Giladi

Facing Up to the Harder Problem of Social Ontology: Sundering Identity

The category of identity plays a pivotal role in social discourse. In this respect, when social ontologists carve social groups at their joints, what is often deemed fundamental to that group is a specific identity. However, more often than not, identity-talk in these contexts has tended to construe social groups as simple blocs, to the extent that racial, gender, disabled, and sexual orientation groups are often conceived as unitary kinds.

Katherine Ritchie (2015; forthcoming) and Amie Thomasson (forthcoming) have recently argued that social metaphysical categories need greater nuance. While I am sympathetic to aspects of Ritchie's and Thomasson's respective general efforts to render the metaphysics of social group identity more complex, and therefore more illustrative of the phenomenology of racial, gender, disabled, and sexual orientation groups, my concern is that the progressive and emancipatory potential embedded in their metaphysical frameworks is held back.

Firstly, my worry about Ritchie's position is that she appears to deploy investigations into social ontology in a manner which fails to create sufficient space for critical social ontology. It is not sufficient to carve the social at its joints; one must also have in view whether or not the metaphysical categories we use to make sense of gender, race, disabled, and sexual orientation groups are themselves prone to ideological distortion and vitiation. In other words, one has to be prepared to not only recognise that our vocabulary for talking about gender and the like is not fit for purpose, but also prepared to transform that very vocabulary for the emancipatory purpose of ending oppression, domination, and marginalisation.

Secondly, my worry about Thomasson's position is that she claims the commitment to seeing the norms social groups bear as constituting-roles helps entail the ideal of a gender-less and race-less world. I raise two problems with Thomasson's position: (a) it is unclear how her argument is valid; (b) even if the argument can be made valid, it is unclear if a race-less or gender-less world is 'ideal'.

I argue that a compelling way to realise the progressive and emancipatory potential embedded in their metaphysical frameworks involves sundering identity. Specifically, 'sundering identity' involves revealing how identity – when understood independently of critical frameworks – is inherently prone to practices of reification, thereby preventing the category of identity from articulation in processual terms. By revealing the propensity for reification built into the basic logic of our ordinary discourse about racial groups, gender groups, disabled, and sexual orientation groups as well as revealing the complex phenomenological textures of social groups which agonistically constitute and revise the norms they bear, I argue that sundering identity reveals how process metaphysics can be deemed a helpful partner for critical theory. For, if one's metaphysics of social identity is inherently processual, then one is committed to the view that gender norms, etc. are constituted agonistically. The sundering of identity is pragmatic, insofar as the category of identity is never fixed and enables more democratic forms of association.

Kamuran Osmanoglu

Medical Genetics Does Not Need a Racial Classification

Racial categories have been used in biomedical sciences to explain causation across the entire spectrum of diseases. It may seem tempting to consider racial classifications in medical research, as this could help identify specific genes that lead to disease susceptibility for certain racial groups—and which might thus allow us to cure these diseases more efficiently (as well as to make more precise risk estimates at the individual and population levels). However, as I will try to establish in more detail, there are two problems with this sort of view.

First, it turns out that race cannot be seen to provide useful genetic information about variation in drug response, diagnosis, or causes of disease—there just do not seem to be race-specific diseases. Of course, there are genetic diseases that vary among populations. For instance, people of Jewish descent share a risk of Tay-Sachs disease; the frequency of cystic fibrosis varies within Europe; and sickle cell anemia is distributed especially widely in a region spanning sub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterranean. However, these diseases while specific to certain population groups, are not specific to races. Second, research appears to show that race has little value in predicting health outcomes without having information about an individual's socioeconomic conditions, such as level of education, type of diet, and place of residence.

Therefore, in this paper, I will argue that (1) race has very little explanatory value as a surrogate for understanding an individual's genetic background for medical purposes; and (2) scientists should collect data about the individuals' socioeconomic conditions rather than their races for medical purposes. This paper will (1) provide researchers with a novel solution to report human genomic variation without inappropriately relying on racial categories; and (2) help medical professionals to understand that the inequities between health and disease across populations are rooted in social experience rather than genome.

Sebastian Müller

The ontology of social roles and the consumer-citizen hybrid

According to traditional economics the social roles of the consumer and the citizen are diametrically opposed to each other. Citizens aim for the greater good while its' counterpart, the consumer, is purely egoistic (Clarke et al. 2007; Mankiw and Taylor 2018, 127). Both roles do not share any characteristics, values, responsibilities or interests. Nevertheless, there are a number of examples in history and everyday life in which people seem to align their buying behaviour with politically agendas. People seem to be able to act political – like citizens – and at the same time engage in the market sphere – like consumers. These so called consumer-citizens or citizen-consumers can express their ethical, political, social, economic and environmental concerns through market instruments like boycotts, buycotts, consume reduction and denial (Carter 2001; Hoffmann 2008; Micheletti 2004; Ricci, Marinelli, and Puliti 2016; Soper 2007; Schrader 2011). But to recognise political consumer actions in the market does not necessarily need to translate into a own consumer-citizen role with its own motives, attitudes and responsibilities. On the contrary, it is easier to attribute behaviour and attitudes to one of both roles instead of developing a new concept, in particular with regard to motive compatibility problems. Therefore, it is no surprise that all consumer-citizen approaches so far give greater weight to one of the two roles. This imbalance drives critics to the conclusion, that empirically there is no, and theoretically cannot be a true

consumer-citizen hybrid. While, on the one hand, advocates of a consumer-citizenship ratio emphasise how such a concept could make sense out of a great variety of historic facts, and furthermore could support efforts to solve global government problems, critics, on the other hand, object the possibility of mutually compatible role motives as well as the democratic legitimacy of politically motivated consume actions. The result is a discourse in which the consumer-citizen role appears to be a historical fact, while both social roles seem irreconcilable. This apparent paradox allows only two possible conclusions to be drawn. Either, interpretations of historic and social phenomena that imply a consumer-citizen role are incorrect. Or, a great variety of traditional and contemporary consumer and citizen concepts are wrong or incomplete.

Despite the fact, that all consumer-citizen theories and their critiques use the term role, so far nobody has discussed this term and its ontological implications in the consumer-citizen context. This work will analyse the contemporary consumer-citizen approaches and their critics. Then, based on ontological reflections on social roles and social role theory, it will analyse the necessary and common behaviour, motives and responsibilities of consumers and citizens. Based on this results, it will elaborate a concept of a consumer citizen intersection that opens a shared space of behaviours, attitudes and (moral) responsibilities. The new approach is particularly beneficial in interdisciplinary socio-economic contexts as well as in stakeholder contexts, since it is open to the possibility to identify specific characteristics and hierarchies in the role intersections.

Noriaki Okamoto

Identifying Collectively-Accepted Social Norms: A Perspective of Performative Nominalization

In the area of philosophical analysis of social institutions, several scholars have theorized how objective institutional reality exists and implied the possibility of its application to social sciences (e.g., Searle 1995, 2005, and 2009; Tuomela 2002 and 2013). For instance, Searle's simple but persuasive accounts have attracted great interests from social scientists and philosophers alike. His theory of social and institutional reality seems to be useful in generally explaining epistemologically objective reality. Yet, to date, relatively few social scientists have thoroughly applied Searlean core concept of collective intentionality to their specific domains. One of the reasons why Searlean collective intentionality and associated perspectives have not been extensively used in social scientific research relates to its abstractness and simplicity, as the concept is considered to be too simple to explain complicated actual dynamics of social institutions. Perhaps Searle's main concern lied in ontological clarification rather than its extensive application to various issues in society, which brought the lack of systematic theory of collective intentionality that could be used in social scientific studies. Another leading scholar of collective intentionality, Raimo Tuomela, established his theory of social ontology on the basis of we-mode and collective acceptance (Tuomela, 2013).

Both two leading scholars have highlighted the existence of normativity in the assignment of status functions through deontic powers (Searle) and we-mode collective acceptance (Tuomela). How such normativity constitutes social institutions needs further investigation. To tackle this issue, this study focuses on the concept of "performativity" that has drawn various scholars' attention recently. Tuomela specifically stated that group attitudes are explicated by performative collective construction of contents for the group (Tuomela, 2013, p. 15). Likewise, some sociologists have directed their attention to the concept of performativity (e.g., MacKenzie, 2006; Aspers, 2007;

MacKenzie et al., 2007). Recently, the concept of performativity itself has been thoroughly analyzed from various interdisciplinary perspectives (e.g., Boldyrev and Svetlova, 2016) and there have been drifts toward investigation of performative practices.

Taking advantage of this situation, this study aims at closing the gap between philosophical analysis of social institutions and social scientific studies by considering the way to identify performative relationship between informal norms and formal institutions. It is done by the following three steps. First, by considering previous works of Searle and Tuomela, it elaborates collective acceptance account that explains the changes of institutional reality. It particularly relies on Tuomela (2002)'s two distinctions between r-norms and s-norms as well as operative members and non-operative members. Specifically, Searle and Tuomela's collective acceptance views are reconsidered from a perspective of performative perlocutionary forces in Austin (1975) and Svetlova (2016). Then it suggests constitutive meso-level collectively accepted social norms that performatively (and reflexively) constitute the changes of institutional reality. Second, the formulated account is integrated into some arguments in critical discourse analyses and communication studies to establish a viewpoint that regards collectively accepted social norms performatively mobilize social institutions and the process is rhetorically represented through the nominalization and lexicalization. Finally, the framework is briefly unfolded to the specific case of collectively accepted "globalization".

John Greenwood

On the Persistence of Social Groups

A popular argument for the claim that social groups are distinct from (mere) sums of individuals is that the persistence conditions of social groups are different from the persistent conditions of the individuals who compose them. Thus, the Supreme Court, the Mooseville College Philosophy Department (fictional) and the Oakland chapter of Hells Angels can persist despite changes in their membership over time. Despite the initial plausibility of this claim, there are reasons to doubt that it is a metaphysical truth about social groups, rather than a theoretical truth about some social groups. Consider the Mooseville College Philosophy Department. The department may be said to have been existence for over a century, and to have persisted though successive changes in its membership, if the department has more or less retrained its original structure (chair and executive committee etc.) and function (teaching students, administration etc.) over the time period. However, if the moral and political psychology of its members today is radically different from the moral and political psychology of its members in the past, then it seems reasonable to claim that the present department is not the same department (numerically) as it was in the past. The members that constituted the department in the past were racist and sexist (they would not appoint Jews or women, and were biased against minority students), whereas the members that constitute the present department (which has Jewish and female members) are not. The present department thinks and acts quite differently from the department in the past, and the present department members would likely insist that they are not the same department (numerically) as the past department given these conditions.

Conversely, it is sometimes the case that social groups can persist throughout changes in their structure. Consider the 30-man group of bikers who form 'The Ravens' motorcycle club. They have a rule that new members can only be admitted on the death of one of the founders. Twenty years later, they are all still alive and active members of the club, although they have changed the club

rules significantly over the years. These rules originally mandated racing and fighting other motorcycle clubs, but later governed their meetings devoted to the interpretation of the poetry of Verlaine and Rimbaud, and still later their work schedules to provide meals for the homeless. Although the motorcycle club has changed quite radically over the years (except that they all still ride motorcycles), so long as the original members remain and remain organized as a club, the motorcycle club seems to have persisted despite these changes. The members of the club would very likely insist that they remained members of the very same club they formed twenty years ago. After all, as they might also insist, it is and has always been their club.

I consider some ways of dealing with these apparent anomalies, none of which support the idea that it is a fundamental metaphysical truth that social groups persist throughout changes in their membership.

Randall Westgren

Collective Identity and Commitment to Group Action

This paper reports an empirical study of seventeen collectives that are instances of a particular kind of social group: wine trails. A wine trail is a voluntary, nonhierarchical group of small family-owned vintners which serves as an organization for collective action in support of raising the image, revenues, or similar socio-economic outcomes for its members. Each member of the trail has its own identity, but it participates in the development of a collective identity that is central to group action.

The empirical model is developed from a thirty-year tradition in organization theory that examines member-organization relationships with the constructs of organizational identity, identification, organizational form, and commitment. Organizational identity treats the organization as a social actor which projects an identity qua image to the social environment in which it acts. Identification is the degree of "fit" between the member's identity, beliefs, and goals with the identity, goals, and actions of the collective. Organizational form is the term that management theorists give to the natural kind that any organization may be a token/member of -- a categorization that is generally agreed upon by member organizations and external social assessors. The assessors confer legitimacy on the category against which member legitimacy may be judged. Commitment to the organization (collective) is operationalized according to the three scales of Ashforth and Mael: affective, continuance, and normative commitment.

The connections between the constructs we test from organization theory and social ontology are discussed, e.g. group identity as shared ethos and identification with the group (Gold and Sugden) as the basis for collectivity. Commitment in our model is a tacit predictor of future participation in group action, but we are primarily interested in identity and identification as antecedents to commitment.

Our model of shared identity, identification, and commitment consists of three sets of scales. The first is the identity requirements for the organizational form: what a wine trail should be, have, or do. From a pre-tested list of thirty scale items, ten show a high degree of agreement as common requirements to be a legitimate instance of a wine trail. The respondents rate their perceptions of how well the wine trail to which they belong conforms to the identity requirements. The difference between expectations and perceptions is modeled as each member's legitimacy score of their specific trail relative to the form requirements. We use a three-item scale to measure the degree of

member identification with their trail (the "fit" between their identities). Finally, we ask three four-item scales to measure the member's affective, normative, and continuance commitment to the trail. Our empirical results show that the legitimacy score (gap between expectations and perceptions) has significant negative effect on affective and continuance commitment, but not on normative (loyalty/duty-based) commitment. Higher levels of identification are positively related to all three measures of commitment to the trail.

The paper finishes with implications for further study of the relationships between identity and intentionality in collectives.

Katharine Jenkins

Dangerous Talk: Gender Kinds, Trans Oppression, and Covert Exercitives

According to many accounts of social kinds in general and gender kinds in particular, there are some gender kinds such that trans people are members of the kind even though it's at odds with their gender identity. Here are two examples:

- Ásta's conferralist account of social kinds. According to this account, a trans woman who is misgendered in a certain social context is a member of the social kind man in that context.

- Haslanger's structuralist account of gender kinds. According to this account, a trans woman who is closeted, or persistently misgendered throughout different social contexts, is a member of the social kind man.

I find both of these accounts highly plausible. However, I have a strong intuition that I ought not to make utterances such as 'Alex is a man', where Alex is a trans woman who is a member of the social kind man according to one or more of these accounts. In this paper, I aim to vindicate this intuition.

There are several theoretical commitments that one might think would help to alleviate worries about utterances such as 'Alex is a man'. Here are two:

(1) Gender pluralism: Alex is also a woman, because there are many different gender kinds, e.g. kinds based on gender identity, kinds conferred in trans-positive spaces.

(2) Kinds can be wrongful/oppressive: the very fact that Alex is made into a member of the social kind man is wrongful/oppressive.

These do help somewhat, but they don't seem to fully fix the problem. I still have the intuition that making claims like 'Alex is a man' is dangerous in a way that talking about some other wrongful social kinds is not (e.g. the kind slave; 'Frederick Douglass was a slave'), and this applies even given gender pluralism (saying 'Alex is a man and Alex is a woman' doesn't feel much safer). Moreover, assuming that my audience fully understands these points does not make the intuition go away.

I argue that the intuition can be vindicated by way of Mary Kate McGowan's account of 'covert exercitives'. McGowan argues that speech can oppress by enacting permissibility facts in norm-governed activities; this can happen covertly and unintentionally and does not require the speaker to have special authority. Such speech acts are covert exercitives. Plausibly, claims such as 'Alex is a woman' are covert exercitives that enact permissibility facts concerning the appropriate

treatment of the individuals in question, in virtue of interacting with background social norms such as ‘individuals who are not women are not entitled to be treated as women’.

Importantly, this can happen even when the speaker is engaged in critical social theory: theorising is a social practice, which does not happen in a quarantined zone, but is rather undertaken by social agents embedded in a broader social context. Thus the take-home point, which is particularly important for critical social theorists, is this: under certain circumstances, merely talking about genuine social kinds can contribute to oppression, due to the covert activation of social norms.

Herschel Chaiet

Categorization and Ontology in Brian Epstein’s *The Ant Trap*

Brian Epstein’s *The Ant Trap* offers an account of social ontology that aims to improve the social sciences. Epstein seeks to provide a picture of the grounds and anchors of various social phenomena such that the social world appears less anthropocentric. Among the grounds Epstein permits for social phenomena are diachronic grounds. In this essay, I argue that permitting diachronic phenomena as the grounds for social entities gives an under-inclusive picture of the social world. In service of this claim, I argue that the existence of a social entity is evidenced by the traits it exhibits, not its past. I divide explanation of the social world into two categories: ontology and categorization. The former searches for existent social entities while the latter merely groups entities according to shared traits or shared pasts. I then show why Epstein mistakenly conflates ontology and categorization, leading to an under-inclusive social ontology. I conclude by arguing that a distinction between ontology and categorization is necessary for diagnoses of the justice of social institutions – namely, the law.

Jordan Shaw

Dehumanization, Misogyny, and Social Hierarchy

One way to describe moral harm or injustice with particular intensity, especially in the context of systems of social subordination like racism and sexism, is to call it “dehumanizing.” Some of the overlapping ways to characterize “dehumanization” include: lowering someone to a less-than-human status (Fincher, Kteily, and Bruneau, 2017; Glover, 1999, p. 338); conceiving of or treating someone as sub- or nonhuman, usually either as an inanimate object or as an animal (Manne, 2017, p. 134; Smith, 2016; Ramseyer, 2013; Mikkola, 2011, 2016; Bloom, 2017; Wynter, 1972, p. 65); treating someone as a mere means to an end, rather than as an end in themselves (Smith, 2011a; Mikkola, 2011, p. 134); and/or otherwise discounting someone’s capacity to direct or experience their own conduct. Paradigmatic examples of dehumanization include sexual assault, especially marital rape, and genocidal cruelty (Appiah, 2008, p. 142-144); although dehumanization can also include less extreme, more everyday injustices (Fricker, 2007, p. 133-134; Bastian and Haslam, 2011).

I refer to sets of claims, or frameworks, which deploy “dehumanization” as a term for moral harm as “dehumanization frameworks.” Some feminist and moral philosophers are especially concerned with the asymmetrically gendered and racialized aspects of dehumanization – where targets of dehumanization are members of socially subordinated groups (Appiah, 2008; Mikkola, 2011, 2016;

Manne, 2017). These philosophers have the explicit purpose, overlapping with the purpose(s) of some dehumanization frameworks, of discussing these kinds of harms in order to help ameliorate them, in support of their targets. However, some have turned against dehumanization frameworks, with Kate Manne leading the charge most recently in her (2017) *Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny*. This paper defends dehumanization frameworks from her critique, in part by highlighting some that evade it. Then, developing these overlooked frameworks, I offer a friendly amendment to Manne's general treatise against misogyny.

As I review in Section 1, Manne argues that we should dispense with dehumanization frameworks, in general, because the embarrassing and degrading aspects of paradigm cases are inconsistent with the claim that their targets are seen as less than human (Manne, 2017, p. 157; 163-165, 168-169, 176; See also Appiah, 2008, p. 142-144). In Section 2, I point out that Manne's critique of the kind of dehumanization frameworks that she targets – even though it's a critique that I sympathize with – does not extend to alternative, pre-existing dehumanization frameworks. Whereas Manne aims for her own, socially situated account to displace the overly psychological “dehumanization paradigm” (Manne, 2017, p. 157) for describing human brutality, dehumanization frameworks have already and always been socially situated. And they can satisfy Manne's desideratum in describing what it's like on “the receiving end” of injustice (176). In Section 3, I provide my own definition of dehumanization, modified from Mikkola's, as an injury to human political capacities, which has the effect of creating or maintaining existing, unjust hierarchies. My view places misogyny within a broader context of gender-based dehumanization, which can help extend Manne's account, in order to more directly challenge the patriarchal assumption of gender binarism.

Rachael Mellin

A Metaphysical Analysis of Social Planning Groups

One of the main debates in trying to understand the metaphysics of groups and group action is between Individualism and Holism. When it comes to the metaphysics (i.e., ontological status) of groups, individualists argue that there is nothing more to groups than their individual members. That is, there is only one main ontological category involved here, namely, individuals. Holists, on the other hand, deny this and instead argue that groups should be understood as a separate ontological category. The debate between ontological individualism and holism can be extended to help us clarify the discussion surrounding the metaphysics of group action. Group action is generally understood in terms of shared agency, which involves collective intentionality. The literature on collective intentionality can be similarly split into two main camps: the individualists and the collectivists. Individualists about collective intentionality argue that there is nothing more to collective intentionality than the intentions of the individual group members. Meanwhile, collectivists deny this, claiming instead that the intentions of the individual group members are not enough to explain collective intentionality.

My project is to apply these distinctions (ontological individualism/holism and individualism/collectivism about intentionality) to social planning groups in order to determine the best way to understand them. This is to ask: Should we be ontological individualists or holists about social planning groups, and individualists or collectivists about their collective intentionality? The first part of this question concerns the ontological status of social planning groups, and the second part regards how we should understand group action. In order to answer each of these

parts, I establish two corresponding questions: (1) What is it for a social planning group to exist? (2) What makes a social planning group able to carry out social planning activity?

My interest in, and understanding of, social planning groups comes from Scott Shapiro's Planning Theory of Law. Shapiro's main claim, the planning thesis, is that legal activity is the activity of social planning. According to Shapiro, legal activity is carried out by legal organisations (legal officials) and the product of this activity are legal rules. Since, by the planning thesis, legal activity is social planning activity, legal organisations are social planning organisations and legal rules are plans (and plan-like norms). Shapiro's social planning organisations are the target of my analysis. I aim to develop this metaphysical account of social planning groups in order to test the success of his overall thesis. This is because, although social planning groups are a central part of his view, Shapiro does not consider any metaphysical analyses of them. He does not mention anything about the existence conditions for social planning groups (1), nor do I take him to provide a satisfactory answer to what makes a social planning group able to carry out social planning activity (2). Incidentally, a metaphysical account of social planning groups will have important implications for legal philosophy in general, as well as the metaphysics of groups. To end, I will briefly consider some of these.

Miguel Garcia

Easy Social Ontology

Are there social practices? This question matters. Firstly, because social practices are regarded as important elements in building-up the social world (e.g., Hart's theory of law affirms that legal systems are founded on a certain kind of social practice). Secondly, because answering it forces us to take a stance regarding what we need to decide what there is. After characterising social practices as collective intentional actions performed for a social reason, I approach this ontological question by using Thomasson's deflationary Easy Ontology, and argue that we do not need anything other than conceptual competence and empirical investigation to answer it. I call this metaontological approach Easy Social Ontology (ESO).

ESO is an alternative to those theories (e.g., Epstein's grounding-anchoring theory) that take social facts as metaphysically explainable (e.g., grounded-anchored) by non-social facts. For these theories, to decide whether a certain social practice exists, we need to determine their metaphysical reasons (e.g., their grounds-anchors). As these metaphysical reasons are supposed to be fundamental facts, the corresponding metaphysical explanation of the social practice corresponds to the metaphysical relations (e.g., grounding-anchoring) that obtain between certain fundamental facts and the social practice.

I advance three objections to these theories. Firstly, it is unclear what counts as fundamental. Secondly, despite there being certain candidates, it is disputable what those metaphysical relations are and how many (e.g., for Schaffer, grounding-anchoring is only one metaphysical relation, i.e., grounding). Thirdly, we need not answer either of these questions unless we adopt their robust metaontology (i.e., their considering fundamentality and the metaphysical relations between fundamental and non-fundamental facts as the criterion for answering ontological questions about the social world).

For an easy social ontologist, to decide whether there actually are social practices, e.g., people dancing at weddings, street musicians playing improvised concerts, customers forming queues,

etc. depends on certain conditions being satisfied. These conditions, however, have nothing to do with what is fundamental or what metaphysical relations obtain. They only concern our conceptual framework: They are established by the concepts we use to refer to them. Take, e.g., our concept forming a queue. Although we do not have a definition of it, we can easily (though contestably) conceptualise what Thomasson calls its application and co-application conditions (i.e., its existence and identity conditions). By using this concept, which is part of the reason they share to act together (i.e., their social reason), customers perform the corresponding collective intentional actions, which are intended to satisfy the application and co-application conditions of the social practice concept. Thus, their collectively intentionally performing these actions is an instance of a social practice, namely, the social practice of forming a queue.

When asking whether social practices exist, ESO suggests, instead of considering a robust criterion, we should take the easy route: Let us apply our social practice concepts (which requires conceptual competence) and see whether their corresponding conditions are satisfied (which requires empirical investigation), if they are, then we have that there are social practices, i.e., collective intentional actions performed for a social reason.

William Tuckwell

What is an Ally?

For all the recent talk of people failing or succeeding as allies to marginalized groups, a well worked out philosophical theory of what it is for someone to be an ally is conspicuously absent. This makes it difficult to evaluate the claims of people failing or succeeding as allies, and consequently diminishes the concept's usefulness to marginalized groups by making it difficult to identify who will genuinely help to further their interests. We aim to rectify this absence by proposing a property cluster theory according to which a person isn't an ally if they fail to instantiate any of the properties, and is a better or worse ally depending on how many of the properties they instantiate. The five properties of an ally that we defend are (1) appropriate deference to the allied-with group; (2) motivation by a sincere desire to further the interests of the allied group (rather than, e.g., to enhance social status); (3) the taking on of costs to further the interests of the allied-with group; (4) the taking of actions that further the interests of the allied-with group, with the authorization or permission of the group, and; (5) recognition as an ally by the group that they seek to be allied with.

Edwin Etieyibo

The Social Conditions of Seniority and Elderhood in an African Place

Philosophically, the concepts of seniority and elderhood or eldership seem largely underexplored, notwithstanding the fact that they do play an important role in society. This is particularly the case in the social life of many African, Asian and Native American societies. Both concepts hierarchize social relationships and one is generally accorded status (and to an extent moral value) on the basis of such hierarchy. One consequence of such hierarchy and status conferring is that the measure of respect that is displayed by one or expected to be manifested by an individual is determined by one's position in the hierarchy. An individual, south or down of the hierarchize social relationship is expected to demonstrate and display more respect for one that is north or up of the hierarchy. Although such respect is asymmetrical, it is well grounded on certain social conditions.

In this talk, I engage with these conditions. I discuss some implications of the practice of the concepts of seniority and elderhood in African societies to issues of gender and gender relations. I argue that although biological age play a role as to who counts as a senior and elder, social conditions largely determine who gets accorded, in society, the status of seniority and eldership. In conclusion, I gesture towards the view that the concepts of seniority and eldership could be taken as normative and that this along with the role that society play in defining and realizing the concepts of seniority and elderhood provide some African societies a useful resource in stabilizing behaviour (moral and social) and society at large.

Emanuele Martinelli

On Whether we Own What We Think

While few argue against the moral and juridical institution of private property altogether, a much more discussed issue is that regarding intellectual property. A notable number of jurists, economists and philosophers, who would defend with no problem the right for individual to own concrete objects in the world exclusively, have nonetheless given little to no justification to legal devices such as copyright norms and patents. This paper will show how the question about intellectual property depends on the view one is willing to embrace about the nature of property and original appropriation.

Among the advocates of private property, Locke's theory of original appropriation is held as the standard view. After brief exposition of this view and its possible flaws, we will employ Reinach's insightful terminology for the nature of property to move on to a more Aristotelian-friendly position. In the second part of this work, by examining arguments for and against intellectual property, we will make clear how the standard view hardly offers good reasons to endorse copyright and patents, whereas the proposed alternative does.

We hold that every individual is entitled to the product of his own mind as much as he is entitled to tangible property. Intellectual property and regular property show little differences in their foundations, though law-design is obviously more complex in the former case. However, what is interesting is that copyright law and patents can probably be justified only by embracing a non-standard view on original appropriation. "The inadequacies of the traditional justifications for property become more severe when applied to intellectual property" – the correct reaction apparently is to reconsider one's position on the nature of property, rather than sacrificing the intuitive right a person has to his ideas and inventions.

Jinyu Sun

Political Obligation and Citizens' Complicity in Non-Democratic States

When more than one people participates in a wrongdoing, the question of complicity may arise. The notion of complicity is also widely used beyond the area of law. In this paper, I argue that as long as citizens know that their obedience and tax payment contribute to the maintenance of the non-democratic order, they are complicit in the state; and citizens intending the non-democratic order to be maintained are co-principals. This does not mean citizens are necessarily blameworthy for their complicity in the state, but the fact of complicity has important implications for their political obligation to resist injustice.

My analysis is based on Christopher Kutz's account of complicity. I refine his account by distinguishing different types of participatory intention. Drawing on some empirical research on citizens' political attitudes and behaviours, I demonstrate the different ways in which non-democratic citizens can be complicit in maintaining the political order. According to their mental states, there are roughly three types of complicitous citizens in non-democratic states: citizens as co-principals, indifferent citizens and dissenting citizens.

While this typology offers some insights for citizens' moral responsibility, my focus is their forward-looking political obligation. Some theorists take complicity as a basis for the distribution of a collective responsibility for state wrongdoings, and thus argue that citizens may have a responsibility to reform state institutions if that is needed to correct the wrongdoing. Some theorists ground the duty to resist injustice on the natural duty of justice. The former group of theorists necessarily need to exempt some citizens from this burden due to their sincere objection to the state unjust laws. The latter group, on the other hand, do not differentiate between citizens who play different roles and have different political attitudes. I argue that they neglect that the duty to reform institutions or resist injustice is citizen's political obligation. This forward-looking obligation binds all citizens but also makes reference to what citizens have done in the past to put some citizens under a stronger burden of the obligation.

Onni Hirvonen

Struggles for the value of work: on the ontology of property

In the contemporary thinking there are two prevalent intuitions about property and its acquisition. The first spells out the assumed link between labor and property. According to this idea, property is acquired through working (Locke) or exerting one's will (Hegel) upon external nature. However, this "labor theory of property" allegedly misses the social elements of the constitution of property. These are the focal point of the second commonly shared intuition, which states that mere work is not enough. For something to be considered as property, it also needs to be collectively accepted (Searle) or publicly recognized (Hegel) as such.

This paper argues that combining these two commonly shared intuitions of the nature of property – labor theory of property and social constitution of property – yields interesting result for the critical analysis of property. Namely, that property is necessarily political, even if we would accept the core of labor theory of property.

The argument is that in the context of highly specialized division of labor and complex work-tasks, almost all labor is in one way or another dependent on the actions of others. Instead of singular craftspersons toiling on their own, production is done jointly. This opens up the question of the recognized value of the contributions that are made in order to complete the product and the suitable share of property or compensation given for workers for their exertions. Further, the system of production (or system of needs) is such that individuals cannot directly ensure their own life through their own labor but rather are dependent on shared fulfilment of various tasks. This stresses that various contributions ought to be such that they guarantee enough property for sustaining a liveable life.

The main claim here is that work, property rights, and public recognition of contributions are interwoven in a way that makes property essentially political. Within this "critical social ontology" of property it does not make sense to discuss property without a reference to working-practices and

recognition within them. This has the consequence that struggles for fair work and decent wage are connected to the struggle for getting one's property rights recognized within a complex system of division of labor. Or, conversely, struggles for property rights can be used to motivate arguments for fair work and workplace democracy.

Matteo Bianchin:

Explaining Ideology: Mechanisms and Metaphysics

Ideology has been recently reclaimed within social ontology as a crucial tool to account for the fact that people accept and enact unjust social practices. On the relevant pejorative reading, however, ideology possesses a number of puzzling features – it looks both true and false, plays both a legitimating and a constitutive (or even causal) role with respect to unjust practices, involves both cognitive and non-cognitive components, possesses both a descriptive and a normative content. This adds to traditional concerns about the interlocked explanatory and normative demands placed on the theory of ideology, the unrealistically pervasive irrationality it allegedly credits to agents, the vantage point from which ideology is detected. Ideology is commonly defined along functional, epistemic, and genetic dimensions. Unless it is specified how they connect and the relevant mechanisms are located to account for how ideologies originate, reproduce, possibly collapse, talks of ideology may look redundant with respect to alternative accounts of the same facts in ordinary terms of strategic interaction.

I trade on the distinction between constitutive and causal relations to frame the account of ideology along the line of Epstein's distinction between anchoring and grounding relations. I locate ideologies at the level of anchoring mechanisms and endorse an etiological reading of functional explanations, drawing on recent work on the epistemology of delusion, Hacking's looping effects, and structural causal explanations to specify the mechanisms linking the functional, epistemic, and genetic features of ideology. On this account, ideology performs the function of undergirding social practices by providing putative reasons to accept the framework principles that set the grounding conditions for the relevant social facts; it results when ordinary cognitive mechanisms responsible for common irrationalities are triggered under structural causal conditions shaped by the practices it undergirds; it turns embedded into these practices by looping effects that make it enacted by habits and embodied by artifacts to the effect of both making it true to the relevant social facts and reinforcing the structural conditions under which the relevant mechanisms trigger. The epistemology of delusions here connects the function of ideology with its epistemic flaws and structural etiology without crediting agents with unrealistically flawed cognitive capacities, while looping effects are given a specific explanatory role as feed-back mechanisms within a functional account, which allows distinguishing between the (putative) legitimating function ideology performs at the anchoring level and the constitutive role it plays at the grounding level.

Focusing on mechanisms and metaphysics finally allows addressing the interlocking of normative and explanatory demands placed on the theory of ideology. Ideologies can perform a social function by virtue of their purported normative content because practices are imbued with normative motives, yet their flawed origins make them unsuited to anchor stable cooperation schemes. Thus, explaining ideology relate to normative questions because it hints to counterfactual conditions under which cooperation would stabilize as those of a practice whose principles are accepted without coercion. In this sense, explaining ideology entails a normative theory of justice designed to articulate such principles as part of a theory of cooperation.

Leonie Smith

The UK Media: Collective and Individual Responsibilities for Poverty Abuse

“[...] I have spoken with people who depend on food banks and charities for their next meal, who are sleeping on friends' couches because they are homeless and don't have a safe place for their children to sleep [...] children who are growing up in poverty unsure of their future [...] and people with disabilities who are being told they need to go back to work or lose benefits, against their doctor's orders”

[Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights,

'Statement on Visit to the United Kingdom', 16/11/2018]

“Anti-austerity rant of UN envoy who compares 'mean' Britain to communist China is another demolition job on the UK... funded with our own cash!”

[Daily Mail headline re Alston's statement, 17/11/2018]

In 2016 the UN committee for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights found the UK to be in breach of this covenant in multiple ways, generating long-term, harmful poverty and rights abuses against the UK's most vulnerable (including children). Specifically, the authors drew attention to the role of UK austerity policies from 2010-2016 in facilitating and sustaining those breaches. In November 2018 Phillip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, undertook a further detailed investigation, finding that far from the 2016 report spurring action to address rights abuses, the situation for the UK's most vulnerable had arguably only worsened. Notably, during this time the austerity measures giving rise to this widespread poverty abuse had no discernible positive impact on the UK economy [Agostini et al, 2014]. They were, nevertheless, well-supported by the general UK population [YouGov,2013; BSA33, 2017] and by the popular British press [Baumberg et al, 2012].

Whilst most defenders of human rights would agree that a free press plays a key role in protecting human rights, in this paper I re-examine the harmful acts of the UK media. I argue that the human rights violations identified by the UN above are in fact in large part attributable to the UK media abusing their press freedom. As such, we may have good pro tanto reasons for believing that the media ought to be held legally accountable for their role in these rights abuses.

However, the mechanism by which these human rights abuses takes place operates at the level of the collective of 'the media'. As such, to make the further claim that individual media outlets and owners ought to be subject to the risk of criminal proceedings and judicial intervention in editorial policy we need, I suggest, to understand the contributory and constitutive relationship of individual media outlets to overall structural rights violations. I therefore analyse the theoretical underpinnings of collective and individual (at the level of individual media outlets) responsibility for perpetuating, atoning for and remedying these rights abuses and propose that this analysis ought to change our understanding of the kinds of state and legal action which individual UK media outlets ought to be subject to, with regard to their reporting of vulnerable social groups.

Jaana Virta

The Ontology of Gender

In my presentation, I study the metaphysics of genders by drawing distinctions corresponding to ontologically distinct aspects of gender. In philosophy and everyday life gender is often talked about without an explanation of what is the “gender” that is under scrutiny. It often leads to misunderstanding and unfruitful conversations, because participants take “real” meaning of gender to be different things, for example sex or gender identity, and this talking at cross-purposes might block the conversation. My aim is to bring out that gender is not a single entity even at the ontological level, but rather phenomena with multiple aspects; and to give tools for studying existing views and metaphysical claims about gender. The goal is to make the confusing enough phenomena of gender easier to approach.

My main argument is that gender is a cluster of ontologically distinct, even though usually at least causally interconnecting, parts. The starting point is a conceptual division between

- 1) gender as a feature of an individual person (or other singular entity),
- 2) gender as a feature of a group of people, and
- 3) representations of gender(s),

that divide into ontologically distinct subcategories. The first, gender as a feature of individual person (or other singular entity), I divide into:

- a) gender identity: a person’s own mental representation of their gender and what it is like,
- b) performative gender: a process constituted by a person’s gendered action and the gendered way others treat the person,
- c) legal gender: a legal entity, and
- d) sex: bodily features linked to gender.

These are not the only metaphysically distinct aspects of gender that an individual has, but they are what I am concentrating in.

Gender as a feature of a group of people I divide into aspects I call

- a) structural gender: societal aspect of gender constituted in the structural gendered processes of a given society, and
- b) statistical gender: facts that have to do with different genders in a given society.

The third main distinction, representations of gender, I divide into

- a) representations of gender in different fields of science,
- b) representations of gender an individual has (excluding gender identity)
- c) representations of gender in different institutions (like religions and schools), and
- d) representations of gender in fiction and arts

which all have implicit and explicit aspects to them. It is important to recognize that to claim e.g. that two things are ontologically distinct is not to argue that those two things are not related. On the contrary, that two things are ontologically distinct opens the possibility of studying their relations.

As an example, Sally Haslanger's definitions of man and woman are about structural gender. Elsewhere I have argued (2018) that Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity concentrates on performative gender and structural gender contrasted with hegemonic representation of gender. Many social science inquiries study a specific aspect of statistical gender, e.g. the pay gap between men and women. Others study the structural processes that lead for example to this pay gap, i.e. structural gender.

Anna Moltchanova

Shared intentionality and power differentials

Many accounts of joint action conceive of its participants as jointly committed to a shared goal. These accounts have difficulty explaining the functioning of institutions that are realized in participants who are mostly or completely alienated from the institutions themselves.

As an example of the difficulties these accounts face, I discuss Michael Bratman's attempts to explain group actions in non-ideal environments. He defends that there is no interruption to group agent functioning as long as the intentions of citizens and officials alienated from the rules of group functioning can be "suitably explained by reasons induced by relevant we-intentions of others" (Bratman, Michael E. 2017. Review of Kirk Ludwig, *From Plural to Institutional Agency*. <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/from-plural-to-institutional-agency-collective-action-ii/>). However, in most oppressive or non-democratic structures, not only are the rules people follow not promulgated, but also most people (including the officials who oppress others) act out of self-interest or fear without any identification with or endorsement of the society's norms at large. Bratman's solution doesn't help to model such groups, because we-intentions directly or indirectly relevant to the performance of status roles that engender group functioning are nowhere to be found.

Bratman may say that although there is no cooperative action, we are faced with a shared intentional action. He suggests that oppressors can not only make sure that they shape specific interactions of the oppressed, but also aim at getting the oppressed to intend the joint activity. In an example of bridge building by a team of war prisoners, he suggests that subplans of the oppressed may mesh with the subplans of the oppressor and "their joint activity of building the bridge [would proceed] by the way of each of their intentions in favor of their building it" (Bratman, Michael E. 2014. *Shared Agency*. OUP: 102).

However, a prisoner's intentions to perform the actions constitutive of the bridge building do not necessarily amount to the intention to build the bridge. The prisoners may intend to perform the actions because that allows them to survive. Their actions are incidentally constitutive of the group action intended by the oppressor without the prisoners' intending the action or its outcome. That the prisoners know that the bridge will be built doesn't constitute the intention to bring this outcome about. Thus, there wouldn't exist a form of shared end-tracking coordination and mutual responsiveness that constitutes the shared intentional action Bratman has in mind.

Bratman may agree that shared intentionality is blocked, but claim he only provides sufficient conditions for shared intentionality (personal communication). This simply acknowledges that Bratman's approach cannot conceptualize how non-egalitarian, non-democratic, and oppressive

group agents act in a relatively systematic way. This leaves untheorized the crucial aspects of the social world related to power differentials.

I briefly outline how to overcome these kinds of limitations. Focusing on individual phenomenology in group actions helps us to capture how power plays a role in structuring individual intentions and, combined with interpretationism, provides an account of group actions in non-democratic environments.

Falk Hamann

Cooperation, Community, and Institution

There are mainly two approaches to the phenomenon of community in social ontology today. The first one attempts to account for community in terms of cooperation and collective action. By elucidating the nature of collective action, it is argued, we also come to understand more complex forms of collectivity such as communities (see M. Gilbert, *On Social Facts*, 1989). The second approach, by contrast, conceives of community as an institutional fact, that is, a status collectively assigned to a set of people in virtue of which they form a social whole (see J. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, 1997). In my presentation, I argue that both these approaches fail in the end. The first approach is unable to accommodate the permanence and stability of communities that distinguish them from single instances of cooperation. The second approach, on the other hand, leaves no room for pre-institutional forms of community that are not constituted by any declarative speech act. What is missing in contemporary social ontology is thus an independent account of communities that also sheds light on the relation between community on the one hand and cooperation and institutions on the other.

I show that such an account can already be found in the works of Thomas Aquinas, in particular, in his *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* and in *De Regno*. Aquinas subscribes to the Aristotelian thesis that every community is grounded in some form of love or friendship—either among its members or at least in its principal part, for example, the relation between a ruler and those ruled. This account provides a clear understanding of the relations between community, cooperation, and institutions (though Aquinas does not use the latter term): First, since friendship as the principle of community has a natural tendency towards living together, cooperation and joint action are essential features of communal life. The cooperation of community members is oriented towards a common good at which their community aims. Secondly, according to Aquinas, some kinds of community require a formal structure of codified rules in order to permanently preserve their form of living together and secure the attainment of their respective common good. In such a case, we may speak of an institutionalized form of community. The essence of institutions, then, would be the actual codification of rules (in contrast to mere codifiability, which Searle thinks is enough). Aquinas's philosophy thus provides conceptual resources that we can use to make a fruitful contribution to the ongoing debate in social ontology.

Hein Duijf

Coordination, Fairness, and Cooperation

This paper examines two strands of literature regarding economic models of cooperation. First, preference transformation theories consider the idea that people care about fairness, rather than

being purely selfish (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002, – to state a few key contributions). Second, team reasoning theorists consider the idea that people might reason from the perspective of the team, rather than from an individualistic perspective (Sugden, 1993; Bacharach, 2006). The former challenges the egoistic assumption in traditional economic models, the latter challenges the individualistic assumption. Moreover, each of these theories gains empirical supports.

Can these economic models be unified? A unification would help provide a rigorous model that supports both the experimental findings regarding fairness and those regarding coordination problems. However, team reasoning theorists have argued that the action recommendations yielded by team reasoning cannot be explained by any preference transformation theory. I call this the incompatibility claim. I argue against this consensus and show that team reasoning can be viewed as a kind of preference transformation theory. To be more precise, there is a preference transformation theory that yields the same behavioural predictions and action recommendations. I call this preference transformation the theory of participatory motivations, because it indicates that people care about the group actions they participate in.

Additionally, team reasoning – and, by extension, participatory motivations – can be compared to and contrasted with existing preference transformation theories. To illustrate this prospect, two well-known models from the preference transformation literature will be investigated. The resulting insights yield a general impossibility result: a large class of preference transformation theories recommends actions that team reasoning rules out. In other words, none of these preference transformation theories can explain the action recommendations that are yielded by team reasoning. Hence, if preference transformation theories wish to explain the experimental finding of coordination games in analogy with team reasoning, then a rather unorthodox motivation function is required.

Krzysztof Poslajko

Group minds and metaphysics of beliefs

Several philosophers (including List & Pettit, Tollefsen, Epstein Hindriks and several others) claim that we can truly attribute beliefs to group agents (including large and institutional groups such as corporations etc.), and that such group beliefs cannot be effectively reduced to beliefs and intentions of group members. In my talk I want to present a challenge to the claim that we can literally ascribe beliefs to group agents, based on contemporary developments in metaphysics of beliefs. The argument will have a form of a dilemma: I will argue that a proponent of group beliefs must choose between a “superficial” and representationalist conception of belief, and that both options lead to problematic consequences.

According to the view I call “superficial”, a belief is a state which attribution does not commit us to any hypotheses about the internal cognitive structure of the belief-holder: a subject must only meet some superficial criteria in order to be attributed a belief (Schwitzgebel’s neo-behaviorism and Dennett’s interpretativism are prime examples of such approach; also the “coarse-grained”, to use Block’s term, versions of functionalism might be classified under this heading). On the opposite, representationalist view (classically attributed to Fodor and more recently defended by Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum) to attribute a belief is to make a hypothesis about an internal causally effective representational state of the subject (this is, in Block’s term, a “fine-grained” version of functionalism).

If the proponent of group belief claim endorses the “superficial” then the claim that groups can be subject of beliefs becomes true, but on pain of being of little theoretical value. A well-known consequence of the superficial account is that this position is extremely liberal with regard to attributing a status of a believer: on this take we might count thermostats and “great brain of China” (and so on) as true believers. Moreover, such superficially understood beliefs can be thought not to be genuine (i.e. causal) explanations of intentional action.

On the other hand, if the proponent of group belief endorses representationalism, then there is a strong reason to disbelieve the group belief claim. This is because on the representationalist view the status of a believer is reserved for those things which have a relevant deep cognitive structure and realize relevant psychofunctional laws, connecting different types of mental events (i.e. connecting beliefs to memory, emotions or consciousness). However, it seems hardly probable that groups would be truly described as having internal structure and that they would realize relevant psychofunctional laws.

In order to solve this dilemma, the theorists of group belief would either have to show that ascribing superficially understood beliefs to groups is genuinely explanatory or that, appearances to the contrary, groups meet the fine-grained psychofunctional criteria of belief. Although this is not impossible in principle, these are substantial theoretical debts and this fact puts pressure on the group belief theory.

Heidi Peltier

The Ontology of Common Goods: A taxonomy of public, social, and collective goods

How is the good of a collective related to the goods of the persons constituting it? Are there types of goods that are social in important senses, meaning that the good of the whole is more than the good of its parts? Are there some goods that must be produced, or consumed, socially? It turns out—or so this paper argues—that there are various types of group goods that differ ontologically. Starting with what are called “public goods” in economics, we then distinguish several other types of private, shared, and shareable goods. Ultimately, we would like to know how these various types of good relate to the concept of “the common good,” and how that might inform collective decisions regarding provision of these goods.

Goods can be used or consumed either individually or socially, and can be produced or provided publicly or privately. Pure public goods are non-rival and non-excludable: If they are provided for some, they are necessarily provided for all. There is thus a justification for public provision of these goods since private producers will provide less than a socially optimal amount.

When goods have the property of excludability, they can be provided by private producers. Yet, some of these goods may have social benefits, including positive externalities that can be quantified as well as unquantifiable benefits such as social cohesion. Where private goods do not have externalities or do not significantly contribute to the common good, there is little rationale for their public provision. But goods that do contribute to the common good may warrant collective provision, either through the state or through other non-market entities such as charities or religious institutions.

This paper will not attempt to determine the institutional provision of goods that contribute to the common good. However, in order for groups to make collective decisions about institutional provision, it is useful and perhaps even necessary to understand the types of goods that can

contribute to the common good. Some of these “collective goods” or “social goods” must be consumed or used individually, others must be used collectively, and yet others are used individually but their good is compounded by social use.

One further distinction is the aspect of resource constraints. While some common goods are most beneficial when consumed by all, they may nonetheless be subject to cost or other resource constraints. Yet other common goods are unconstrained by resources.

This paper offers a taxonomy of goods, paying particular attention to the goods that are either consumed collectively or offer collective benefits and thus require collective decision-making as to their provision, where the collective decision involves (1) whether to provide the good, (2) how much of it to provide, and (3) to whom to provide it.

Steven Norris

A Comprehensive Account of Promising

Non-standard cases of promising include cases of immoral promises and promises to the self. These non-standard cases are typically ignored in the predominant literature on promising, and by some even deemed impossible. In this paper I develop an account of promising that explains how non-standard cases of promising are possible. My account arises out of an application of a framework put forth by Brian Epstein in “A Framework for Social Ontology” (2016). I argue that promises constitutively depend on the existence of a social practice of promising, and therefore any fact about a promise is a social fact. Social facts are here understood as states of affairs involving social phenomena. Epstein’s framework provides a means of explaining why social facts obtain. Using Epstein’s framework I develop a general grounding fact for promises that explains what makes it the case that a promise has been made. I illustrate my account based on this general grounding fact by showing how the plausible, yet non-standard case of a promise to the self is possible. I conclude with a discussion of two purported counterexamples to the account I develop.

Kristina Rolin

The Social Construction of Diversity

While gender and race are properties of individuals, diversity is a property of social groups. If categories such as genders and races are socially constructed, it seems reasonable to suggest that diversity with respect to gender or race is socially constructed. But what exactly does it mean to say that diversity is socially constructed? The aim of my paper is to answer this question.

I argue that the social construction of diversity involves judgments concerning two features of social groups. One judgment concerns the properties that are relevant for assessing whether the group is diverse. Are we focusing on diversity with respect to gender (woman, man, transgender)? Are we focusing on diversity with respect ethnicity - and if we are, what are the relevant categories of ethnicity in a context C? Or are we focusing on several properties (e.g., gender, ethnicity, and religious affiliation)? Another judgment concerns the distribution of the relevant categories in the group. Does maximizing diversity mean that we aim for an equal distribution of the relevant categories? Does it mean that we aim for a representative distribution of the relevant categories,

that is, a distribution that is similar to the distribution of the categories in the reference population? Or does it mean something else (see also Steel et al. 2018)?

Choosing an appropriate conception of diversity is a delicate task requiring careful attention on cultural, social, and political context as well as on the question of why diversity is of interest. This leads me to the main thesis of my paper: In order to understand how diversity is socially constructed, we need the concept of second-order social construction. Second-order social construction builds on first-order social construction in that it involves endorsing a particular way of socially constructing human kinds with the aim of achieving a goal G. I will use Ásta K. Sveinsdóttir's (2013, 2018) conferralist account of the social construction of human kinds to explain what I mean by first-order social construction. One of the main elements in second-order social construction is the goal G that gives a justification for endorsing a particular first-order social construction in a context C.

I argue that there is a justification for endorsing a first-order social construction when diversity is an integral element of social justice or it has instrumental value. The social justice case for diversity appeals to egalitarian social values and explains why social groups, organizations or institutions should be more inclusive of historically underrepresented, marginal or excluded people. The instrumental case for diversity comes in two kinds, one emphasizing the economic benefits of diversity and another its epistemic benefits.

Finally, I argue that second-order social construction challenges the view that social constructivists' main interest lies in the "debunking" project (Haslanger 2012). The debunking project aims to reveal that a category that is widely believed to be a natural one is in fact a social one. It is a political project because by revealing that categories are socially constructed, it urges us to inquire about the moral-political justification of maintaining social constructions. I argue that social constructivist arguments can serve another political project: the valorization of diversity.

Lee Wilson

Voluntary Servitude and the Explanatory Problem of False Consciousness

Actions ranging from discriminating against women in the sciences to police violence against compliant and law-abiding people of colour, are performed not only by members of oppressing social groups, but also sometimes by members of oppressed groups. The latter are systematically conferred with ranges of unjust constraints that are salient for decision-making, according to which they participate in everyday practices that take either institutional or communal forms. But it seems they are not only constrained in ranges of actions available to them but also in the reasons for such actions, many of which are constituted by false beliefs (e.g. female scientists are less competent and unproductive; or Black Americans committing crime out of character while White Americans do so out of circumstance).

Responding to this apparent 'voluntary servitude', social philosophers often see false consciousness as explanatory: a set of values and attitudes that resist revision in face of counter-evidence, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating individuals to perpetuate, structures of oppression. But false consciousness is also often denigrated as explanatorily bankrupt, lacking an adequate philosophical account for an all-too-convenient appeal; as imposing epistemically inaccessible or outright foreign moral standards; or, as implicitly supporting, if not amounting to, victim-blaming. These concerns must be addressed if the concept of false consciousness is to

perform its supposed explanatory and critical work. Each problem builds on the previous: understanding how agents have pernicious beliefs formed and maintained is crucial to understanding their epistemic and moral standings, and this subsequently is crucial for understanding how moral agency is affected.

Here, I focus on the explanatory problem, concerning doxastic attitudes constituting motivating reasons for oppressed individuals to act in ways that contribute to their own oppression. A satisfactory solution for this problem must explain:

- (i) how such oppressed individuals themselves come to form and maintain certain beliefs as normative;
- (ii) how the beliefs themselves are formed and maintained in the structures within which such individuals are embedded; and
- (iii) how similarly oppressed individuals may nevertheless resist the formation or maintenance of such beliefs.

I argue that a social constructionist explanation satisfies all three: false consciousness' development and persistence is largely explained by the stable (though socio-historical) nature of the relevant objects of those attitudes. Members of oppressed social groups mistake a certain socially objectified understanding of themselves as natural self-understanding, due to the looping effect and historical stabilisation of pre-existing structures of oppression. That an individual may have multiplicities of group memberships, acquiring varying modes and complexes of self-understandings, accounts for the possibility of resistance.

In doing so, I will also find three previous approaches to the explanatory problem lacking: functionalism, psychologism, and epistemic oppression, arguing that they do not adequately resolve the explanatory problem, failing to satisfy all three conditions. Still, I hope to show that the social constructionist approach not only provides the best solution for the explanatory problem but also a more comprehensive and robust framework for the other existing approaches.

Molly McGrath

The Syntax of Corrupt Action

This paper articulates the structure of corrupt action within an institution. Talk about corruption has been on the uptick for a couple of decades, as has empirical research about it—especially in the social sciences and legal journals. The definition of corruption often remains somewhat vague in such discussions, however. Often corruption will be defined as misuse of power or misuse of power for private gain or misuse of power that violates a policy. While such definitions are often adequate for empirical purposes, this paper argues that these definitions are too imprecise and that social ontology can help articulate the definition of corruption by rooting it in an understanding of institutional roles and duties.

This paper uses a broadly Searlean account of an institutional role as constituted by rights and duties conferred by a status. The paper shows the inadequacy of several definitions of corruption and then argues that a corrupt action has the following structure. Assuming the institutional context in which

Person S qua holding role R with institutional ends E has a duty to perform task(s) D, and possesses institutional prerogatives P in order to perform task(s) D or perform them well, a corrupt action has the following structure:

In corrupt action C, person S exercises some prerogative of his role R in order to pursue some other purpose(s) instead of exercising the prerogative in fulfillment of role R's duties D to institutional end E.

The agent of the corrupt action may yet fulfill his duties through other actions, he may not act for private gain, and he may not violate any established policies of his institution. Nevertheless, in some exercise of an institutional power, the agent uses that power for ulterior purposes.

Using this structure helps us analyze also several subtypes of corruption, such as bribery, conflict of interest, and nepotism. It further helps us understand many accusations about or complaints about corruption in which the institutional agent (whether an individual or a group, like a legislative body) does not seem to be abusing power for private gain or violating any institutional rules. Rather, the person (or group of persons) uses a power attaching to the institutional status for purposes other than those for which the institution has established such powers.

Finally, this analysis clarifies why much corruption talk is controversial. The proper ends of an institutional role are often a matter of political dispute even within a well-functioning institution. Thus, what constitutes corrupt use of such a role will, to that extent, also be disputed.

Saba Bazargan-Forward

Shared Action as a Division of Agential Labor

We share action when we coordinate and combine our actions in furtherance of doing something together, e.g., walking together or painting a house together. Here, I analyze this phenomenon in a novel way: shared action is best characterized in terms of an interpersonal division of agential labor.

Normally, my intentional conduct has the function of enacting the practical reasons I take there to be; concomitantly, the practical reasons I take there to be have the function of normatively guiding my conduct. However, it is possible for me to attribute to you the role of enacting those practical reasons; should you accept that role, I thereby change the object at which my practical reasoning is directed. Its object is no longer my conduct, but yours. So, the practical reasons I take there to be have the function of guiding your conduct, and your conduct has the function of enacting the practical reasons I take there to be. In this sense that we establish a division of agential labor, in that I count as the 'decider', and you count as the 'doer'.

I argue that we establish this division of agential labor when you grant me, and I accept, authority over you pertaining to some act ϕ , where that authority yields for you (what Joseph Raz calls) a protected reason to do ϕ . This is comprised of a first-order reason to do ϕ and a second-order reason to exclude certain competing considerations in deliberating about ϕ . In virtue of the reason's protected status, the practical reasons I take there to be has the function of guiding your conduct, and your conduct has the function of enacting those practical reasons. Hence, I count as the 'decider', and you count as the 'doer'.

Typically, by agreeing to participate in a shared action, each participant has putative authority over every other participant that they 'do their part', whatever that might be. I argue that this yields a protected reason for each participant to do their part. So, where you and I engaged in shared action, your conduct has the function of enacting the practical reasons I take there to be, and I have the function of enacting the practical reasons you take there to be. That is, by adopting particular practical reasons, each of us constitutively determines the purpose of the other's conduct, and each of us engages in conduct purposed by the other. In this way, each of us counts as both a 'decider' and a 'doer'. These dovetailing functions are what make shared action distinctive; it forms the basis for more organizationally complex instances of shared action. Analyzing shared action in terms of a division of agential labor allows us to capture key features of shared action obscured in Margaret Gilbert's and Michael Bratman's accounts – or so I argue. It also has moral implications, which I briefly explore.

Giulia Lasagni

Could distribution resist reduction? Some considerations on group action and the meaning(s) of 'sharing an intention'

The group agency thesis claims that some intentional actions are group actions with the group being the subject of mental states. Yet, mental states require a mind and groups do not have a mind in any ordinary sense. Because of this truism, current discussions in social ontology have approached the controversial case of group agency trying to explain this social phenomenon by ascribing attitudes to group members as opposed to social groups per se. Thus, some groups have been considered extrinsically intentional systems, capable of performing an action without being the original source of intentionality (Tuomela 2013). This position comes with a form of reduction concerning the subject of intentionality (and agency), because it assumes that the attitudes governing the group action are shared intentions, i.e. attitudes in the mind of each participant that are somehow connected with those of the others.

Considering this, in my talk I discuss three ways in which the conception of shared intentions may support a distributive, not necessarily reductive, view on the subject of group agency. In particular, I would start from a classification recently proposed by Georg Theiner (2018), who distinguishes between three kinds of "sharing": sharing-with (having some trait in common), sharing-in (participating in cognitive activities), sharing-out (dividing labor). While the first two meanings entail a distributive model of sharedness, which reduces the subject of group-level intentional actions to the group members, the third pattern introduces a form of distribution that, in certain cases, may avoid reduction by allowing emergence. Emergence happens when the sharing-out type shows mechanisms in which all components provide complementary pieces of a single cognitive process.

I will argue that theories of group action in social ontology have focused especially on the first two meanings of Theiner's classification, offering a model that cannot (and does not presume to) resist the reduction of the intentional subject. I will illustrate the point with special reference to Margaret Gilbert's account (1989, 2018), which is generally taken to endorse a non-reductive subject-account of collective agency. My point is that the reduction of the subject could also apply to Gilbert's theory, which I find similar to the sharing-in pattern, open to sharing-with features, and yet still uncertain about the full-blown sharing-out model.

Jonas Faria Costa

Joint commitment supplements team reasoning

In this presentation, I will propose that the theory of joint commitment supplements the theory of team reasoning. I will deal with two problems in the theory of team reasoning and one in the theory of joint commitment: (I) The main gap in the theory of team reasoning is that it does not explain when a person should perform team reasoning. More specifically, any agent can think about how it would be if they perform team reasoning, but this does not mean they have the motivation to act accordingly. I will argue that joint commitment gives the motivation to perform your part in the team reasoning. Joint commitment satisfies the agency transformation required by team reasoning, i.e. the players see the group as the agent, their individual actions are part that group agent's action. (II) There is also a problem with the reason team-reasoners have for expecting others to cooperate. How does the person acquire such a belief? This can be tricky. Because if I have the assurance that you will play your part, then in a situation like a prisoner's dilemma, I can take advantage of that by not cooperating. This would mean that the assurance that there will be cooperation undermines the possibility of the cooperation. However I acquire such belief, it needs also to block such an undermining effect. The reason for me to cooperate needs to be the reason for you to cooperate. I believe you will cooperate because the reason for me to cooperate is the same reason for you to cooperate. Joint commitment can be such a special kind of reason. The joint commitment has a normative pressure on both of us to perform our parts. Another property of joint commitment is the divergence criterion, which is that even if a member has a divergent intention, this does not release him from the joint commitment. This divergence criterion can explain circumspect and restricted team reasoning, which are cases when a person performs team reasoning without the assurance that the others will cooperate or with the assurance that the other will not cooperate. If there is a joint commitment, then even if the other member does not cooperate, he is still part of the joint commitment, he is still part of the team. (III) The theory of joint commitment does not explain how members reason when they act together. Joint commitment gives the motivation to cooperate, it is a sufficient reason, but it says little about how the members will coordinate. For example, if something unexpected happens, something that was not considered when we formed the joint commitment, how should each of us react? If we need to have an agreement on all possible reactions when we form the joint commitment, then joint commitment is too demanding and inflexible. Team reasoning can fill this gap by explaining how the members work out what they have to do.

Grace Paterson

Group Promises and Apologies

Part of what makes large structured groups such as governments, corporations, and academic societies special is that they are not purely reducible to their members. In fact, their entire membership can change while they remain, in some sense, the same group. Because of this, such groups can have long lifespans—centuries, in some cases. And indeed, many such groups take advantage of their longevity by engaging in projects that extend over long periods of time, not infrequently crossing generation lines. A significant aspect of these long term projects often involves the making of various promises and commitments that pertain to the distant future, following up on such commitments made in the past, and even sometimes accepting credit or blame for past actions by apologizing.

The topic of this paper is speech acts such as promising and apologizing which involve the aforementioned cross-temporal commitments and judgements of responsibility. These cases raise a number of important questions pertaining to group responsibility, group identity, and diachronic group rationality. They also help shed light on the nature of these kinds of speech act more generally. I investigate, in particular, what allows us to say that a group today is responsible at a certain time for something done in the past. One possibility is that the actions taken by the group in the past make the present group responsible for certain things or accountable in a sense analogous to that in which actions taken by subordinates may make a superior responsible (the captain is responsible for the actions of her crew) or, alternately, the way in which a superior might make a subordinate responsible for some task or assignment by delegating it to them. This explanation is plausible in cases where the membership of a group has not dramatically changed and where the speech act at issue is a promise. However, I will argue that such an explanation is inadequate. This is first because they do not seem nearly as plausible with respect to apologies, and second because on this explanation a group is cross-temporally alienated from itself. That is, the relationship between the past group and the present group is modeled on the relationship between different individuals, not on the relationship between oneself today and oneself yesterday (unless one adopts an account of self-identity where time slices are, in this way, alienated from one another). I will suggest an alternative on which a group's actions help constitute its cross-temporal identity, an identity which can help ground attributions of responsibility.

Yair Levy

Collective Action and Reciprocal Control

How does collective action (e.g. walking together) differ from mere collective behaviour (walking alongside one another)? The standard approach seeks answers in the analysis of collective intentions, most commonly in terms of interlocking individual intentions and further doxastic constraints; collective action is then understood as collective behaviour caused (in the right way) by collective intention. I outline and defend an alternative account of collective action terms of reciprocal control, which does not appeal to collective intention.

In the larger paper from which this material is drawn, I first motivate my alternative approach by raising doubts about the standard alternative. Following others, I argue for the existence of unintentional collective actions, which the standard approach fails to accommodate. I also explain that, with its focus on collective intention, the standard approach risks marginalizing collective action. Here, however, for reasons of time, I aim to focus primarily on the constructive part of my argument.

This part builds on earlier work [references omitted to facilitate blind review], in which I argue that the standard "causalist" approach to individual action should be replaced with a more serviceable approach whereby intentional action is treated as the fundamental, unanalyzable building block in theorizing. Here, I extend that approach to collective action. Whereas, as I've argued elsewhere, individual acts are (roughly) those events an agent has the power to stop and continue performing intentionally, collective action exhibits reciprocal control that in one sense extends, and in a another sense detracts from one's intentional self-control. When *i* and *j* are V-ing together, each of them can stop the other's performance by stopping V-ing herself. And conversely, each of *i* and *j* can make the other continue V-ing by continuing to V herself. Put together, each of *i* and *j* have two-way powers over whether the collective deed is carried out.

In defending my account, I dispel an apparent tension between the two complementary powers of reciprocal control just noted. I also raise the possibility of a spectrum of collective acts, ranging from the fully cooperative and committed, which exhibit one's two-way power to the fullest degree; all the way down to halfheartedly joint acts, which exhibit only some partial degree thereof.

My account can be seen as steering a middle course between two prevalent approaches to collective action: On the one hand, fully reductive views such as Bratman's (2014), i.e. views that are reductive 'all the way down' in understanding collective action as collective behaviour caused (in the right way) by collective intention, and go on to reduce collective intention to a combination of individual mental states; and on the other hand, fully anti-reductive views such as Margaret Gilbert's (1996), which insist that collective action or agency is *sui generis*. In contrast to both, my approach is partially reductive: It explains collective action in terms of individual action, but resists any further reduction of the latter.

One central advantage of my account is that it covers not only intentional acts, but also unintentional ones. Furthermore, I suggest that my account can accommodate two types of collective acts that are typically left outside the scope of extant alternatives — viz., asymmetrically collective acts (i.e., acts over which one agent exerts more influence and control than the others), and actions performed jointly by more than two agents.

Valeria Martino

An ontology of online (social) groups

My talk aims at problematizing the notion of "group" within social ontology. My background is Italian context where little attention has been given to it. Or rather, it has attention within some specific fields, such as philosophy of action with questions about intentionality or responsibility, but I think it should have more. Following the basic ontological distinction made by the Italian philosopher Maurizio Ferraris in his work "Documentality. Why it is necessary to leave traces" (Ferraris 2012), we can distinguish between four kinds of objects: natural objects, artifacts, abstract objects, and social objects. Unlike others, social objects depends on us in that they wouldn't exist without human beings, but once they get into existence, they don't need us anymore: they have existence in space and time, they are not abstract, and they are not subjective. I think this kind of definition can be attached to social groups too. This allow us to understand them in a preeminently ontological perspective able to recognize the consistency of social groups and their position in the catalogue of what there is in the world. This is the premise I need in order to arrive at my specific purpose that is to understand where online groups stand within the list. I wonder if something has been changing in the Internet era, and if any what. Indeed, we can either understand Internet as a parallel online world or as a sphere to be counted with the others. In the first case, we have a virtual community parallel to the non-virtual one and Internet is like a strange mirror which reflects some specific features of the social world. In this way, we would need a kind of "ontology of the Internet" to study the virtual world. In the second case – in my opinion, the more promising one – Internet is a real part of our (social) world. As a consequence, we should include it and highlight its own features. Thus, Internet is part of the social context as groups existing thanks to it and they should be included in the list of yet existing (and admitted) groups. Indeed, in order to distinguish them we are used to talk about crowds, social groups (such as, for example, the plural subject by Margaret Gilbert or families, etc.), and corporations (word which means organizations, institutions, and every group which has an organizational system, written, recorded, and then recognizable as

such). On the Internet, there is a vast number of groups, such as forums, newsletters, blogs, social networks, and so on. But what is interesting to me is the fact that most of the interpretations has been given aimed at considering the virtual community in the effect it has on the real one. Instead, online communities are real and ask for a conceptualization which using philosophical and ontological tools, will be able to comprehend the wide phenomenon we are witnessing.

Rowan Mellor

Social Holism without Social Ontology

Philosophers of social science often contrast two theories about the explanation of social phenomena: 'Methodological Individualism' and 'Social Holism'. According to the former, "all social phenomena ... are in principle explicable only in terms of individuals - their properties, goals and beliefs" (Elster 1982, p. 453). According to the latter, social phenomena cannot be explained without reference to the social whole of which they are a part, "so that one must begin with the whole ... rather than with disconnected elements if one wants to describe those parts" (Descombes 2014, p. 157). Supporters of Methodological Individualism sometimes worry that Social Holism unjustifiably posits social entities beyond individual humans, mysterious "superhuman agents" (Watkins 1957, p. 106). Some theorists have responded to this charge by denying that such a postulate is unjustifiable (e.g. Epstein 2009; Petit and List 2011). In this talk, I will offer a different response: one can adopt Social Holism without thinking that the social world contains anything other than individual humans and their physical environment.

My argument will proceed as follows. First, I suggest that Methodological Individualism can be thought of as consisting of two claims:

- (1) All social phenomena are reducible to the actions of individual humans and their consequences;
- (2) Actions are to be explained by reference to the mental states (usually, beliefs and desires) of the relevant individuals.

Assuming (1) and (2), one can derive that all social phenomena are to be explained by reference to the beliefs and desires of individuals. Social Holists deny this claim. But in doing so, they need not deny the ontological claim asserted by (1); they might instead deny (2). I suggest that there are good grounds for doing just that. According to a popular view in contemporary philosophy of action, 'Factualism' or 'Externalism', we can explain an individual's actions purely by pointing out facts about their physical environment: for instance, one might explain my leaving the house by pointing out the fact that it was a sunny day (Alvarez 2010; Dancy 2000; Raz 2011; Scanlon 2014).

However this is not sufficient to establish Social Holism. In addition, we need the following: some of the facts which can be used to explain individuals' behavior are social in nature, and cannot be fully understood without considering their functional role in a given society. I suggest that social norms can be thought of in this way. We can, for example, explain why Kwakiutl chiefs stockpiled Hudson Bay blankets by pointing out the fact that, in Kwakiutl societies, a norm developed according to which such blankets demonstrated power (Boas 1966). But in order to explain the stability of this fact, one must understand the role the norm plays in other areas of Kwakiutl society: from the organization of marriages, to military power.

If all this is correct, then there is, I suggest, a version of Social Holism which does not depend on the contested ontological claim that there exists more in the social realm than individual humans.

Daniel Story

Interpersonal Moral Luck and Normative Entanglement

In this paper, I discuss moral luck as it is found in collective contexts involving shared responsibility. Moral luck occurs when an agent's moral status depends upon factors that are in some relevant sense outside of that agent's control, and shared responsibility occurs when an individual is morally responsible, in the sense of being praiseworthy or blameworthy, for what distinct individuals or groups do. I argue that when an agent is susceptible to shared responsibility, that agent is usually thereby susceptible to a special type of moral luck, called 'interpersonal moral luck'. Interpersonal moral luck characteristically occurs when the actions of other moral agents, qua morally evaluable actions, affect an agent's moral status in a way that is outside of that agent's capacity to control. I argue that many philosophers who write about shared responsibility are already committed to the possibility of interpersonal moral luck (and hence to the possibility of moral luck simpliciter). I then discuss some of the ways in which interpersonal moral luck is both similar to and different from more familiar types of moral luck.

Next, I argue that agents who are susceptible to interpersonal moral luck usually on that basis enjoy special claims against those agents who constitute the source of (or whose actions constitute the source of) that luck. This is the phenomenon of normative entanglement. When agent X is normatively entangled with agent Y, X is defeasibly entitled to demand that Y avoid damaging X's moral status by action or inaction. I suggest that this phenomenon underlies many of our intuitions about the norms that govern the interactions of individuals in group settings, norms which are often overlooked in the literature on joint action. For instance, normative entanglement can explain why agents are entitled to demand conscientiousness from their subordinates and superordinates and why participants in a joint action are sometimes specially entitled to demand that a joint action or an individual's contributory action not progress. I conclude with a discussion of some of the broader implications of normative entanglement for our thinking about the social world and our place in it.

Francesco Franda

A Well-Tempered Pluralism about Social Kinds

That social kinds play an important role, both theoretically and practically, is a platitude. Social kinds that group people such as prime minister, terrorist, waiter, and social kinds that group things such as border, money, work of art are used both in social sciences to give explanations as well as in everyday life to guide us through the social world. Although we are most familiar with social kinds, it is not obvious what their source is. The goal of this paper is precisely to answer the question "How are social kinds produced?"

Despite the diversity of answers that have been given to the question, I think we can group the views on the origin of social kinds into two families. Some views of social kinds are constructivist, as they take social kinds to be directly built out of our intentionality: this is the most popular kind of view in the social ontology of the last decades. Other views are emergentist, as they take social

kinds to arise not out of direct intentionality, but rather out of human interactions: this kind of view has a long history, dating back to at least the 19th century. I believe that there is some truth in both of these accounts. In the paper, I claim that some social kinds are constructed out of our intentionality, like for example legal categories, whereas other social kinds, like for example informal conventions, arise from a web of beliefs and practice. But these are only the two limit cases: most social kinds will be a mix of constructed and emergent kinds, like for example legal categories that acknowledge existing informal conventions.

The view I defend is therefore what I call a “well-tempered pluralism”. “Pluralism” because it holds that there are different ways in which we produce social kinds: limiting the ways in which we produce social kinds to only one does not do justice to the variety of ways in which we give rise to social kinds. “Well-tempered” because it is a pluralism with some order: I consider social kinds as on a spectrum with constructed social kinds on one extreme end, whereas on the other end of the spectrum there are emergent social kinds. Most social kinds will lie between the two extremes of the spectrum, having different “degrees” of construction or emergence.

Dee Payton

Defining Social Constructions

It is now commonplace to claim that properties like ‘being a woman’, ‘being black’, and ‘being gay’ are socially constructed. In this paper I characterize a view according to which properties like this are socially constructed just in case their real definitions make reference to social factors.

Generally speaking, the literature on social construction respects a distinction between socially constructed representations (e.g., ideas, concepts, predicates), and socially constructed entities (e.g., individuals, categories, events, properties). Further, it is commonplace to distinguish between representations and entities which are causally socially constructed, and those which are constitutively socially constructed. Here I follow Haslanger (2012) in understanding the latter as follows:

Constitutive Construction: Something is constitutively constructed iff in defining it we must make reference to social factors.

In a footnote following the introduction of this definition, Haslanger writes that she intends for the definition to apply directly to entities, not just to the terms or concepts which correspond to them. On one reading, this suggests that we can provide real definitions for constitutively constructed entities, definitions which make reference to social factors. This essay takes that reading seriously, and as such, endeavors to answer the following two questions: First, what might a view of social construction which incorporates a fully articulated account of real definition look like? And second, how well would a real definition approach to social construction fair with respect to the goals of projects in feminist metaphysics, and the literature on social construction more broadly?

With that said, in this paper I consider a view I call definitional construction, according to which a property F is socially constructed just in case the real definition of F makes reference to social factors.

Here, then, is the plan for the paper: After considering some problems faced by constitution views of social construction (§2), the following section will consist in a very general overview of the distinction between nominal definitions and real definitions: In a nutshell, nominal definitions are

generally taken to specify the meaning of a term, while real definitions are generally taken to specify the essence of the thing to which that term refers. Then in §4 I summarize the account of real definition recently articulated by Rosen (2015) and consider how it might be combined with Haslanger's notion of constitutive construction, to yield one among many possible full articulations of the view I'm calling definitional construction. Importantly, the notion of definitional construction that I present here is intended to be general enough to be combined with any account of real definition. I've just chosen to work with Rosen's account here because it is relatively straightforward, and I think it lends itself particularly well to the project of giving an analysis of social construction in terms of real definitions. In §5 I evaluate the proposed view in terms of the goals of projects in feminist metaphysics, and the literature on social construction more broadly. Finally, in §6 I consider three objections to definitional construction thus characterized.

Chloe Uffenheimer

How to be an eliminativist about social groups

In this paper, I advocate for a version of eliminativism about social groups. There has been much attention recently to the ontology of social groups, but virtually all theorists have opted for a version of realism or reductionism. For instance, some have attempted to reduce groups to sets, fusions, or instantiations of structures. Others have argued that social groups are constituted by but numerically distinct from sets or other entities.

Here I argue that eliminativism can accommodate desiderata independently set out by such theorists. These desiderata include constraints on the sorts of features groups have. For example, it has been claimed that a metaphysical theory of groups must allow that groups can survive changes in membership across times, and that many groups could have members other than those they actually do. A theory of groups should also accommodate the possibility of distinct groups with the same members, the possibility of groups with groups as members, and the possibility of collective action that does not reduce to individual action. I sketch an eliminativist approach that can accommodate the intuitions that drive these desiderata, or can satisfy conditions that are relevantly similar and equally plausible. Though it does not admit groups into its ontology, this eliminativist approach is able to provide for what is core to and plausible about each of these requirements. This approach emphasizes the possibility of joint satisfaction of conditions-- e.g., that of filling the Supreme Court role-- by individuals. After handling the theoretical constraints just mentioned, I consider some meta-theoretic desiderata such as parsimony and faithfulness to ordinary ways of talking. Since eliminativism can fare well with respect to all of the relevant desiderata, I shall conclude that we have reason-- by the competitors' own lights-- to count eliminativism (or at least some version of eliminativism) as a viable alternative to realist and reductionist treatments of groups.

Nurbay Irmak

Creation and Authorship

Abstract creationism (or creationism for short) is the view that there are abstract objects that come into existence at a particular time as a result of certain activities of human agents. Most common examples of created abstracta are artifacts such as musical works, novels, poems, words, computer programs, scientific theories, etc. Christy Mag Uidhir in his recent book *Art and Art-*

Attempts provides a compelling argument against creationism, or any view that identifies works of art with some abstracta (Mag Uidhir, 2013). Mag Uidhir's argument relies on one of the most central art-theoretic assumptions: artworks have authors. Authors, on his view, are directly responsible for the creation of artworks. For an artist x to be directly responsible for a work of art w just is for x to stand in a causal-intentional relation with w such that x 's intention directed activities are constitutive of w satisfying the conditions for being art, whatever those conditions may be. (Mag Uidhir, p. 135). Abstract objects, standardly taken as non-spatiotemporal entities, however, are not the kind of objects that can stand in such causal relations with artists. Therefore, abstract objects cannot be intentional products of artistic creation.

Mag Uidhir acknowledges that in response abstract creationists can appeal to some non-causal notion of creation where to create an abstract artifact is, simply put, to bring about the conditions (including entities, events, properties, etc.) on which the created object ontologically depend. Mag Uidhir insists that this alternative notion of creation doesn't correspond to any standard use of the notion, and thus it is stipulative. However, even if we adopt this non-standard notion of creation it fails to provide the kind of substantive responsibility artworks stand with their authors.

In this paper, I elaborate and defend a non-causal notion of creation where authors are directly responsible for their creations. I use a modal notion of ontological dependence that explains how abstract works of art depend for their existence upon concrete objects, events, and intentions of their authors, i.e. their dependence base. Creation of an abstract artifact on this view requires some agent's intentionally bringing about the conditions specified in its dependence base. I further argue that what guarantees substantive ascriptions of responsibility is not some causal relations between an author and her creation, but rather some specific metaphysical relation between the created object and its dependence base, such as ontological dependence, constitution, or composition. I further argue that this non-causal notion of creation, pace Mag Uidhir, does not require radical revisions in our linguistic discourse concerning the entities in question. Neither does it require embracing non-standard metaphysical views about the nature of artifacts, or creation. Non-causal creation is not some mysterious view that relies on magical metaphysical powers or obscure philosophical principles. I conclude that a properly developed account of non-causal creation not only avoids the kind of problems Mag Uidhir raises but also provides a better understanding of the question how one gets to create an artifact, be it abstract or concrete.

Johan Brännmark

Institutions as Distributions

Although there are many specific conceptions of institutions in the literature, there are arguably (as suggested by, e.g., Guala & Hindriks) two broad main families into which many of these conceptions fall: institutions-as-rules, where institutions are understood as rules constraining behavior or providing deontic powers (e.g., North, Searle), and institutions-as-equilibria, where institutions are understood as equilibria of strategic games (e.g., Schotter, Calvert).

Part of the challenge in providing a fully satisfactory account of institutions lies in there being many different kinds of institutions. There are highly codified institutions like laws and different state institutions, but there are also much more informal institutions (e.g., while the family is certainly partly regulated in law, most of the ways in which family life functions are governed by implicit and informal understandings). Then there are also a variety of organizations, such as churches and universities, which seem reasonable to understand as institutions. Additionally, as pointed out

already by Menger, the genesis of institutions might differ widely, sometimes they are consciously designed, sometimes they emerge organically.

It is argued here that both of the main approaches to institutions are deficient in that they fail to provide fully general accounts of institutions. The institutions-as-rules approach is good at making sense of designed institutions as well as strongly codified institutions, but struggles with informal institutions and ones that have emerged organically. Such institutions will involve regularities in behavior, but where people do not act by following rules (at least not in any substantial sense). In contrast, the institutions-as-equilibria approach is much better at making sense of how spontaneous order can arise from a myriad of micro-level interactions, but does not really provide the tools needed to make sense of complex designed institutions such as universities, where it is difficult to tell both what kind of equilibrium that is involved, as well as how all the different sub-parts of the university would be explicated in terms of any such more general equilibrium. The nature of the respective problems faced by these accounts also means that attempts at unifying them, such as proposed by Guala and Hédoïn, will tend to inherit both kinds of problems. What is needed is instead an alternative account.

It is suggested that one promising such possibility is to understand institutions in terms of distributions of typical bundles of rights and duties, and as grounded in synchronized and coordinated normative expectations. Many accounts of institutions already feature rights/duties (or deontic powers) as important parts, although typically understanding them as created by certain rules being in place. On the alternative account proposed here, rules (to the extent that they feature in an institution) are facilitators of this kind of distribution, but the distribution is the institution. Such distributions can however also arise organically, through gradually converging micro-level behavior. The two traditional models are accordingly integrated into the alternative model: not as accounts of what institutions are, but as accounts of how institutions might come to settle in certain specific ways.

David Strohmaier

Computational Social Ontology

What makes the ontology of the social special? When social ontology received renewed interest in the late 80s and early 90s, authors tried to capture what was special about the social as a domain of ontological inquiry. Margaret Gilbert argued for joint commitment as a key feature of the social, John Searle for a primitive joint intentionality. As the debate matured and more specific questions were addressed, such bold proposals became rare. I, however, argue for a hitherto neglected proposal.

My talk defends a computational approach to social ontology. I argue that what makes the realm of the social special from an ontological perspective is that involves a particular kind of computation. According to this proposal, the characteristic features of the ontology of the social can be traced back to the computational nature of the underlying facts. When committees work towards decisions, when stock markets respond to news about a company, when human individuals are pushed into norm-governed social kinds, the nature of the decisive processes is computational. This computational perspective explains the following key features:

- Flexibility of social kinds.
- Dependence on minds and language.

- The functional characterisation of social entities.

The flexibility of social kinds can be understood as the results of distributed symbol manipulation through a network of sophisticated computational units, including but not limited to individual agents. The dependency of social facts on human minds and language results from our minds participating in a larger computational system and the role of natural language results from it enabling this distributed computation. The functional characterisation of social entities is a consequence of their computational role in these larger distributed systems. The functional characterisation created by the distributed computation. In contrast to Searle's theory it is not required that any individual agent has a status function in their mind. In this respect, my approach is closer to Brian Epstein's *The Ant Trap* than Searle's or Gilbert's work.

After having present these three benefits of my proposal, I will address two worries:

First, one might question the presence of computational systems. In particular, because there does not seem to be reliable implementation of computational functions. But this argument rests on empirical assumptions about how reliable socially distributed computations are. Furthermore, human-made computers only implement computational functions imperfectly as well. As long as the pattern comes close enough to make reference to it explanatorily powerful we should take this computational stance (cf. Dennett, *Real Patterns*).

Second, one might question whether this computational approach really distinguishes social ontology. If one is happy to talk about computation in the case of social interaction, why not in e.g. in the more general realm of the biological? While I am open to this thought, I defend that the computations involved in the social domain are special, because they involve particularly powerful symbolic representations. Human language enables computations that lead to a distinct ontology.

I end my talk by suggesting how we should change our research in social ontology in light of my proposal.

Polaris Koi

A Realist Social Ontology for Mental Disorder

There is a strong case for accounting for mental disorders on a realist basis. In order for us to productively engage in psychiatry as a science, that is, to develop our understanding of mental disorders, revise our knowledge about them and improve our therapeutic and social responses to them, there need to be facts in light of which we can do all these things. A standard approach to the notion of 'real' would be something that is independent of our beliefs about it (cf. Haack 2003: 131–132; Kendler, Zachar and Craver 2011: 1145). This notion roughly corresponds to Searle's concept of 'brute fact': a fact that is not generated in relation to culture or to intentionality (Searle 1995).

Both realists and antirealists about mental disorder have often thought that 'real' phenomena are (neuro)biological phenomena. But despite that antirealists about mental disorder tend to be social theorists about mental disorder, to argue for a social ontology of mental disorder need not be to assert antirealism about it. First, beliefs often function as de facto constituents of mental disorder. Secondly, entities with a social ontology are not dependent on an observer's beliefs.

In this paper, I argue that some of the controversy regarding the ontology of mental disorders has stemmed from insufficient conceptual clarity. I submit that this is because in resolving whether

mental disorder is a social construct, we are, in fact, asking questions on three distinct explanatory strata:

(1) The demarcation stratum, on which the ontology of mental disorders qua categories is analysed.

(2) The instantiation stratum, on which explanation is sought concerning on which grounds certain individuals, and not others, are picked out as members of the category at hand.

(3) The individual trait stratum, on which we examine the ontology of the traits that ground diagnosis.

Accounts concerning the ontology of mental disorder do not generalize across these strata. There are two reasons why philosophers ought to pay attention to this distinction. First, while it is possible for a philosopher to defend, e.g., a social ontology of mental disorder across all three explanatory levels, extending the same analysis from one stratum to other strata yields implausibly heavy-handed results. Secondly, the distinction makes a split response feasible and consistent. A philosopher may wish to defend a social ontology of mental disorder in terms of instantiation and demarcation yet be a neuroreductivist concerning the stratum of individual traits.

For example, the claim that the demarcation of mental disorders is social does not entail that the individual traits the demarcation criteria refer to would be socially constructed; to claim that they are requires a separate argument. Distinguishing between these strata, I defend a realist social ontology of mental disorder.

Argun Abrek Canbolat

Synchronic Composition and Social Groups

In this work, I analyze the synchronic composition of complex social groups. In doing this, I aim to merge Bourdieuean social analysis with analytic metaphysics, or, more specifically, with mereology. Although there are various approaches as to how social groups are formed, I will take parthood as the focal point and analyze certain cases where mereological composition of a group might seem vague. Taking a relationalist attitude, I use Bourdieuean notions as a way to shape intuition about part-whole relations of social groups. For instance, say, department of D in University of U is composed of some individuals as parts; yet a member (P), who has her specialty in else-science, is hired and becomes a new part. Or does she? Is she accepted and does she satisfy the necessary bonds and fulfil certain obligations, etc.? According to Bourdieu, each 'field' stresses the structure within which the actors act. One might, analogously, think of a specific social group, as a 'sub-field,' if it has a corresponding 'habitus.' Habitus can be defined as the 'internalized exterior.' (Bourdieu, 1993) It is closely related to 'capitals.' In Bourdieu's account, capital is not solely monetary in character; it has other varieties such as cultural capital, social capital and context dependent capitals. In returning to the example of a new member of staff, we need to consider this particular group's dynamics (partially derived from the 'field' of academia, and its corresponding 'habitus', and the specific group's dynamics as subfield and its habitus as internalized by the particular individuals), and the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (the capitals an individual has to possess), and some individual causes that affect group borders. In this light, though on paper this new staff member is a part of the department, D, her parthood seems vague and may need some degree-analysis. She is, in a way, part of the group but not to the same degree as, say, a successful, accepted (i.e. well-equipped by capital and internalized the habitus

well enough,) associate professor, say Q. So, concerning the vagueness in P's status within the group as a part, I suggest we might use the following criterion or a version of it referring to cross-world identity:

Possible world A: [Social group D] does not have [P] as a part.

Possible world B: [Social group D] does not have [Q] as a part.

[Q] is part of [D] to a higher degree than is [P] if and only if there is a B-world which is farther away from the actual world in overall similarity than all A-worlds.

This means that P is less a part of D than is Q. I take such ordinal degree analysis as crucial to vague cases of part-whole relationships in different types of social groups and suggest that in such cases, we might refer to context-dependent versions of it. Since the analysis is mostly depended upon intuition, I suggest using aforementioned Bourdieuean notions to shape our intuition in each such case.

Visa Kurki

A Taxonomy of Collective Rights

The paper is an attempt to synthesize social ontology, rights theories and legal philosophy. It will in particular combine certain insights of Margaret Gilbert and Raimo Tuomela to argue that group agents can hold commitment-based rights as "corporations" even without legal recognition. It may be that corporations are not "legal fictions" but rather a legal application of certain fundamental features of human sociality.

We should first distinguish (A) individual rights, (B) individual rights based on group membership, and (C) robust collective rights. Type-A rights are based on the interests the individual, whereas type-B rights are held by individuals but based on their interests qua members of a group. Consider a religious sect that practices shunning toward members who do not follow the norms of the sect. This practice may very well be simultaneously detrimental to some member X qua individual but beneficial to him qua a member of the sect. However, such collective-interest-based rights are not necessarily held by the collective itself. Rights held by collectives are labelled "robust collective rights". I will argue that group agents can certainly hold robust collective rights, whereas I will remain somewhat more reserved about the right-holding of other types of groups.

Organized collectivities -- group agents -- are in many ways "person-like": it is meaningful to think of them as e.g. accruing obligations based on their commitments. Furthermore, organized collectivities can obtain rights distinct from those of their members. This is what Raimo Tuomela terms "for-groupness": the products of the joint project belong initially to the group, unless agreed otherwise. Thus, if a four-member rock band receives €400 for playing a gig, the money goes initially to the group, not to its members: if they want to have €100 each, they must decide as much as a group. The "personhood" of organized collectivities is accentuated if they are given the legal status of a corporation (though not all corporations are collectivities, as single-person corporations exist as well).

Rights held by group agents seem the most plausible candidates for robust group rights. As noted, such rights are often accrued based on transactions and relationships rather than held by groups in general – they are "special rights" rather than "general rights", to use HLA Hart's terminology. However, the question remains whether non-organised collectives can hold rights, and whether

any collectives can hold general rights, i.e. rights not based on transactions or relationships. Here the answer turns on what theory of rights one prefers. For instance, organized collectives certainly hold the “right to accrue rights”, i.e. the power to make transactions with others. Such a position might only be a right according to the will theory but not according to the interest theory of rights. On the other hand, the rights of non-organized collectivities might be more problematic for the will theory. Consider an unorganized ethnic group that has been the victim of historical injustices. If they hold a (moral) right to compensation, it is unclear who would be entitled to demand this right. Here the interest theory fares better, as it places less emphasis on the demandability of rights.

Tilman Hertz and Maria Manciall Garcia

The nature of social-ecological institutions and organizations: Revisiting the concept of emergence through complexity and process-based approaches

Philosophical discussions about the scope of the concept of emergence have been mainly centered around two approaches: epistemological and ontological emergence. Epistemological emergence understands the concept of emergence as being metaphysically innocent, indicating a (perhaps temporary) insufficient knowledge of the world. Ontological emergence, on the other hand, admits new levels of reality and/or causal powers and emphasizes that this is incompatible with reductionism and necessarily leads to an explanatory gap. This paper explores the possibilities a complexity perspective grounded on a process-relational ontology offers to make sense of the concept of emergence. In adopting a process ontology, emergence necessarily has an ontological dimension that entails new causal powers, but we never are in a situation wherein the world is represented “as it is”. Instead, what matters in a world where change is more fundamental than stability, is whether we are conceptually equipped to address the challenges of a world in constant change, from what is necessarily an onto-epistemological perspective. On the basis of works from philosophers such as William James, Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Sanders Peirce, we argue that complexity sciences provide concrete tools to engage in abductive approaches – such as agent-based models or certain approaches to network analysis – and propose concepts to tackle non-linear causality such as the concept of feedbacks. The contribution is structured as follows: First we shortly summarize the debate between epistemological and ontological emergence. Second, we will situate this debate ontologically, discussing emergence in the framework of substance and process ontologies and in particular we focus on the concept of event as a conceptualization of being. Third, we specifically delve into the causal notion of “organization” as a process-based causal notion compatible with complexity perspectives. Finally, we introduce abductive approaches as approaches to explain and understand emergent phenomena.

Leo Townsend and Dina Townsend

Collective epistemic injustice and the rights of indigenous groups

'Epistemic injustice' concerns the various ways in which people can suffer unfair treatment as epistemic agents—how they may be harmed in their capacity to know things and to share their knowledge. Although standard treatments of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007; Medina 2013; Pohlhaus 2017) stress its connection with a speaker's group or social identity as well as collective hermeneutic resources, the idea that groups themselves can be the victims of epistemic injustice is

seldom discussed in the literature. Our paper explores this somewhat neglected topic in a very particular context, namely the context of international human rights law as it pertains to so-called 'indigenous communities'. We argue that although various human rights courts have sought to protect indigenous communities and secure them in their territories, the mechanisms for doing so have meant that these groups suffer both 'hermeneutical' and 'testimonial' forms of epistemic injustice (cf. Fricker 2007).

In the wake of colonial dispossession and large-scale natural resource exploitation, human rights courts have attempted to protect indigenous communities in two main ways. First, they have reinterpreted the human right to property so as to recognize collective property rights, and, second, they have introduced the requirement that indigenous communities be collectively consulted, that is, consulted as a community and in accordance with traditional group decision-making practices, before decisions affecting their survival and territories are taken. While these have been important steps in the protection of indigenous groups, we argue that they can nonetheless result in these communities suffering forms of collective epistemic injustice. More specifically, we argue that imposing the conceptual framework of 'property' hinders these communities' ability to properly articulate their relationship to their territory—a form of collective hermeneutical injustice—while the right to consultation does not ensure that the claims indigenous communities make about their environment will be taken seriously, and hence that they remain susceptible to collective testimonial injustice. Moreover, we argue that these two forms of injustice are closely intertwined in this context, since the need to articulate their legal claims in the ill-suited conceptual vocabulary of property (the collective hermeneutic injustice) can further undermine the perceived epistemic credibility of these groups' claims (the collective testimonial injustice).

Luka Burazin

Legal Systems as Abstract Institutional Artifacts

I analyze the claim that legal systems should best be understood to be abstract institutional artifacts and seek to provide a more detailed account of some of the questions arising from such a claim. I argue that legal systems existentially or ontologically depend on collective intentionality and that it is conceptually sufficient that it be in the form of (a we-mode) collective recognition (or acceptance), where this is understood in the sense that members of a relevant group have particular collective attitudes (i.e., we-attitudes) which are about or refer to the existence of their legal system and in this way constitute their recognition. I claim that this recognition, as a social practice accompanied with its participants' particular attitude toward it, in fact constitutes a (constitutive) social norm, and distinguishes between different types of (constitutive) norms by which a group of people collectively imposes a certain institutional status (like that of officials) or make it the case that a certain institutional status (like that of a legal system) exists. Moreover, I also claim that legal systems often emerge gradually from a standing practice since collective recognition is often preceded by and emerges from some existing rudimentary pre-legal practices which may be said to create the context or the background in which constitutive social norms of recognition can emerge. I then argue that those who collectively recognize that someone is a legal official or that a legal system exists do not have to have a full-blown concept of what they recognize but only some degree of conceptual understanding and that what really matters is how participants actually treat and use the institutional artifact in question and what deontic powers they attach to it or its users. Finally, I argue that the actual existence of a legal system (and its actual character) depends on whether or not the content of collective recognition was largely successfully

realized, which is manifested precisely in people actually using a legal system, i.e., in their social (legal) practices.

Tuomas Forsberg

Order – What Order? The Ontology of Social Order and its Implications for the Study of World Politics

[Social] Order is one of the key concepts in social sciences but its exact meaning and purpose remains ambivalent and contested. In the study of world politics, there is a burgeoning debate on the changing nature of global / world / international / liberal order but there is no shared meaning of the concept and its analytical value is not always clear. Speaking in terms of social ontology, this paper distinguishes between subjective, objective and inter-subjective approaches to [global / world / international] order. It will point to the obvious tendency in the literature whereby the [durability of the] order is often tautologically explained by the order itself. The paper also discusses and deconstructs the normative underpinnings of the concept when juxtaposed to chaos or justice in particular. The paper will draw on the so called English School (Hedley Bull) but it will also deal with the recent key articles on the nature of the [global / world / international] order.

Tobias Hansson Wahlberg

The Creation of Institutional Reality, Special Theory of Relativity, and Mere Cambridge Change

Saying so can make it so, J. L. Austin taught us long ago (e.g. Austin 1962). Famously, John Searle has developed this Austinian insight in an account of the construction of institutional reality (e.g. Searle 1975/1979, 1989, 1995, 2010). Searle maintains that so-called Status Function Declarations create institutional facts in the world corresponding to the propositional content of the declarations. The institutional facts in question are generally held to be created simultaneously with the performance of the relevant declarations (e.g. 1989: 556-557; 2010: 12, 99) – wherefore the use of the present tense and indexicals like “now” are said to be appropriate (ibid.). If, for example, an authorized teacher (who marks a student’s assignment) officially declares “I hereby give student a the grade Y in subject s”, then, on Searle’s theory, an institutional fact of the form a’s having grade-Y-on-subject-s is simultaneously created (the grade being an institutional feature, or “status function”, had by the student). In this talk, I will argue that Searle’s account of the making of institutional reality is, for various reasons (and perhaps surprisingly), in tension with the special theory of relativity: problems arise irrespective of whether the creation of institutional facts by declarations is interpreted in causal terms (e.g. Elder-Vass 2012: 62-64) or in terms of grounding (e.g. Schaffer forthcoming). However, the difficulties can be handled, I will argue, if Searle’s theory is replaced by a more modest version which interprets the results of Status Function Declarations in terms of mere Cambridge change and institutional truth. I will end the talk by indicating the import of this more modest theory for theorizing about the causal standing of institutional phenomena.

Corrado Piroddi

Pierre Bourdieu's notion of "field" and Axel Honneth's idea of "recognition"

According to Pierre Bourdieu, the human social dimension is a set of different fields in which social actors compete for maximizing the amount of capital at stake in each field. The physiognomy and extension of a field are variable. It can be a material space like the school, an intellectual discipline like science, a public institution like the state. In Bourdieu's perspective, the social sedimentation of norms and rules that govern field's dynamics happens by means of a process of internalization of symbolic representations that takes the form of bodily dispositions that are defined in terms of individual habitus. The present paper tries to enrich the notion of «social field» arguing that also the satisfaction of the human desire for recognition plays an important role in ensuring the ontological reality and stability of a social field. In the first section, it deepens Bourdieu's notion of field, pointing up how even Bourdieu has foreseen the important role played by interpersonal recognition for explaining fields' functioning. In the second part, the paper illustrates Honneth's conception of the spheres of recognition, highlighting its coherence with Bourdieu's idea of field. In the third section, it tries to describe a field as an objective order of recognition, in which agents can satisfy a specific set of recognitive needs (for instance, the satisfaction of affective needs, individual search for social esteem, self-respect) that are objective for social agents in F at time t.

In this last part, it also lists some of the possible advantages of such a reinterpretation of the concept of field. In particular, it will be shown how the notion of "field of recognition" can be used to clarify the ontological status and nature of those "relational institution" (the family, the market, the democratic community) that Honneth mainly describes in normative terms.

Tarna Kannisto

Queer ontology

In the current ontologies of gender, what kind of space is left for the "other" forms of gender identities, such as trans*gender or genderqueer? For those who do not fit either into the class of "woman" or "man", are the only available options whether belong to a class of (gender)"neutral" or "in-between"? If so, what kind of possibilities are there to address new or even utopian forms of gender identities? Current feminist theories on the ontology of gender emphasize the plurality in the descriptive and normative conditions for belonging to the class of "woman". This is largely because the conceptualizations of gender categories are not "only" ontological, but political and, in a sense, utopian. Relying on different ontological conceptualizations of "woman", feminists have presented political arguments for whether emphasizing or abolishing the category, in order to end gender related oppression. From the perspective of queer ontology, what follows from the abolition of the ontological class of "woman"? Does this mean that once the class is socially demolished, everyone will be queer? What would then be the analytical purpose of terms such as "queer" or "trans*"? Currently, gender categories are crucial concepts for our everyday understanding about the social world. As such, ontological descriptions of gender cannot be fully counterintuitive, but must also take people's general beliefs, attitudes, identities, and lived experiences into account. On this basis, Mikkola (2011) has argued that the idea of abolishing the class "woman" does not resonate with the beliefs and experiences of the majority of ordinary people. Instead, she suggests a moderately realist ontological account of genders which mimics the common usage of gender categorisations. However, I argue that it is crucial to keep every-day language usage analytically separate from what can be attained philosophically. Although Mikkola's theory provides fresh tools

for dismantling gender inequalities while at the same time keeping its ontology accessible to non-philosophers, I claim that by preserving the central pillars of the binary view on genders, the space “other” genders (than “women” and “men”) can have in her theory is attained only through negation and denial of the reproductive, heterosexual future. This strategy of negation is embraced by some queer theorists, most prominently by Edelman (2004). However, the strategy of simple negation is not available or desirable even for the majority of those who do not fit into the heteronormative gender categories and thus the viewpoint has been claimed to turn a blind eye to numerous lived queer experiences. Furthermore, the strategy of sole negation seems to deny the possibility of positively creating new kinds of gender descriptions or identities. I argue that when ontological theories are employed strategically, instead of negation, critical utopianism as developed among others by Muñoz (2009) provides a more satisfying basis for the development of the (queer) ontologies of gender, because as a method it both keeps critical distance towards gender binaries and aims for open-ended definitions of gender.

Mattias Gunnemyr

Causing global warming

Do I have a moral obligation to refrain from going for a leisure drive with my gas-guzzling car since doing so causally contributes to global warming, climate change and their related harms? Could I be morally responsible for these harms if I go for a leisure drive since such a drive causes them? Sinnott-Armstrong (2005), Jamieson (2007) and Kingston & Sinnott-Armstrong (2018) argues that I do not; the emissions produced by my drive are much too insignificant to make a difference for the occurrence of global warming and its related harms. In a similar vein, Kutz (2000) argues that I do not have a reason refrain from using a CFC-free coolant for my car, at least not on the grounds that using this coolant would causally contribute to the thinning of the ozone layer and, in extent, to additional skin cancer cases in Australia. I argue that our verdict in such cases depends on what we mean by ‘causation’. If we for instance assume a simple counterfactual analysis of causation according to which ‘C causes E’ means ‘if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred’, we must conclude that a single drive does not cause global warming and that using a CFC coolant does not cause any additional skin cancer cases. However, this analysis of causation is well-known for giving counterintuitive results in exactly this kind of cases. Consider instead Lewis’s (2000) analysis of causation which states first that ‘C influences E if and only if how, when or whether C occurs makes enough of a difference for how, when or whether E occurs’; and second that ‘C causes E if and only if there is a causal chain leading from C to E, where a causal chain is a sequence of causal influences’. This analysis of causation entails that it is indeterminate whether I cause global warming when I go for a single drive. This indeterminacy stems from conceptual inexactness in our concept of ‘global warming’. Still, in contexts where we seek to control or understand global warming, there is a pressure to adopt a more fragile view of this event. If we adopt such a view, it turns out that a single drive does cause global warming. This means that we cannot like Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) and Kingston & Sinnott-Armstrong (2018) reject the idea that I should refrain from going for a leisure drive simply because such a drive does not cause global warming. This also opens up the possibility that people who go for a leisure drive are morally responsible for global warming. Still, there is a case to be made for thinking that a single drive does not influence climate change related harm even if it influences global warming. However, I argue, if causation is transitive (which it is according to Lewis’ analysis), my leisure drive do cause climate change related harm if it does influence global warming, which in turn influence climate change, which in turn influence climate change related harm.

Heather Logue

Gender Fictionalism

In section 1 of this paper, I argue that theories of womanhood face a dilemma. On the one hand, arguably, the most prominent theories of womanhood fail to capture all women (the exclusion problem). On the other hand, we can avoid the exclusion problem by holding that believing that one is a woman is sufficient for being one (the belief condition); but the belief condition faces two serious objections. First, there are many counterexamples (e.g., cases in which one believes that one is a woman on the basis of an inference from a dubious claim). Second, the belief condition isn't a stable stopping point in the search for an account of womanhood. To say that believing that you're a woman is sufficient for being one raises the question: what, exactly, do you believe that you are?

I argue that we can embrace the second horn of this dilemma if we adopt fictionalism about gender discourse. On this view, gender discourse could be understood not as aiming at truth, but rather as constituting a pretence; that is, to say 'S is a woman' could be to pretend that S has a certain property. In section 2, I sketch gender fictionalism and compare it to other relevant views.

In section 3, I flesh out the details of gender fictionalism (arguing that it should take the form of a revolutionary use fictionalism), and argue that if the belief condition is regarded as an interpretation of the gender fiction, its problems can be resolved. We can resolve the problem that the belief condition isn't an acceptable stopping point by appealing to fictionalism to justify a refusal to specify the nature of womanhood—given that fictions can be indeterminate in many respects. We can deal with the counterexamples to the belief condition by simply ignoring them—given that we're entitled to ignore certain awkward aspects of fictions.

In section 4, I respond to two important objections to the view: namely, that gender discourse isn't useful (unlike, e.g., mathematical, modal, and moral discourse), and that gender fictionalism trivialises gender.

Dimitrios Zachos

Collective intentionality as a Theory for the Criminal Law

In its paradigmatic application, criminal law is concerned with individual criminal responsibility and the ascription of criminal liability to individual perpetrators. Nevertheless, crime often manifests itself as a joined effort of multiple individuals who often act jointly, share an overarching aim, an action-plan and an attitudinal or ethical stance i.e. a set of normative constraints that are fundamental for the structural cohesion of the group. Criminal law has reacted to this fact of social reality with the promulgation of various theories that purport to adequately capture the ontological essence and precisely describe the criminological phenotype of collective criminal phenomena in order to accurately attribute criminal liability to groups and, ultimately, to individuals, who are to bear the taint of criminal blame and criminal punishment, by disentangling the action-theoretical knots that emerge in interactive social contexts. In this regard, of a foundational nature in the criminal law of all the legal orders I will be focused on (Anglo-American criminal law, German criminal law, and international criminal law) is the concept of accomplice liability in its various manifestations and refinements (co-perpetration, conspiracy liability, liability for participation in a criminal association, joint criminal enterprise, etc.). On the other hand, the

concept of collective intentionality, in its multifarious interpretations (subject, mode, and content accounts of collective intentionality) was developed in an effort to 'socialize' the notion of intentionality by making different metaphysical stipulations with regard to which are the fundamental, the atomic particles of the ('social') world, with a view to better analysing the individual and institutional social interactions and interrelations and has, at least at first glance, nothing novel to contribute to criminal law theory, which has to operate under different normative and policy constraints and is still, to a significant extent, premised on the individual perpetrator, and treats notions such as 'group-agent', or 'group-subject' as *façons de parler*, as metaphorical, symbolic utterances, which are certainly useful as interpretative tools in that they create a semantically and pragmatically richer elucidative context, but have no ontological foundation and do not establish, with the exception of corporate criminal liability, a new, non-personal 'seat', where criminal liability might latch onto. To investigate if this is indeed the case will be the purpose of this essay. Even though individual criminal law theorists have, on occasion, explored in a conceptually productive way various applications of conceptual analyses by Bratman, Tuomela, Gilbert, or Pettit on criminal law, a generalized, systematic approach of the question whether collective intentionality can function as a more or less independent theory within criminal law, in synch with, or in opposition to criminal law dogmatics, seems to be

lacking. This is this investigation I am proposing to try to do with the present essay by means of conceptual analysis, by taking as starting points current problems within criminal law theory and praxis.

Francesca Sofia Alexandratos

Loosing Human Engagement: on Dewey's and Honneth's Critical Social Ontology

The expression "critical social ontology" identifies a recent approach to the study of the metaphysics of the social world and its entities, which aims to enable a critical approach to social reality. The challenge is to provide a normative and transformative conception of social practices and institutions, by linking the conditions of criticism to the human capacity of actively changing the social context.

As regards the criticism of the social world and the etiology of its pathological recourses, the talk aims to highlight the similar theoretical and methodological strategy shared by the American pragmatist John Dewey in his naturalistic humanism, and the social philosopher Axel Honneth, with special focus on *Social Action and Human Nature* (1980) and *Reification* (2005).

Firstly, I will try to show how both authors share a similar formal philosophical anthropology, which seeks to outline a conception of human action in terms of engaged action, where the latter is understood as an emotional and practical ongoing response to the values of the social, the external and the inner world.

Secondly, I will maintain that Dewey's and Honneth's anthropological analyses both rely upon an ontological conception of human action as necessarily social action, since it requires some form of intersubjective mediation for its emerging, for the stabilisation of the values of experience through practical organization and cognitive elaboration, and for their fulfilment in the social context.

Hence, I suggest, their analysis of engaged action directly implies an evaluative and critical approach to the social world. Within such theoretical framework, social practices and institutions are to be criticized and modified through a criterion of human praxis, which does not prescribe

substantial contents. Instead, such a criterion should identify a quality – the one of ongoing sensuous, emotional and practical engagement to values – among the three types of relations that shape human action. Social practices should be the means to satisfy and strengthen, through cognitive elaboration and practical control, the values of human interactions, of the inner and the natural world, while fostering human reconstructive engagement in social, personal and natural situations. Thus, they should allow individuals, within the process of social action, to gain self-acknowledgment of their exchange with and transformative activity of the contexts of social practice.

Considering this, diagnosing social pathologies means detecting in the social members, involved in social intercourses, the substitution of an engaged attitude with a contemplative attitude directed, first of all, towards the other subjects and the inner world, and subsequently towards the values of external situations. This form of “forgetfulness” of the recognitive attitude by social individuals obstructs the richness of human values and the process of appropriation and transformation of the social world, that appears as a given and natural object. Whereas investigating the etiology of social pathologies means to identify those social practices that develop and sustain such contemplative attitude, by relying on manifestly disengaged thought schemata and patterns of action or by totalizing social ends.

Michael Vlerick

The evolution of social contracts

In important and influential work, authors like Young, Sugden, Binmore, and Skyrms have developed naturalistic accounts of the emergence, persistence and evolution of social contracts. Social contracts are sets of commonly understood rules that govern cooperative social interaction within societies. Their chosen tool of analysis is game theory. This enables them to model the emergence and evolution of social contracts out of the strategic interaction of individuals within the group. This project, I believe, is of utmost importance. It seeks to provide a scientific understanding of the foundations of human societies.

However, current game-theoretic accounts of social contracts (or social structure) focus on how evolutionary dynamics drive the interaction to group beneficial equilibria available in the various games of life being played within the group. This leaves us with an incomplete account of what social contracts evolved to do. It provides an account of how social contracts solve coordination problems in which the interests of the individual participants are relatively aligned, not competition problems in which individual interests compete with group interests (and in which there is therefore no group beneficial Nash equilibrium available). Solving competition problems in large groups mainly composed of non-kin is what sets human cooperation apart in the natural realm. Understanding how and why this is done is central to understanding human society.

In response, I set out to build on those important naturalistic theories and provide a (more) comprehensive naturalistic account of the emergence, persistence and evolution of social contracts. My central claim is that social contracts have culturally evolved to solve cooperation problems. Cooperation problems range from (pure) coordination problems – which, as pointed out, have been getting most of the attention – to competition problems. I argue that solutions to coordination problems – which are epistemic problems and are solved by communication (signaling) and common knowledge of coordination rules – emerge from within-group dynamics. These dynamics, however, are powerless in the face of competition problems. The latter are

(typically) solved by norms backed up by punishment in order to align individual interests with group interest and are culturally selected by competitive between-group dynamics.

Olle Blomberg

From Simple to Composite Agency: On Kirk Ludwig's "From Individual to Plural Agency"

According to Kirk Ludwig (2017), "there is nothing strictly speaking that is a joint action in the sense in which there are actions in the case of individuals." (p. 11). He takes this restrictive view of the proper use of the term 'action' because he, following Donald Davidson, takes the only actions that exist to be primitive actions. An action that is an agent's primitive action (or "basic action") can be performed directly by the agent, without the agent having to intend to do something else by way of which the action is performed. Ludwig assumes (with some qualifications) that such actions are exhausted by some bodily movements of the agent. He then argues from this restrictive view of the use of 'action' to the conclusion that there are no collective primitive actions. Hence, there are strictly speaking no collective actions.

Ludwig appeals to two considerations in support of this restrictive view. First, if we ask when someone did something, say killed the victim, then the appropriate answer is the time at which the agent moved her body (she killed him when she squeezed the trigger, not when he later died in the hospital). Secondly, it seems that in order to distinguish systematically between an agent's action and that action's consequences, we must identify the action with the primitive action performed, and not with its consequences.

I argue that Ludwig's conclusions about the implications of the restrictive view for collective action are mistaken in two ways. First, there are good reasons to think not only that collective primitive actions are possible, but that some skilled joint actions are actual examples of collective primitive actions. Hence, there are some collective actions, even on Ludwig and Davidson's own restrictive views. Furthermore, and more importantly, the two considerations that favour the restrictive view arguably supports the conclusion that many actions are composites of primitive actions. If you ask me, "When did you build the house?", the appropriate answer is the period of time during which I performed all the various primitive actions that together had the consequence that a house was built, not the time at which I performed one of those primitive actions (say, the time at which I extended the measuring tape). And the natural distinction here between my action and its consequence is a distinction between the complex event of me performing the various primitive actions and its collective effect of the house being built. Once it has been concluded that such individual composite intentional actions are, even strictly speaking, actions, it becomes clear that also collective composite intentional actions are, for the same reasons, also actions.

I conclude that Ludwig's theory is best interpreted in a somewhat different light than that in which Ludwig himself presents it. It is a theory on which individual and collective actions end up as ontological equals. The latter is not in any sense secondary to, or derivative of, the former.

Andler

The Sexual Orientation/Identity Distinction

The sex/gender distinction is a staple of feminist philosophy. In slogan form, sex is "natural," while gender is the "social meaning" of sex. Although the distinction isn't universally accepted, its

widespread endorsement is likely due to its remarkable theoretical power. By separating gender from sex, we're equipped to explain the structure of patriarchy, validate trans identities, and imagine just alternative societies. Happily, social metaphysicians have recently turned their attention to the social significance of sexuality. Considering the importance of the sex/gender distinction, it's interesting to ask if we might make use of an analogous distinction. In this paper, I argue that we ought to endorse the sexual orientation/identity distinction. The paper has three stages. First, I motivate the orientation/identity distinction by considering bisexual orientated individuals who are socially similar to their heterosexual oriented counterparts. Second, I provide my primary argument for the sexual orientation/identity distinction; in particular, I demonstrate that the concepts of sexual identity and sexual orientation ought to play distinct theoretical roles in our explanations of LGBTQ+ oppression. As a case study, I demonstrate that the concept of sexual identity plays a distinct theoretical role in explaining the oppression constituted by sanctions against queer spaces. In particular, I argue that (i) the social meanings of sexual identities such as lesbian and gay differ significantly across queer and mainstream spaces, and it's normatively important that sexual minorities have access to the social meanings (of the aforementioned sexual identities) that are operative in queer spaces, and (ii) queer spaces create and maintain distinctive sub-cultural sexual identities, such as dyke, twink, and bear, and it's normatively important that sexual minorities have access to these sub-cultural sexual identities. Third, I formulate the sexual orientation/identity distinction by providing analytical expression to the following slogan: sexual orientation is "natural," while sexual identity is the "social meaning" of sexual orientation.

Arvi Särkelä

Crescendoing Rhythms of Nature: Ontological Monism and Modal Pluralism in Tarde and Dewey

In spite of being separated by an ocean and several philosophical issues, Gabriel Tarde and John Dewey have in common that they are classical process metaphysicians who focused predominantly on the mode of existence of those entities dealt with today within social ontology. However, instead of singling out a "social world," whose nature and properties stand in dispute, they argue that "the social" is not a substance but a mode of natural process. In this, their variants of process thought exemplifies a metaphysical naturalism characterized by the attempt to do justice to two commitments: ontological monism and modal pluralism. This is a habit of thought that can be traced back to Spinoza's neutral monism of the one nature of infinite modes.

Ontological monism is the idea that all existence expresses one principle. Modal pluralism is the idea that there is plurality of ways to express this principle. Gabriel Tarde calls his monistic principle "possession," Dewey names his "association." Both philosophers then go on to distinguish three modal kinds, which Tarde calls "worlds" and Dewey "degrees of reality", or, as they both metaphorically put it, "rhythms" of nature: the physical, the organic and the social. Thus, Tarde and Dewey try to map the landscape of social ontology, i.e. the nature, in which social processes evolve, by processualizing an Aristotelian *scala naturae*. For this reason, their metaphysical naturalism also contains a story of how more complex and freer modes of existence grow out of less complex and free processes: physical, organic and social nature is not only conceptually but also historically continuous.

This leads Tarde and Dewey to formulate a conception of impure sociality. In this process metaphysical picture, the social is not *sui generis*. It is fused with life and things. Social forms of life

have to be both reproduced and dissolved. This observation of the constitutive impurity of social processes, Tarde and Dewey believe, has important consequences for social criticism. These consequences have become all the more serious in our times of robotization and climate change where social criticism needs to re-conceptualize its relation to things and life.

Hans Bernhard Schmid

Collective Rationality: Coordination, Cooperation, and Corporation

“Collective rationality” is used in a variety of ways in the relevant literature, two of which stand out: the rationality of cooperation and coordination, and corporate rationality. Even though these two conceptions are markedly different from each other in the issues they concern, and the concepts of collectivity and rationality they involve, they are more closely interconnected than it is usually seen in the literature. From two different sides, they approach the same feature, the capacity to act together in virtue of collective self-awareness.

In the first sense, collective rationality is a relational feature of choices of individuals. The paradigmatic case of collective rationality in this sense is mutual cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma. Individual choices are collectively rational if they realize a mutually cooperative outcome (that is better for both than mutual defection) even though individual strategic reasoning recommends defection, because defection realizes what one values better if the other cooperates as well as if the other defects. Collective rationality in this sense is defined in contradistinction against (a strategic conception of) individual rationality; there is an air of individual irrationality about individual choices that are collectively rational, even though in terms of efficiency, the participants are ultimately better off through mutual cooperation than through mutual defection. Collective rationality in this sense is a matter of the rationality of cooperation (though as will be argued below, coordination might be a better paradigm to study this concept of collective rationality). The rationality of cooperation and coordination matters because it explains the provision of common and public goods (cooperation) and the function of conventions (coordination).

In the second salient sense of the word, collective rationality is an attribute of collective or group agents, their attitudes, and their actions. It is the feature in virtue of which collective or group agents (such as political parties, universities, or business corporations) are consistent in their attitudes and actions over more or less complex interdependent issues. In this second sense, collective rationality is defined in an analogy (rather than in contradistinction) to individual rationality. Just as rational individual agency needs some degree of consistency, collectives need to ensure that their views and decisions are mutually consistent. The problem of collective rationality in this second sense, as discussed in the literature, is that it does not robustly supervene on the rationality of individuals and any fixed plausible aggregation procedure. Thus under any plausible aggregative view of the formation of collective or group attitudes, the rationality of individual members does not robustly ensure the rationality of the collective, or group. Achieving collective rationality is thus an additional task – the “collectivization of reason” –, and it is taken to matter for human social life insofar as the credibility and trustworthiness of group agents such as institutions and organizations depends on their rationality.

These two conceptions of collective rationality – the rationality of coordination and cooperation, and corporate rationality – thus seem to differ from each other in their targets and approaches. Perhaps more importantly, however, they radically differ with regards both to the idea of rationality,

as well as with regards to the notion of collectivity they entail: The rationality of cooperation between individuals is a matter of efficiency, and it involves collectivity in the sense that it is a relational feature of participant choices. By contrast, the rationality of collective agents is (primarily) a matter of consistency, and it involves collectivity in terms of agency that is collective rather than individual.

This paper opens with a brief section on the efficiency of mutual cooperation (1.) followed by an equally brief section on the consistency of group agents (2.). The main part of the talk is a discussion of how the efficiency of cooperation and the consistency of group agents relate to each other. The claim is that the feature that rationalizes cooperation (and coordination) between individuals is also the basic force that drives towards coherence between group attitudes (3.), and that both conceptions of collective rationality thus focus on the feature that enables agents to think and act together, and do so consistently. I argue that this capacity crucially involves a certain kind of participant awareness, consciousness, or self-knowledge, of what is at stake in both cases, and that this kind of awareness, consciousness or knowledge is plural pre-reflective self-awareness.

Richard Strong

Social Ontology and "Socioception:" Cognition, Scales, Relations, & Activities

Recently, Brian Epstein has given compelling reasons for thinking that the social world is more than merely people. Social reality is more than interhuman interactions, beliefs, and attitudes. Part of Epstein's criticism of prevailing models is what he characterizes as an undue emphasis, if not exclusive focus, on what he calls "psychological" or cognitive stories grounded in collective intentions, beliefs, and background abilities. These orientations, he claims, fail to offer sufficient answers and even mislead us when it comes to "what is it?" questions about social reality.

In this presentation I will argue that accounting for embodied cognitive structures (e.g., of perception, classification, meaning-making, identity, memory, time reckoning, and emotion) is an absolutely essential task for social ontology, especially for understanding the "what is it?" question about the social world. Past shortcomings of cognitivist approaches can be attributed, in part, to things like relatively fixed and unduly uniform stories about the nature of social cognition and overly simply renderings of the relationships between mind and social reality. More positively, I argue that social structures, features, entities, and relations are in part constituted by laminated levels of both similar and differential cognitive, affective, and embodied structures. One cannot understand social structures without understanding these complex mental armatures of social activity.

The focus of my talk will be to identify what I see as three key considerations for making sense of mind and social world. These are (1) a multi-scalar approach, (2) a relational and process driven metaphysical picture encompassing bodies and things, and (3) a focus on on-going activities, not states or attitudes.

The "socioceptive" structures underpinning societies are multi-scalar. This means modeling the cognitive structures relevant to social ontology at different scales (from the individual to the societal) as well accounting for different types of aggregation or social units. Some of the most salient cognitive structures – general schemas and dispositions of perception and action – are impersonal and distributed throughout a population, some are complementary sets of structures found in paired groups. A multi-scalar approach shirks the simple distinction between individual and collective and the holism or uniformity implied by theories reliant on collective intentionality.

The structures that underpin societies are relational. This means that social entities and properties are what they are because of their relationships with other social entities and properties. Social properties are not intrinsic properties of isolated social atoms. To understand the existence relational structures we must chart out co-constitutive relations, not simply hunt down and formally analyze isolated correlations and statuses.

The social world is, in part, enacted. The activity of the past scaffolds present and future activity. From the past agents develop prototypical concepts, schemas, and dispositions for making sense of their activities in the social world. At the same time, present activity has margins of negotiation and generative novelty. Social activity is not merely interhuman. It includes things: artifacts, documents, systems, and ecologies in conjunction with socioceptive abilities. Social activity encapsulates the ongoing relationships between human and non-humans.

The picture of social mind and social reality I outline departs from conventional models criticized by Epstein without abandoning the search for a rigorous account of the nature of the mind-dependency of social reality (or the ways in which our minds depend on social interaction as well).

Tim Klaassen

Normative Political Theory and Social Ontology: A Constitutivist View

What bearing should social ontology have on normative political theorizing? Ever since the publication of Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*, social institutions have been at the center of contemporary normative political theory. Yet political philosophers have had little to say on the question of what the nature of these so-called "social institutions" consist in. The discipline of political philosophy has largely proceeded from the assumption that it is possible to engage in political normative theorizing in isolation from addressing fundamental questions about the metaphysics and ontology of its primary subject-matter (Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 1992) (McDermott 2008). Are there any credible alternatives to this assumption?

The aim of this paper is to develop an alternative view on the relationship between normative theory and social ontology, one according to which the two cannot that easily be separated. More specifically, it tries to articulate a view according to which these two disciplines essentially become one and the same. It does so by taking as its basis a recently developed framework in moral philosophy and the philosophy of action referred to as constitutivism. Constitutivism seeks to explain the authority of practical normative requirements in terms of constitutive features of action and agency (Velleman 2009) (Korsgaard 2009) (Katsafanas 2016). It holds, in other words, that something like morality is basically a corollary of the essence that defines agential activity as such (which is inescapable to us in virtue of our identity as agents).

Part of what makes the constitutivist approach distinctive is that moral philosophy and the philosophy of action collapse into one another. Hence, by extending constitutivist principles to the political domain a similar result may be obtained with respect to the disciplines of normative political theory and social ontology. The main goal of the paper is to articulate in more detail what this entails. Using Rawls's distinction between a 'concept' and a 'conception' (Rawls 1999), it proposes that from a constitutivist perspective the nature of social reality becomes itself a fundamental normative problem. Where the objectivity of social institutions is to be presupposed as a formal background condition of politics, the primary political task of a people is to arrive at a

substantive and legitimate interpretation of the socio-political reality in which it finds itself historically situated.

Matti Sarkia

From a monolithic to a pluralistic approach to shared intention

Most contemporary philosophical accounts of shared intention are based at least in part on the systematic analysis, elucidation and elaboration of terms and concepts that are familiar from our ordinary framework of intentional agency. This framework consists of a network of interrelated and partially inter-defined mental-state denoting terms and concepts, such as 'belief' and 'intention, and their counterparts in action. For example, it is commonly held that having an intention to x entails the belief that it is not impossible that one will x (or on some accounts, the belief that one will x) and leads to the action of x-ing, provided that one does not reconsider and there are no internal or external constraints withholding one from acting on one's intention. This analysis of the meaning of 'intention' also provides part of a philosophical theory or model of intentional action.

Traditional views in the philosophy of mind and in cognitive psychology have treated our ordinary framework of agency as constituting a tacit theory of the mind. This involves the idea that it appeals to unobservable posits (such as beliefs and desires) which are not unlike the unobservable posits (such as electrons or fields of force) that are appealed to in scientific theories. And it involves the idea that these unobservable posits can be individuated by the law-like connections that exist between them according to the correct theory of how the mind is organized. The conjunction of these two claims naturally leads to what I will describe as a monolithic approach to our ordinary framework of agency, i.e. the view that there is a single correct understanding of the notions that make up our ordinary framework of agency.

Philosophical views about the nature of shared intention have been influenced by the monolithic approach to our ordinary framework of agency. Despite the variety of philosophical analyses of shared intention that have been developed, many philosophers continue to assume that there can and should be a single, correct understanding of the nature and constituents of shared intention. And while some philosophers accept that shared intention may be multiply realizable, they generally believe that there must at least be a single correct understanding of the building blocks (such as individual belief and intention) that may give rise to possible realizations of shared intention. In my presentation, I will argue that this view is not plausible either in the light of current empirical research in cognitive science, nor in the light of an up-to-date understanding of how scientific theories are organized in the philosophy of science. Thus my paper argues against a monolithic approach to shared intention, and in favor of a pluralistic and pragmatic approach to shared intention.

Barend Cornelis de Rooij

Common Knowledge in (Improvised) Joint Activity

One of the central questions in the field of social ontology concerns the nature of shared agency. What is special about two or more individuals acting together? The majority of theorists discussing this question have focused in particular on the nature of intentional joint activity. These theorists have asked how we should analyze such joint intentional acts as executing a dance performance,

performing a pass play, or painting a house together. While the dominant voices in social ontology disagree in their analysis of joint phenomena like these, many of them accept as uncontroversial the claim that intentional joint activity requires that participant agents share certain highly specific objects of knowledge or belief in common. This common knowledge condition usually entails that two or more individuals cannot engage in intentional joint activity unless they know or believe in common that they (i) share the intention or goal of doing something together, and that they (ii) each intend to do their part in realizing that goal or intention. (A version of this condition occurs in the work of Bratman, Gilbert, Miller, Pettit and Schweikard, and the early Tuomela.) In spite of its intuitive appeal, I argue that the common knowledge requirement problematically rules out an important category of intentionally improvised joint activity as a genuine subset of intentional joint activity. Since so much of our lives is improvised, this gives us a strong reason to scrutinize the role of common knowledge in the dominant theories of shared agency.

An upshot of the main claim I defend here, namely that we should take seriously the possibility of intentionally improvised joint activity, is that we ought to abandon the idea that the common knowledge condition is a necessary condition for joint activity. My strategy is as follows. I first examine the common knowledge condition as it occurs in the dominant theories of shared agency. I then discuss a range of cases that do not seem to fit well with this requirement. Indeed, we frequently succeed in intentionally enacting joint performances in the absence of detailed knowledge of each other's plans or intentions. Many of the instances in which we succeed in doing this concern improvised joint actions. Army troops react to changing battlefield conditions, combining in complex ways under conditions of great uncertainty. Jazz groups improvise, each musician responding openly and flexibly to musical cues without knowing in advance when their partners will pick up where they left off. And football players complete pass plays they did not anticipate. In my conclusion, I consider why we often succeed in acting together under conditions of uncertainty. Enabling that success is not detailed common knowledge of each other's plans or intentions, but rather a practical wisdom that draws on shared background beliefs and prepares us to react openly and flexibly to the unknown.

Tobias Stoerzinger

Dispositions vs. Judgements: Implications of a distinction for the debate about intentional states of group agents

The aim of the paper is to take a new perspective on the question of how to understand the ascriptions of intentional states to groups by drawing on the distinction between intentional states as dispositions on the one hand and intentional states as judgements on the other.

Those scholars giving a positive answer to the question whether groups can be seen as intentional agents that have intentional states which are not reducible to the mere sum of the intentional states of the group members can roughly be divided into two camps: The "constitutionalists" and the "interpretationalist".

Constitutionalist – they care about the internal constitution of group states – claim that the intentional states of a group agent can be analyzed, either as a function of collective acceptances (Tuomela 2013), as an aggregation of the individual judgements of group members (List&Pettit 2011) or as something constituted by a joint commitment (Gilbert 2013).

Interpretationalist on the other hand claim that certain groups can be understood as intentional systems with their own intentional states not because some groups show an overall behavior and depict such behavioral patterns which makes the attribution of intentional states justified (Tollefsen 2015; Clarke 1994).

My claim is that a theory of group agency needs to relate those two perspectives in order to give a more fundamental understanding of the phenomenon of group agency.

After showing why some suggestions that have been proposed on how to relate the two competing views (one in Tollefsen 2015 Chapter 5 and one implicit in List and Pettit 2011) are problematic I will draw on a distinction between types of intentional states that has been established in the philosophy of language (Henning 2018) and in the debate about self-knowledge (Coliva 2016; McGeer 1996).

In both fields, different authors have suggested distinguishing at least two different meanings of (seemingly) mental state ascriptions: Sentences like “S believes that p” have two different readings and can, therefore, refer to two different types of intentional states. On the one hand “S believes that p” can be understood as – in fact – the ascription of a mental state understood as some kind of psychological or dispositional state the agent is in and which allows an explanation of its behavior in a pro- and retrospective way. On the second reading, these sentences do not (self-) ascribe psychological states but rather have to be analyzed as expressions of a judgement (or a standpoint, or the opinion) about the world in the name of “S”.

I will then show that interpretationalist accounts focus on the psychological reading of intentional state ascriptions while the constitutionalist accounts concentrate on “judgement reading”.

Finally, the paper ends by showing how judgements play an important role when it comes to the self-regulatory capacities of group agents.

Rachel Cooper

On Grounding Social Phenomena

Social constructionists about, for example, race or gender hold that members of these kinds share nothing but a social position, and that they occupy this position in virtue of being (regularly or for the most part) taken to have some feature and being treated in certain ways as a result (Haslanger, 2012). In response to the worry that the metaphysics behind social construction “remains obscure” (Mallon, 2013), Jonathan Schaffer (2017) has proposed that we understand social construction claims as grounding claims. In particular, he endorses: to be socially constructed is to be grounded in distinctive social patterns. However, in order to see whether “social construction as grounding” can be made to work, we have to ask about the ordering of “what grounds what” in between the mainly social (“distinctive social patterns”) and the purely physical (the most basic physical entities). If degrees of fundamentality “vary inversely with degrees of complexity” (Barnes, 2012, p. 894), surely individuals are somewhere in between the mainly social and the purely physical on the spectrum of fundamentality. So it is natural to think that on the picture provided by the grounding theorist, social phenomena will somewhere down the line be grounded in individual phenomena. My aim in this paper is to bring this step in particular into question.

In this paper, I argue that social construction claims, rather than being best understood as grounding claims, provide one with reasons to reject a grounding framework altogether. I will begin by explaining the social constructionist position. I will then explain the notion of grounding and what it is supposed to do, as well as Schaffer's argument for social construction as grounding. I will then argue that social constructionism and grounding are incompatible for two reasons 1) social phenomena cannot be grounded in individual phenomena and 2) even if we could find a way to ground social construction, doing so would render it epiphenomenal. I conclude that the grounding framework is incompatible with social constructionism, at least as I think we should understand it: as the claim that collective attitudes are genuinely causally efficacious.

Lauri Lahikainen

Climate Change, Collective Responsibility, and the Ontology of the City

For a systemic and global problem such as climate change, individual responsibility alone seems inadequate. On the other hand, states and global actors such as the UN have also been unable to act responsibly and enact effective laws and international binding agreements to mitigate climate change. In this situation, in public discourse, some have looked to cities as the prospective collective agents that could take the initiative. The Covenant for Mayors for Climate & Energy, C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, and cities such as New York pledging to commit to the ideals of the Paris Accord as cities represent attempts of such initiatives. Are there philosophical reasons for thinking of cities as collective agents capable of being responsible for climate change? Cities usually have structures for deliberation and decision making like states and corporations, but it is not certain whether these structures are an essential feature of cities. The structures, identities, and mereologies of cities are complicated and geographically differentiated. Many city-dwellers feel all kinds of normative attachments to the city where they live, but for many others their living arrangements are temporary and loyalties lie elsewhere. All in all, cities seem to fulfill the criteria of responsibility to different extents and different degrees, but, on the other hand, this is the case with other collective agents and even individual persons.

What makes cities an especially interesting case both for social ontology and climate ethics is that in cities, the connection with moral agency and infrastructures is clear to see. Cities mitigate climate change by investing and de-investing in infrastructure and planning and building differently. The infrastructural arrangements of the city, in turn, effect the possibilities of individuals for forming social relations, acting in concert, and living sustainably. In 1968 the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre proposed the idea of the right to the city as a political and moral demand. Perhaps, in our warming world, this right could be supplemented by the idea of the responsibility for the city.

Emily McWilliams

Testimonial Injustice Beyond Credibility Deficits

Concepts that illuminate the ethical dimensions of our epistemic lives help us to see and understand the systematic injustices that inhere in our social epistemic norms, practices, and institutions. The ways that we delimit such concepts thus matters, since it has the power to reveal certain injustices, while obscuring others. One such concept that has gained widespread uptake in the philosophical literature of the past decade is Fricker's (2007) notion of testimonial injustice, which occurs when a speaker receives an unfair credibility deficit owing to a prejudice on the part

of the hearer. This concept has served to illuminate the many ways in which a speaker's communicative intentions can be thwarted as a result of both individual prejudices, and unfair distributions of collective markers of credibility. Nonetheless, I will argue that this definition covers over other important ways in which epistemic injustice inheres in the social practice of testimony. I therefore make a case that the notion of testimonial injustice that need not be about a loss of credibility.

I argue for this by (1) introducing a kind of coercive silencing that I call testimonial withdraw, which does not operate via a threat to the speaker's credibility; and, (2) arguing that there are principled reasons to expand our operative definition of testimonial injustice to include testimonial withdraw. More specifically, I draw inspiration from Wanderer (2017) in suggesting that we expand our notion of testimonial injustice to include all phenomena where our grasp of the injustice and the way(s) in which it is distinctly epistemic emerges from an understanding of the social epistemic practice of testimony, broadly construed. This broader notion avoids the danger of circumscribing our definition of testimonial injustice in a way that makes it harder to see and address injustices that fall outside of Fricker's original purview.

Minna-Kerttu Vienola

Authentic Encountering of Others in Physical Presence and in the Media

In philosophical discussion of authenticity, often authenticity means either finding out one's 'true identity', as in works of Charles Taylor, or revealing the groundlessness and contingency of the attributes of one's being, as in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time*. In the contemporary phenomenological discussion, developing further the Heideggerian definition of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*), Tanja Staehler (2014) has brought social media in picture as a form of inauthentic sociality. As she claims, social media constitutes an inauthentic form of sociality while assuming that authentic sociality is possibly constituted in physical bodily presence.

In this paper, I argue against Staehler's assumption about the possibility of authentic sociality in physical presence and state that all sociality is rather inauthentic, at least if we follow Heidegger's definitions of authenticity and inauthenticity. For composing my argument, I use Heidegger's own work as well as Maurice Merleau-Ponty's analysis of sociality. My focus is on the nature and characteristics of sociality from the viewpoint of the possibility of authenticity and especially on the difference between virtual and non-virtual sociality. The interpretations of the works of classical phenomenologists are merely systematic. In the light of Merleau-Ponty's analysis of communication and sociality, we can conclude that all communication is mediated by corporeality and the social-linguistic context in a shared world, while simultaneously our bodily grasp of the world and others extends beyond spatial and temporal presence. In the light of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, then, we can come to a conclusion that if all communication is mediated and occurs when positing the common world, all social life is rather inevitably inauthentic, because authenticity, for him, is inexplicable and related to one's very own possibilities.

I do agree with Staehler in that the sociality in social media is inauthentic, but I disagree with her in that there would be any possibility for authentic sociality at all. While there is no essential difference between sociality in social media or non-virtual face-to-face situations either in the sense of authenticity or in the sense of direct 'body-to-body' and mediated encounters, I suggest that sociality in social media might reveal characteristics of our sociality that remain hidden in non-virtual sociality. Rather, social media is just one form of sociality, but because of its clearly

mediated and half-public form it can help us to reveal aspects of all sociality, such as positing the common world, inauthenticity and mediation.

Bernd Prien

Searle's Social Ontology and the Emergence and Stability of Institutions

In *Making the Social World* John Searle provides an account of institutional facts in terms of collective acceptance: Marks on the ground count as a border in virtue of being collectively accepted as such. However, there is a further question concerning institutional facts that Searle is virtually silent about: What are the social forces that account for the emergence, the stability, and the eventual demise of institutional facts? What are the social forces that bring the members of a society to collectively accept a status function? While Searle would certainly agree that this question is interesting and important, he would presumably argue that it does not belong to the field of social ontology and that he therefore does not have to address it. Social ontology, he would argue, explains what institutional facts are. Why they emerge, change, and cease to exist, is a different question.

In this paper, I want to argue that Searle is committed to address this question. This turns out to be a consequence of the naturalistic standard he adopts for his account of institutional facts, according to which it has to be clear how institutional facts build on the basic facts of nature. More specifically, it should be clear how institutional facts build on abilities of human beings that can be explained by the theory of evolution. Searle argues that his account satisfies this naturalistic requirement because the ability of humans to form we-intentions and thus to collectively accept status functions can be explained by biological evolution.

While I accept this, I think that this does not suffice show that a specific institutional fact can exist in the natural world. In order to show that a given status-function can exist in the natural world, it is not enough to show that humans are capable of accepting it, one also has to show that they would collectively accept it. There are certain psychological laws (shaped by evolution) according to which humans would accept or refuse to accept a status function. One relevant factor certainly is the natural concern of humans for their survival and well-being, another is habituation. Now, in order to show that a specific status function can exist in the natural world, it has to be shown in accordance with these psychological laws, that humans would actually accept this institution.

The gap in Searle's argument can be illustrated by looking at institutions that work against the interests of the majority. I believe that institutions of this kind exist, but in order to explain how they can exist in the natural world, one has to explain why, given the psychological laws governing such acceptance, all or most members of a society actually do so.

I thus conclude that, in order to live up to his naturalistic standards, Searle has to include at least the broad outlines of an account of why humans accept certain status functions. In other words, he has to address the questions of the emergence, stability, and historical development of institutions.

Julisa Fernandez-Rivera

Collective Responsibility and Non-Agential Collectives

In the literature on collective responsibility, theorists have utilized different methods in order to argue collective responsibility can be attributed to collectives. Some theorists have referred to Strawson's account of participant reactive attitudes in order to support their claims that certain collectives can be the appropriate targets of reactive attitudes. According to Strawson, attributing reactive attitudes, such as guilt, praise, hurt feelings, obligation, etc. towards others and ourselves is what constitutes moral responsibility. Though Strawson's account only focuses on individual responsibility, theorists, such as Deborah Tollefsen and Kay Mathiesen, have extended his account to support their claims about collective responsibility. Tollefsen argues that, similar to individual agents, certain collectives can be the appropriate target of reactive attitudes if they have the capacity of moral address. Mathiesen, on the other hand, uses a Strawsonian approach in order to develop a set of conditions for moral agency that only specific kinds of collectives can meet. As a result, the collectives that meet the criteria these theorists have developed are structured, collective agents, such as companies, governments, institutions, etc.

I have discussed how Strawson's work has been used in the literature to point out that Tollefsen and Mathiesen are assuming that the way we analyze how an individual is the appropriate target of reactive attitudes has to be extended or carried over to the collective. My claim in this paper is that there is no prima facie reason for our assessment of individuals and collectives to be analogous. Specifically, I am skeptical as to whether collectives have to meet the moral address condition in the way that individuals do. As a result, I argue that non-agential, loosely structured collectives can, nonetheless, be bearers of collective responsibility by being the appropriate objects of reactive attitudes. As my case example, I will be using the Latinx ethnoracial collective.

Petri Ylikoski and Emrah Aydinonat:

Explaining Institutional Change

Any full theory of institutions should be able to account for their emergence, persistence, and change. However, it seems that extant theories both in philosophy and the social sciences are mostly focused on explaining persistence and stability of institutions. For example, Mahoney and Thelen (2009) argue that existing theories of institutions are biased towards exogenous shocks as causes of institutional change, ignoring slow and endogenous processes of change. Furthermore, they argue that when institutions are treated as causes, the big and abrupt changes are salient while slow and incremental changes are ignored. Especially they claim that rational choice theory inspired theories of institutions that emphasize the self-enforcing nature of institutions makes it conceptually necessary that the change is exogenous. As rational choice institutionalism has become prominent also in social ontology with Francesco Guala's rules-in-the-equilibrium account of institutions, it makes sense to see whether the charge made by Mahoney and Thelen holds. Thus, the present paper asks whether there is an inherent bias in rational-choice institutionalism, and particularly in the rules-in-equilibrium approach, against explaining endogenous institutional change. If such a bias exists, what are its sources? Is the bias just a reflection of the cases to which the theory has been applied to, or is there a more principal reason for it? Does the bias consist of blindness towards certain kinds of causes of change, or is it based on the more general presumption of stability of institutions?

The paper begins by comparing Mahoney and Thelen's historical institutionalist theory of institutional change with the rules-in-the-equilibrium theory that has been defended by Avner Greif in political science and Guala in philosophy. Both Greif and Guala claim that their theory provides a unified account of institutions, so it is fair to compare it to a theory that Mahoney and Thelen claim to be especially apt to explaining institutional change. Our primary interest is in how these two alternative ways of conceptualizing institutions fare in terms of their ability to explain institutional change. We consider whether the approaches are biased towards certain ways of conceptualizing change, whether they rule out certain sources of change, and whether there is a trade-off between their ability to account for change and for their ability to explain stability. We also ask whether the two accounts are mutually compatible, or even complementary. We conclude the paper with some more general lessons about theorizing about institutions.

Martin Miragoli

Group Belief Functionalism

Epistemic attributions to collective entities (groups of friends, associations, institutions, collections) are pervasive in ordinary language. We say that juries believe that the defendant is guilty, or that gastroenterologists know that ulcers are caused by *Helicobacter Pylori*. Moreover, beliefs are produced in different ways by different types of groups. For example, beliefs realised in groups of friends can be understood as mere judgements that are common knowledge within such groups; beliefs attributed to companies or organisations, on the other hand, typically correspond to the beliefs of their operative members, while political institutions (governments, councils) combine the belief of their members according to specific aggregation procedure (majoritarian, dictatorial, unanimity).

Collective epistemology is the area in epistemology that seeks to answer the question: "how do we understand epistemic ascription to collective entities?". Traditionally, collective epistemologists have attempted to analyse group belief either by aggregation of individual beliefs, or independently of them. Deflationists (Quinton 1976) argue that belief attributions to collective entities must be understood in a purely metaphorical way, and be reduced to the mere 'sum' of individual beliefs. Inflationists, on the other hand, claim that collective doxastic attitudes do not depend on the members' beliefs, but rather on their Joint Acceptance (Gilbert 1987), or their Social Function within the group (Bird 2010). Crucially, however, both inflationist and deflationist views suffer from the same belief under-generation problem – that is, they unjustifiably rule out plausible cases of collective belief – and thus fail to give a satisfactory account of group belief. Despite this, I argue, they offer valid explanations at least for some cases: for instance, deflationism successfully describes beliefs realised by collections of individuals, whereas inflationism plausibly accounts for institutionalized groups. This suggests that, depending on the cases, group belief can be realised in different ways.

In this article, I argue that the failure of these accounts can be traced back to the fact that collective epistemologists have modelled their views on specific types of group belief production, arbitrarily assumed as distinctive. Conversely, as we acknowledge the plurality of belief-realisation types, a functionalist approach naturally suggests itself. In conclusion, then, I sketch a novel functionalist model that analyses group belief in virtue of the role it plays in the system of which it is part. I show that this model reveals particularly suited in that it does not just aptly deflect the main objections that threaten competing accounts, but it also accommodates elegantly the plural realisability of

collective belief while preserving at the same time the intuitions of both views concerning different groups' belief-realisation mechanisms (individual belief aggregation, joint acceptance or social function).

Niels de Haan

Collective Responsibility and the Principle of Blame Presupposes Duty

Moral responsibility as in blameworthiness presupposes the violation or unfulfillment of a moral imperative. If I am retrospectively morally blameworthy for harming you, then this presupposes that, prospectively, I had an all-things-considered obligation not to harm. Call this the principle of blame-presupposes-duty (Hindriks 2014, Ross 1939, Scanlon 1998, Wallace 1994). I investigate whether and how this principle functions in collective contexts. If type-symmetrical, (i) collective responsibility necessarily presupposes a collective duty; and (ii) given that only moral agents can have moral duties, collective responsibility necessarily presupposes collective moral agency. The assumption of type-symmetry seems widespread among procedural collectivists, as I call them, who (roughly) equate collective (moral) agency with a group having a procedure that facilitates rational decision-making (Collins 2017; French 1984; Hess 2014; Hindriks 2009; Lawford-Smith 2015; List & Pettit 2011). Analyzing various cases of blameworthy collective actions involving various types of groups, I argue that non-agential groups can be collectively responsible without having a collective obligation, because the violation of individual obligations may lead to irreducible collective wrongdoing for which only the group is blameworthy.

First, I show why proceduralists think that, just as an individual agent, a group agent can be non-distributively collectively responsible for either a group action or a consequence of their group action because the group agent was culpably ignorant. Next, I construct a similar case involving a purposive collective (May 1987), a mob lacking any (informal) decision-making procedure, and show that the joint action and subsequently the wrongdoing is equally irreducible. Barring any excuses or exemptions, the responsibility must be irreducible as well. But the individuals only had individual duties to refrain from harm. To retain type-symmetry the proceduralist can employ a reductionist strategy and argue that members share responsibility in full (Zimmerman 1985) in virtue of either the joint intention or the collective goal. However, this strategy fails for large-scale joint actions involving purposive groups and other cases involving weak collective actions, where agents rely on other's de facto participatory intentions without common knowledge (Tuomela 2007), because there is a too large discrepancy between the group's ethos, the contributory act and the to-be-foreseen-consequence. Moreover, some cases involve neither a joint intention nor a shared goal, but only aggregated 'actions' of members of an unstructured collective that result in a bad state of affairs that can only be imputed to the non-agential collective.

Proceduralists cannot claim there are nonetheless collective obligations without there being a group agent (Schwenkenbecher 2018), because it is clear what is individually morally required without we-framing the situation. Therefore, collective responsibility possibly presupposes the violation of individual duties. The irreducible wrongdoing transforms the nature of blame. Because of this asymmetry, certain arguments that show that non-agential groups can or cannot have obligations fail. Moreover, procedural collectivists can no longer invoke collective responsibility to argue for the irreducibility of collective agency (Copp 2006). Finally, having conceptually pried apart agency and responsibility, I show this is not problematic for individual responsibility, because here agency, obligations, wrongdoing and blame never come apart.

Adam Klewenhagen

Division of Linguistic Labor, Recognition and a Problem of Class

My paper poses three questions concerning the eponymous concepts and their relations:

- 1) What role the (Hegelian-Branomian) notion of mutual recognition, as a semantic-normative ground of social intercourses, plays within the structures of what Putnam called the "Division of Linguistic Labor" (DLL)?
- 2) How class stratification, being a result of a "mundane" division of labor, affect the normative consequences of DLL?
- 3) How, in turn, the formal frames of recognition impact the actual possibilities of expression of class-related interests, claims and their validation within the institutions of public sphere.

The answer to (1) is that the twofold impact of recognition can be indicated in respect to DLL. Firstly, it is necessary to apply a notion of recognition to properly conceptualize the very function of being an expert. Secondly, since in this picture expert's opinions are not only descriptive but also normative factor determining meanings, the DLL needs to be understood as setting the rules of undertaking and ascribing commitments. In respect to (2) I claim that the embedment in the role of an expert is class-dependent and so are semantic norms based on expert's authority. Moreover, also the relation of a speaker towards these norms may differ according to her class-status. Ad (3) it is stated that besides (e.g. juridical) institutions securing formal frames of mutual recognition underlying the very notion of social communication, the class-related conflicts limiting agents' means of claiming their interest may well be reproduce within those frames. What follows from these points is the contradiction between institutionalizing notion of language (based on assumption of normative mutual recognition of speakers) and language as institutionalized by non-institutional norms concerning labor and its division. These norms are non-institutional not because they function regardless of any form of collective intentionality. However, they are non-institutional inasmuch as labor, class, economic interest etc. are not to be explained solely in terms of constitutive rules. The conclusion of the paper proposes to settle the contradiction in favor of non-institutional factors, appreciating interest- rather than intention-oriented aspects of institutionalization.

The above claims are supported by an argument based on these assumptions: DLL is understood as a genuine, non-metaphorical mechanism of expert's knowledge fixing the reference of terms used by laymen. Its range is also widened to 'natural-kind terms' others than those of natural sciences (especially to terms of social sciences such as "property" or "justice"). Referentialism assumed in DLL is here separated from essentialism. These suppositions allow to apply DLL to an analysis of the public discourse on vital social issues (3) and to found the expert-layman distinctions on social ground, rather than on former's knowledge of the essence (1).

Recognition is meant to be present both in the notion of scorekeeping and of principle of charity (interpreted as a form of scorekeeping). Its institutionalized forms are also believed to rely on the linguistic ones, although the content of the later is probably more modest and itself open for the influence of non-intentional normativity of labor-sphere. This supports the normative character of expertise (1) and class-dependence of this normativity (2, 3, conclusion).

Björn Petersson

The concept of group identification and its relevance

The idea that individuals may identify with groups has been central in social psychology at least since the seventies. Group identification is regarded as an explanatory factor in relation to group victimization and group victimhood, discrimination, etc. However, in these contexts it is not always clear what it means for an individual to identify with a group. Ambiguities in the phrase “identify with a group” leads to risks of fallacious equivocations. Moreover, some uses of the phrase appear less fruitful than others.

The concept of group identification has also had a recent renaissance in different areas of analytical philosophy. In philosophy of action, group identification is related to the question of how to distinguish collective action from mere coordination. In game theory, it is central to the much discussed “team reasoning” model. In moral philosophy, it is invoked in relation to criteria for moral and legal complicity.

I discuss some uses of “group identification”. My tentative claim is that there is a fruitful way of understanding group identification which is relevant to, and gets support from, the different contexts, and that a scientifically respectable functional analysis of this core concept would clarify empirical claims as well as issues of relevance to ethics and practical rationality. The discussion draws upon recent discussions by e.g. Salice and Miazono, Pacherie, Blomberg, and Petersson.

Simon Derpmann

Ownership in Money and the Commodification of Money

Money, credit and finance are not novel social instruments, but they have been driving forces of capitalist development from the very introduction of markets, taxes, debt, contracts, corporations and banks. Among the integral features of the capitalist order is the ability of economic subjects to dispose over money, spend money, save money, or invest money, and it appears that they only have these opportunities on the basis of ownership in money. Most normative analyses of the social meaning of money are primarily concerned with its function as a market maker rather than a market object. However, just like other commodities money can be described as being produced and traded through private banking. This disposition of money is arguably an essential feature of contemporary capitalism. Due to the economic power associated with the creation and trade of money, the moral justification of the regulation of markets for money and credit is debatable. This relates to the role of commercial banks in financial crises, but also to the status of public debt, or practices of predatory lending.

Objections to the regulation of markets in money, finance, and capital regularly resort to money as an object of basic property rights. After all, how could monetary intermediation function without having the proprietary right to use and alienate money? This initially pervasive line of defense of basic claims of ownership to money runs presupposes a reifying conception of money and a premature transfer of the morality of ownership in material objects to that in immaterial or incorporeal objects. Only based on this reifying conception of money and this transition, the default position emerges that ownership in money implies property rights that in turn grant the power to alienate money in market exchanges.

In my contribution, I aim to demonstrate the significance of an adequate social ontology of money to the morality of the practice of commodifying money. I defend the thesis that the social constitution of money as relation of credit that is embedded in a social monetary framework justifies interferences into markets for money and finance. First, I reject the common conception of money as a quantifiable object belonging to individual market subjects by reference to contemporary monetary theory and economic sociology that account for money in terms of a relation of credit and debt. Second, I demonstrate that, while the idea of property rights may also be applicable to money in this relational understanding, the moral implications for the configuration of concrete proprietary titles to money are limited due to the social nature of money and its dependency on the institution of money through an economic community.

Judith Martens

Dancing together: a skillful joint activity

In recent scholarship the difference between joint and parallel action manifests itself in two broad categories of theories developed around two types of coordination of joint actions. There is a tendency among philosophers to distinguish between emergent coordination (Lakin et al. 2003; Knoblich et al; 2011, Tollefsen and Dale 2012; Pacherie 2013) and planned coordination (Bratman 2007, 2014; Knoblich et al., 2011; Gilbert 1990, 2009; Tuomela 1999, 2007). These two approaches both try to underpin the distinction between parallel and joint cases

By setting up the debate in this way, (1) philosophers and psychologists underestimate the interdependence of the different levels of coordination and (2) overemphasize the difference between the two types of coordination. This state of the debate pushes us to accept a framework of dualism, i.e. a strict division between two kinds of joint action and a strict division between joint action and parallel action. This division is problematic because it does not do justice to many “in-between” cases.

A tripartite distinction in the conceptualization of coordination in joint action allows us to better capture many of the phenomena that are considered key to this debate. This tripartite distinction is based on the tripartite distinction in control that we find in the debate on skillful action: strategic control, situation control (or selective, top-down, automatic attention), and implementation control (Pacherie 2008, Fridland 2014, and Christensen and colleagues 2016) I introduce three levels of coordination. Together these three levels of coordination allow us to skillfully act together.

A. Planned Coordination. Long-term plans (ranging from the upcoming minute to the upcoming years).

B. Situation Coordination. Adjustments of existing plans because of contingencies and on-the-spot improvisations when there is no plan yet.

C. Emergent Coordination. At all times agents that are interacting and acting jointly will adjust their movements and facilitate coordination of their movements through alignment and synchronization mechanisms.

My proposal will be illustrated with the example of dancing together, a key example in the joint action debate. I discuss dancing together, more particularly ballroom dancing, for two reasons. First of all, it already is a beloved example that has been used in the debate about joint action (i.e., Bratman, 2014; Gilbert, 2006, 2009; Vesper et al., 2010; Tollefsen and Dale, 2012). It appeals

because engaging in dancing together seems to be an activity in which jointness is at the core of the activity.

I will argue that a closer examination of dancing together, although it is used as an example by many theorists in joint action, shows that all these theories are incomplete at best. This partially has to do with a general tendency for dichotomous thinking. Having been a performing ballroom dancer and teacher myself I can draw on this experience to elucidate my proposal. Ballroom dancing shows that we cannot dance together based only on either only emergent coordination or planned coordination alone. Furthermore, it shows that we sometimes have to make decisions on the spot, decisions best described through situation control.

Maryam Ebrahimi Dinani

Constitutive Rules: Definitional or Essential?

This paper is about a distinction between two types of constitutive rules. I enter the discussion through speech act theories and through an analogy between speech acts and competitive games. I then explain how this analogy is formulated in the literature in terms of what is known as “constitutive rules”, and I discuss two distinct, but conflated, ways of characterizing constitutive rules from the works of Williamson and Searle: According to both authors, speech acts, as well as games, are governed by constitutive rules, but whereas a constitutive rule in the Williamsonian sense is a rule that is essential to an act, such that it necessarily governs every performance of the act (Williamson T., 2000: 239), a constitutive rule in the Searlian sense is a rule that is tautological in character, such that it can be seen, now as a rule, now as an analytic truth based on the meaning of the activity term in question. (Searle J., 1969: 34). In the second part, I introduce a distinction between two types of constitutive rules, which I call “definitional” vs. “essential” constitutive rules. Definitional rules correspond to the Searlian sense of ‘constitutive’, and essential rules correspond to the Williamsonian sense. The difference lies in the fact that if a constitutive rule is definitional, we do not engage in the act of which the rule is definitional if we do not act in accordance with the rule, but if a constitutive rule is essential, obeying it is not a necessary condition for performing the act which is constituted by that rule. I then give a possible explanation of the distinction within the institutional framework, where we could make a parallel distinction between what I call “intra-institutional” vs. “inter-institutional” concepts: The former are concepts that are entirely defined or that exist only in virtue of a rule within a certain institution, and the latter are somewhat-floating concepts used in different institutions. (Miller D., 1981) I argue that such a distinction could help us find an explanation in the institutional framework for the distinction between the two types of constitutive rules. I finish the paper by looking at one possible account of the nature of the essential type of constitutive rules, through a realist account of the social act of promising, given by A. Reinach (Reinach A., 1913), according to which the social act of promising, as such, is governed by “essential laws” and I explain two characteristics of these laws: their immediate intelligibility and their non-forgettability. I conclude the paper by mentioning some implications of the distinction between two types of rules.

Marija Jankovic

Lying as subversion of cooperative communication

I propose an account of lying as a subversion of the practice of cooperative communication, i.e., communication between sincere speakers and attentive audiences. Cooperative communication is

not merely “the sum of a speaker speaking and a listener listening” (Clark, 1996) but an action that results from speakers speaking and listeners listening as their parts in something they aim to do together. That is, it is a collective intentional action. Specifically, cooperative communication is an action type with two participants (S and A) whose roles are these:

- (1) S says p only if p is true
- (2) A attends in order to determine that S does (1).

S and A cooperatively communicate when there is a proposition p such that S says it intending to perform his part in their cooperatively communicating, and A determines that S does so as a result of attending to S’s utterance as her part in their cooperatively communicating. S cooperatively tells p to A iff S says p intending to perform his part in cooperative communication with A.

Lying is a subversion of cooperative telling in the following respect. Agents of collective intentional actions are, as a matter of general principle, obligated to one another to do their parts (see e.g., Gilbert 1989, 2006, Roth 2004). Applied to cooperative communication, this principle entails that the speaker is obligated to the addressee to perform his part in cooperative communication. To lie is to say a proposition one believes to be false, intending to place oneself under and at the same time to violate this communicative obligation. Or more specifically, S lies to A iff there is a proposition p such that

- (1) S says p and in doing so
- (2) intends to become obligated to this utterance being his part in cooperative communication with A and
- (3) intends to violate that obligation by saying something he believes to be false

In short, a lie is an utterance that aims to establish an obligation to it being the liar’s part in cooperative communication and at the same time violates that obligation.

This account is preferable to rival accounts on two grounds: (i) it delivers correct verdicts on examples that confound others (for example, it rules in so-called “bald-faced lies (see Carson 2006, Sorensen 2007) and rules out non-literal speech), and, (ii) it explains the common intuition that lies wrong their addressees even when they are not deceptive.

Alex Bryant

Inclusive Anchor Individualism: A Comparative Model of Individualist Social Ontologies

Brian Epstein’s recent engagement with individualist metaphysics in the social sciences charges that such views harmfully misrepresent the bases of social construction and can thereby lead to unfounded support for important social policies and scientific claims. While I am receptive to Epstein’s project, I suggest that his published work emphasizes counter-examplifying individualist models of social construction that are minimally inclusive of variety within their conceptual framework, and that future research should prioritize demonstrating the inadequacy of theoretically inclusive individualist models.

To better account for the range of theoretical flexibility available to metaphysicians who hope to ward off Epstein’s critique, this paper provides a new comparative model of individualist social ontologies and notes three examples of comparative conceptual inclusivity in individualist theories

that Epstein must contend with. To do so, I develop Epstein's own suggestion of three forms of counter-examplification which are likely to discredit individualist models. Given the bases upon which individualist theories are available to Epstein's critique, I show that some individualist anchor theories will survive through the inclusivity of their model of frame principles creation and the variety of facts which underwrite such processes.

More exclusive theories of anchoring social facts (1) take a homogeneous view of possible types of facts constitutive of social facts (admitting as few as one type, e.g. facts about certain mental states like beliefs); (2) adopt a specific thesis about anchoring processes (that there is just one way that frame principles are metaphysically anchored, which they specify); and, (3) are demanding with respect to the capacities required to participate in the social construction of frame principles (e.g. cognitive or other capacities which restrict facts relevant to (1) and (2) to facts about a limited set of adult human beings). On the inclusive end of the model are theories which (1) take a broad view of the possible types of individualist facts which anchor frame principles (e.g. admitting mental states, social practices, tacit conventions, and/or others); (2) only adopt the generic thesis (Epstein 2015) of anchor individualism that frame principles are anchored by facts about individuals without committing to a general account of how this occurs; and, (3) are inclusive with respect to the types and content of anchoring facts in order that facts about individuals of varied capacities are admissible as anchors.

Using this comparative analysis, I identify the cascading negative impact of commitments to a homogeneous view of anchoring facts for individualist theories while also noting that more inclusive models are sufficiently flexible to accommodate at least some of Epstein's worries about prioritizing individual human agents in the study of sociality. As inclusive models avoid many of the pitfalls of individualist social ontology Epstein's published worries address, this comparative analysis also highlights that future research in pluralist metaphysics must problematize these inclusive forms of anchor individualism.

Samuli Reijula

Social kinds in the making – construction or recruitment?

Real kinds, both natural and social ones, are characterized by inductive thickness. A real kind has a relatively stable set of conceptually independent projectable properties. Somewhat surprisingly, even some purely social kinds (e.g., ethnicity, gender, teenager, genius) show such multiple projectability. I explore different accounts of the origin of the inductive thickness of social kinds. Such accounts have been put forward by philosophers but also by social theorists. Most traditional theories of natural kinds are not applicable to purely social kinds. Collective-acceptance based accounts of institutional kinds are problematic as well: Focusing on the logical structure of social reality often leads us to ignore the unintended consequences of kind formation and categorization. Mallon (2016) defends a causal-mechanistic view inspired by Boyd's homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theory of natural kinds. I argue that although Mallon's account provides a viable picture of the metaphysics of real kinds, the one-mechanism-per-one-kind view suggested by HPC theory is uninformative in the case of purely social kinds. The inductive reliability of such kinds is typically not explained by a single homeostatic mechanism, but instead by different kinds of mechanisms (i) generating and (ii) sustaining multiple projectability. I propose that the research done in relational sociology on boundary formation (Abbott 1995; Lamont & Molnar 2002; Tilly 2004) can be used to complement Mallon's account. Abbott, in particular, suggests a useful inversion: Instead of starting

from pre-existing concepts and categories, we should begin from the emergence of boundaries and see how they give to units/entities. Mechanisms of boundary formation (e.g., invention, borrowing, encounter and certification) and stabilization (e.g. different forms of intragroup and intergroup interaction) play a key role in the emergence and maintenance of social kinds: Social categories do not emerge out of thin air. They result from processes in which local sites of difference are, so to say, linked or stitched together into boundaries, which, when stabilized – often by often a distinct set of mechanisms – give rise to inductively rich social kinds.

Pierre Saint-Germier, Clément Canonne and Cédric Paternotte

With or without shared representations? The case of collective free improvisation

The study of human cooperation is divided in two strands. On the one hand, we find mostly philosophical accounts of human joint actions, all of which hinge on shared representations: it is in virtue of sharing certain mental attitudes that we manage to cooperate and coordinate so reliably. There is little consensus on the nature of such fundamental shared representations: Shared plans of action (Bratman)? Joint commitments (Gilbert)? Collective modes (Tuomela)? Common knowledge (all of the above)? Even recent minimal approaches – which aim to obtain streamlined characterisations of joint action by reducing its reliance on joint representations – still have to retain some of them (e.g. joint goals in Butterfill's recent 'minimalist approach'). Such classical accounts typically target complex, high-level tasks.

On the other hand, a mostly psychological literature focuses in low-level, simple cases of coordination and on their psychological or cognitive mechanisms (entrainment effects, affordances, etc.). Shared representations are hardly necessary for collective success in such cases, which typically emerge from interactions. Overall, we would have a reasonably clear-cut distinction between full-fledged, complex, intentional joint actions and minimal, simple, emergent collective actions, the understanding of which respectively relies on high-level mental attitudes or low-level cognitive processes.

We aim to break this dichotomy and question the necessity of shared representations for full-fledged joint actions by focusing on collective free improvisation (CFI), an extremely complex, high-level joint activity in which low-level processes are nonetheless crucial. In CFI, musicians aim to play together, although without any preconceived plan regarding the rhythmic/harmonic structure, the instruments' respective roles, or even the type of music to be played. Any key structures or properties of the performance are supposed to emerge freely during the improvisation. In short, behaviourally speaking, CFIs appear as cases of (at least sometimes) successful, complex coordination where an enormous number of choices are available; but mechanism-wise, they appear to rely only on emergence due to low-level mechanisms.

The question is thus: does CFI show that high-level joint actions may be possible without any shared representations to guide them? We reply by considering different options. First, distributed cognition accounts may favour the all-emergence thesis. Second, shared representations may be present, although of a unusual type. We will argue for this latter option, by showing 1/ how CFI does allow for less freedom than it seems (there are but a few kinds of strategies to follow and of cues to communicate to others); 2/ by identifying a number of shared/public representations that are present after all, although at short time-scales. Even apparently strongly emergent joint actions such as CFI turn out to involve shared representations.

Kaisa Kärki and Säde Hormio

Intentional omissions of groups

Some social phenomena such as strikes, boycotts, non-participations and acts of civil disobedience are at the basic level intentional omissions. In an intentional omission, an agent does not do something, recognizes the possibility of action and forms an evaluation toward this possibility. In addition, there is an appropriate relation between the agent's evaluation and the actual omission of hers.

Some intentional omissions are such that they may only be accomplished by a group of agents. How should we understand the nature of intentional omissions by groups? What distinguishes collectively not performing an action from an aggregate of individual omissions of agents?

In the most minimal sense, individual intentional omissions consist in the agents procedural metacognition toward the action not done in which the agent picks the action not done to her horizon of future action. In group intentional omissions this means that the action not done must be somehow noticed by the agents and it must be considered as something "we are not doing".

We argue that what distinguishes group intentional omissions of from the aggregate of individual ones is either a shared plan, or a group identity, that can be found by doing or not doing something together. Intentional omissions thus both result from as well as constitute the agency of groups.

For instance, agents not laughing at a sexist joke are not doing it together unless they a) have made a plan to act in a non-sexist way, and recognize laughing at a sexist joke as an instance of sexist behavior, or b) spontaneously decide not to laugh, but have found a sense of group agency that may have been formed by previous acts or omissions during which a collective form of acting was established.

Shared attitudes are not enough to account for group intentional omissions but shared attitudes toward certain kind of actions are needed as well as picking out these actions as something that is not done by the agents. The recognition, "this is the kind of action that constitutes consent to sexist attitudes" is needed for the group to intentionally omit laughing for a sexist joke. A group merely lacking motivation to do anything is not intentionally omitting on our account.

This view does not necessitate that the properties of group intentionality somehow transcend those of the properties of its individual parts. Furthermore, the proposed view suggests that the metacognitive capabilities of individual agents in groups are central for understanding the moral and political responsibility of agents in groups. Individuals may act as the "conscience" of a group. It matters what we do not do as individuals because intentional omissions of agents have the power to conform as well as create new group identities and shared possibilities of action. The interplay between individual intentional omissions and those of groups are at the base of our understanding of central social phenomena from non-participations to revolutions. A theory of this interplay may also enlighten our role and responsibility of individuals as social beings.

Adrian Boutel

Downward Social Causation

Individual action is often naturally explained in social or cultural terms. Individuals' behaviour—from choice of language to wedding speeches—varies with the practices, norms and institutions of their

societies. But ascribing individual behaviour to social-level *causes* is sometimes objected to, on the basis that doing so denies individual agency, or conflicts with either methodological or ontological individualism. I discuss how a modified interventionist account of causation can yield an inoffensive account of social “downward” causation, one which is compatible with both materialist supervenience of the social level on the individual, and individual agency.

A standard interventionist approach applies to agency. Variations in (or interventions on) individual minds produce variations in their behaviour. A simple interventionist approach to social causation, however, is complicated by the metaphysical principle that social-level phenomena supervene on facts about individuals, including action-producing mental states. Interventions on the social-level phenomena do produce changes in behaviour, but it is hard for those interventions to be surgical, since they affect—non-causally—the individual-level phenomena. (This is analogous to the problem for mental causation discussed by Bennett (2003).)

A proportionality approach (as introduced by Yablo (1992) and developed by inter alia List and Menzies (2009)) offers a solution for social-level causation. The social cause is proportional to the effect in the sense that it is what “makes the difference”: variations in the lower-level phenomena which do not change the high-level cause leave the effect in place.

Since this combined approach is consistent with supervenience, it does not entail an autonomous social ontology. And since it respects the low-level causes as causes, it does not compromise individual agency—it does not, for example, entail a denial that actions are “the rational outcome of the agent’s beliefs and desires” (Macdonald & Pettit, 1981:104).

However, motivated by casual-exclusion worries, the proportionality approach has traditionally ruled out the non-proportional cause as a cause, in favour of the proportional cause. The case of social causation illustrates the desirability of including causation at both levels. Doing so, of course, leaves the causal-exclusion problem in place. (In fact, since there is no obvious prospect of even token-reduction of a social property to an individual-level one, the social causal-exclusion problem might seem worse.) On the other hand, the differences between the approaches to causal identification employed at each level suggest this is not an objectionable kind of overdetermination.

Eliot Litalien

Collective Agency, Interference and Domination

Much attention has been devoted to the notions of collective responsibility and of individual responsibility in the context of collective action. Many authors have argued that it is possible to assign collective responsibility, and that it is difficult to assign individual responsibility in the context of collective action, because groups are or can be agents in their own right. Just as it is the case for individuals, agency attribution qualify groups for responsibility attribution. For that reason, if those group agents act, say, in a normatively problematic way, they can properly be said to wrong others and be blamed for their actions. What has been, however, given much less attention, if at all, is the question of whether groups, because they are agents, can themselves be wronged.

In this paper, I argue that we have good reason to think that group agents can indeed be wronged, as groups, because they are agents. In a nutshell, my argument is that group agents can see their agency curtailed in ways that are morally problematic. The argument proceeds in three steps.

I first (1) argue that certain groups can qualify as agents because they display, just like individual agents do, intentionality. In other words, certain groups are agents because they have intentional structures that allow them to make choices whose etiology cannot be reduced to the actions and intentions of their individual components—although those actions and intentions do indeed participate to the collective level of intentionality and agency. Then, I (2) show that the wrong-making feature of certain evils that individuals can experience is to be located in their effect on individuals' agency. More precisely, I argue that (at least) interference and domination are evils because they curtail agency. Finally, I (3) contend that because certain groups are agents, they can, as groups, suffer from interference and domination, that is, from constraints imposed on their agency and/or from a vulnerability to such constraints. As such, their choices or options can be constrained by interference or the possibility of interference from another agent, be it an individual, a group of individuals or another collective agent.

In this paper, then, I argue that findings or conclusions in social ontology have important normative significance. If I am right that certain groups have agency, and if interference and domination have effects on an entity's agency, those groups are, like individual agents, appropriate targets of interference and domination. Although that does not entail any specific obligation that we could have toward group agents, I think it does entail at least that we have pro tanto reasons to avoid to interfere with or dominate those agents.

James Miller

Are Linguistic Kinds Natural Kinds?

If there are linguistic kinds then they are kinds of linguistic entities. For example, particular nouns will be instances of the kind 'NOUN'. Prima facie, there are a number of different linguistic kinds, possibly including, but not limited to, kinds of words, spellings, graphemes, pronunciations, phonemes, meanings, and senses.

Recently there has been a growing interest in social ontology, and in social kinds. Social kinds like MONEY are contrasted with putative natural kinds such as WATER and TIGER. Linguistic kinds seem to be social kinds at least in the sense that they depend on social phenomenon (i.e. speakers) for their existence (see Haslanger 1995: 97-98).

They also, I argue, are good candidates for being natural kinds for (at least) the following reasons (see Mason 2016):

1. All members of a linguistic kind have some natural property in common (e.g. all instances of the kind 'WORD' have some determinate of the determinable property 'meaning');
2. Linguistic kinds permit inductive inferences as shown by the success of linguistics as a science of language (e.g. the kind 'NOUN' permits inductive inferences about the relation any particular noun will bear to other particular words within a grammatical structure);
3. Linguistic kinds form a hierarchy (e.g. the kind 'VERB' has subkinds of transitive and intransitive verbs).

Given this, in this paper, I will argue that at least some some linguistic kinds are natural kinds. That is, I will defend the claim that some kinds, such as 'NOUN', 'VERB', and 'WORD' are natural kinds, but I will argue that more specific word-kinds such as 'TABLE' (posited by Wetzel 2009, Hawthorne and Lepore 2011 and others) are not natural kinds.

I conclude the paper by suggesting which linguistic kinds we should be committed to. I will argue for two further conclusions. First, I argue that particular word-kinds, such as 'TABLE', are not natural kinds. This is because the members of such a putative kind do not share any property in common (see Miller 2019); and it is implausible that such kinds form a hierarchy of word-kinds in the way that grammatical kinds do.

Second, I will argue that linguistics and empirical research should play a central role in the identification of the real natural linguistic kinds (for example, whether 'NOUN' is a real kind or should be rejected in favour of more technical grammatical kinds posited within our best theories of syntax). I argue that whilst there are linguistic kinds and at least some of them are natural, which linguistic kind terms identify genuine natural kinds is, at least in part, an empirical matter. Engagement with the disciplines that enquire into the cognitive, social, and psychological aspects of language and language use is required to begin to identify which terms pick out genuine kinds, just as engagement with physics, chemistry, and biology is required to identify which terms pick out genuine physical, chemical, and biological kinds.

Federica Gregoratto

Transformative Collective Emotions

Debates around collective intentionality and joint action or agency have recently dived into collective emotions (e.g. Scheve and Salmela, eds. 2014; Ziv and Schmid, eds. 2014). In this paper, my aim is to explore whether and to which extent collective emotions can have a critical and transformative social role. In particular, I concentrate on positive collective emotions (e.g. joy) experienced within small collectivities of love and friendship, since these are the ones usually disregarded by social and political philosophy.

In the first part of the paper, I argue that it is in small groups of friends and/or lovers that we find exemplary cases of intense shared emotions. I discuss Angelika Krebs' (2015) work, which offers the most detailed account of love/friendship in terms of both collective agency and emotions. Since she equates love and collective action/emotion, however, her view is flawed; in particular, she is not able to clarify the relation between actions and emotions.

In the second part of the paper, I explain one possible link between shared emotions and collective action by investigating the critical and transformative effects of collectivities of lovers/friends. I draw upon those accounts that envisage not only the evaluative but also the world-creating and world-transformative consequences of individual emotions (Hartmann 2016; Congdon 2018) and show how these positions can be applied to shared emotions as well. Audre Lorde's (2007) reflections on the power of the erotic, albeit ignored in contemporary philosophy of emotions, can provide precious indications: In her view, the joy experienced in erotic connections might turn into a critical lens through which assessing the social and political context and as a motivational force to undertake collective actions against it (see also Salmela and Nagatsu 2016). In the most radical cases, the collective emotions as motivational force push individuals outside of their love/friendship collectivities to join larger political groups. Joy, moreover, does often appear in conjunction with negative emotions and affects (anger, resentment). As a conclusion, I argue that love and friendship are not to be regarded as mere private phenomena, but at the crossroad between the private and the public.

Antonio Maria Cleani

Towards a Structuralist Account of Social Groups

I argue that Ritchie's group structuralism is best understood not as a single metaphysical account of social groups but rather as a framework within which to develop such accounts, and advance the framework by improving Ritchie's analysis of structure-realisation and outlining a structuralist account of group persistence.

Barbara Fultner

Joint Agency From the Perspective of Ecological Thinking

In *Ecological Thinking*, Lorraine Code articulates a feminist account of subjectivity that criticizes Piagetian and Kohlbergian developmental frameworks for their "reliance on assumptions about achieved rational mastery as the mark of moral and cognitive maturity" (23). Instead, she defends a conception of "developmentality that is socially-ecologically aware in its conception of subjectivity, sociality, and citizenship and its view of knowledge as a power-saturated social institution" (ibid). I have argued elsewhere that a feminist relational conception of the self requires a reconceptualization of the problem of joint intentionality and that one of the shortcomings of many accounts of joint intentionality is their neglect of developmentality. Here, I want to examine the ways in which ecological subjectivity requires us to reconceptualize shared agency. Just as Code asks what (naturalistic) epistemologists can learn from (feminist) developmentalist about the production of knowledge and subjectivity, I ask what social ontologists can learn from developmentalists about shared agency and joint intentionality.

I argue that shared agency need not be regarded as produced by the joining forces of two fully formed autonomous subjects (who, in order to act together, may have to give up some of their autonomy). Rather, shared agency is or can be co-constitutive not only of a collective agent, but also of individual subjects. An ecological conception of agency helps to situate action in a web of socio-cultural practices and norms rather than seeing actions as isolated or isolatable events. I focus on two widely known accounts of shared agency: Michael Bratman's individualist "planning theory of acting together" and Raimo Tuomela's "weakly collectivist" account of acting together. While both of these accounts proceed from the assumption of fully matured, autonomous agents, it has been suggested that they could take on board a relational and developmental conception of the self. I argue against this suggestion because they cannot take on such a conception without radically revising their accounts. Even developmental accounts of joint intentionality such as Michael Tomasello's are subject to critique from the perspective of ecological thinking because they do not adequately take into account cultural, gender, and power differences. An ecological perspective on joint action requires recognizing that shared intentionality is inflected and informed by "place, language, sociality, affectivity, culture, race, and other ecological specificities" (Code, 157) and examining how it is thus inflected and informed.

Adam Arnold

Against Collective Intentionality: On the Production and Critique of Sociality

The major theories of social ontology in contemporary philosophy, despite their differences, share a fundamental assumption regarding the intentional nature of sociality. Sociality is built up, in some

way, from individuals intending to do so (Bratman's meshing sub-plans, Gilbert's joint-commitments, Searle's and Tuomela's we-intentions). Even Gilbert's views about intentions forming rather than being formed and implicit consent maintain this intentional assumption. In the first part of this paper, I will argue against this assumption. By this, I mean that at the fundamental level individuals do not intend to form social groups nor social facts. In order for individual to so intend with others, there must already be in a deep background structure of unconscious shared assumptions and expectations. In the second part of this paper, I will propose a social ontology not fundamentally built from individuals intending to do so. This basis of sociality is a product of a historical process of iterative actions of multiple individuals. However, these individuals are not intending to do anything together in the strong sense. On this view, sociality is produced through an unconscious formation of expectations and assumptions that characterize a *Lebenswelt*. These expectations and assumptions do have the logical structure of a status function (X counts as Y in context C). However, none of the individuals are aware or recognize this – becoming explicit only in cases when there is a violation of the background assumption and even then what was violated might not be readily apparent to anyone. The sharedness of these unconscious expectations and assumptions is secured not through any collectivity but rather through common experiences of individual actions over time. This common experience becomes reified and produces a second nature in which individuals simply take a status function as a natural fact – individuals simply take it as a part of the nature of things. In other words, it is through a common history that status functions are produced in the normal case, it is not through speech-act-like occurrences that need either awareness or recognition from the group. The third part of the paper will develop the upshot of this non-intentional view in terms of *Ideologiekritik*. The goal of *Ideologiekritik* should be the making explicit groups' unconscious deep structure of assumptions and expectations in order for us to make judgments about said structure. If sociality has, at bottom, the sort of intentional structure that is commonly argued for today, then *Ideologiekritik* would not have an objective task as individuals would already be aware of the basis of social structures.

Heikki Patomäki

On the epistemology and historicity of social ontology

The concept of ontology would seem to suggest that social ontology is a branch of metaphysics or at least belongs to the exclusive sphere of philosophy. In a typical characterisation, 'the field can be understood as a branch of metaphysics, the general inquiry into the nature of entities'. The term 'nature' is ambiguous in this context, however. In this paper I argue that social is something that has emerged from nature and is thus distinct from – though dependent on – it. Emergence from nature has been a process occurring in real geohistorical time (raising questions such as 'when?' and 'how?') and concerns the level of intentional action and society. The causal powers of mind can be explained in terms of 'synchronic emergent powers materialism'. The brain provides a basis, medium and vehicle of mental powers, but the powers of the human mind are not reducible to the brain. The properties and powers of the mind evolve in social contexts; and psychological states are relational and make references to social states and structures. Social structures exist, however, in a different way than natural structures and mechanisms. Social structures are activity- and concept-dependent and are thus usually much less stable and enduring than natural structures. The tendencies generated by particular social structures are not invariant across time and space.

What is more, emergence of new things and relations occurs also within layers, such as social. New social relations and practices can emerge and through their combination and integration they also may give rise to emergent powers and properties. For instance, Tyler Volk distinguishes three sublayers of human social existence following the emergence of language and related social complexity: from tribal metagroups to agrovillages to geopolitical states. He also discusses the possibility of a fourth one, a qualitatively new social combination and integration on a planetary scale. For each sublayer there are still further sublayers of emergence, each giving rise to particular properties and powers, for instance changing forms of reflexivity within the industrial civilization of the last two centuries. The multiplication and complexification of concepts, structures, properties and powers casts also a shadow of doubt on any essentialist project of social ontology.

In non-social contexts it makes sense to talk about real categories that are definable in terms of necessary properties and powers – e.g. water – but in social contexts water can become a metaphor for instance for moral purification, spiritual development, or time; and water can be flavoured, polluted, commodified or used as a symbol for power. These categories and uses and their consequent causal and constitutive effects can be criticized. The rules defining the categories of social activities are typically vague and ambiguous, and indeed their force may derive from their ambiguity, hypocrisy, deceptiveness and their effect in reinforcing power structures. Social ontology is not about finding the essence of the ‘nature’ of social being reducible to a few fundamental concepts. Rather any specification of social ontology and social theory must always be subject to the results of concrete historical, causally oriented research. Social ontology is not immune to real historical change. Rather a social ontology is an abstract model of some of the basic characteristics and powers of relational social being in a given geo-historical era, nothing more.

Thomas Brouwer

Social Ontology for Multiple Populations

Social reality is metaphysically rather distinctive. It is objective and mind-independent, but also in an important way constitutively determined by us: our thought, talk and behaviour. Theories of social reality need to explain to us how both of these things can be true. Many authors (e.g. Searle 1995, Thomasson 2003, Einheuser 2006, Hindriks 2013, Tuomela 2013, Epstein 2015) have converged on structurally similar explanations, which run something like this: (1) the facts about the social world are a function of the facts about the non-social world; (2) what that function is like is contingent, and depends (in some way) on our collective thought, talk and behaviour. Because of (1), the social world gets to be objective and mind-independent, and because of (2), it also gets to be constitutively shaped by us.

Any such view will have to further spell out the relations and mechanisms involved, but it's a promising place to start. However, it is typical to make a certain simplifying idealisation in building our theories: that we only have to deal with the thought, talk and behaviour of the members of a single population, who share a common way of doing things (e.g. legal system, language, culture). The actual world, of course, has any number of populations in it that do things very differently from each other. What it takes for someone to break the law, be an adult, have good manners or get a divorce depends on what society they live in.

Given a workable metaphysics of social reality, we could apply that theory to population X or to population Y and explain how, in each case, a certain social reality arises out of the way people do

things in that population. That's all well and good: but how do we then put those results together? For the thing about realities – arguably – is that you can only have one of them. And if population X and population Y both get to constitutively determine what social reality is like, and do so in very different ways, it is not obvious how a single reality emerges.

It is profoundly unclear, even for our best metaphysical theories of social reality, how they are meant to generalise to the multiple-population case. In this talk I survey the options and make some recommendations. I consider elegant but radical options such as relativism and fragmentalism, arguing that they are unlikely to make sufficient sense of the facts of cultural interaction and social-scientific practice. I then consider what machinery we could add instead to extant theories (e.g. Epstein's) to make sense of a single unified social reality arising out of the disjoint practices of multiple populations (e.g. ontological deference relations, context-dependent grounding). Is it reasonable to expect that the resulting reality is consistent and/or determinate? Along the way, I will (time permitting) touch on some salient related issues, such as how we might demarcate populations in principled ways for various theoretical purposes.

Gloria Sansò

Simulation of consent in complex document acts

Barry Smith (2012, 2014) provides a theory of document acts – namely, those acts performed by means of documents; his proposal is supposed to supplement the Reinach-Austin-Searle theory of speech acts. The main aim of my paper is precisely to make a contribution to Smith's theory. First of all, I propose to distinguish between simple and complex document acts. Simple document acts are directed by an agent A to another agent B. Examples of these acts include applying for citizenship and requesting a loan. Complex document acts, in contrast, are compound and bidirectional. Each complex document act is composed by two sub-acts: one of these is directed by an agent A to another agent B, while the other one is directed by B to A. The prime example of such complex acts are contracts; by means of contracts people exchange something: money for different kinds of entities, mutual support, and so on. According to John Searle (2010), acts performed within institutions require cooperation; cooperation implies that people share the same intention-in-action, namely the same goal. In the world of documents, however, things are more complicated. Consider, for instance, a marriage contract between A and B. The document expresses a shared intention-in-action (the goal of supporting each other), but it does not mean that they necessarily share that intention-in-action. Indeed, four different scenarios are possible: i) A and B have the intention-in-action expressed by the document; ii) only one of them has the intention-in-action expressed by the document: A deceives B or vice versa; iii) no one of them has the intention-in-action expressed by the document: A and B deceive each other; and iv) no one of them has the intention-in-action expressed by the document: A and B share an intention-in-action other than that expressed by the document. Suppose, for instance, that A is a EU citizen whereas B is not. Suppose, further, that B wants to acquire the EU citizenship, and that A wants to help B to do that. They thus decide to get married even though they do not intend to enter a real marriage: they simulate consent. The crucial question concerning case iv) is: what is the nature of the illocutionary act performed by A and B when they sign the marriage contract? The illocutionary act at hand seems to be placed in the middle between an insincere act and a fictional one. On one hand, A and B declare an intention-in-action that they do not have. However, unlike an insincere act, in this case the element of deceit is missing: A and B do not deceive each other, and they do not even deceive the legal system insofar as the simulation of consent is not illegal. On the other

hand, like a novelist, A and B create a fictional reality. Nevertheless, while a novelist pretends to perform illocutionary acts (Searle 1975), A and B actually perform their illocutionary act, they just pretend to have the intention-in-action expressed by it.

Zuzanna Krzykalska

How to Think of Legal Institutions

It is noticeable in a social-ontological debate that many social institutions are shaped by legal concepts. Commonly given examples such as marriage, money, property or companies are not only social but also legal institutions. Therefore, apart from philosophical debate, they are subject to insightful inquiries in professional expert communities, namely legal dogmatics. My aim is to show that legal-dogmatic discourse is an instance of the ameliorative project as defined by Sally Haslanger. I will also point to some promising advantages of such an approach to legal discourse.

After a brief presentation of the legal-dogmatic method of interpretation, I will argue that—contrary to its methodological self-identification—it does not only provide a descriptive reconstruction of legal concepts but also answers a normative question “What is the best way to understand this concept?”. My argument is based on the following observation. On one hand, legal dogmatics seems to presuppose a kind of naïve realistic essentialism towards an ontology of legal institutions. Legal institutions are regarded as existing in legal systems independently from the legal-dogmatic discourse and having a cluster of necessary properties that are to be reconstructed from statutory law in a process called legal interpretation which resembles discovery rather than invention. Thus, the essence of legal constructs—i.e. the properties constituting a legal institution and its conditions of identity, existence, and persistence—is regarded as having a tracking epistemology. On the other hand, however, a great deal of legal-dogmatic enterprise consists of finding solutions for the so-called hard cases, i.e. legal problems posing a need for creative answers. These solutions often involve a reinterpretation of legal institutions or even declarative decisions about which of their properties are in fact essential and which are not. Therefore—contrary to the methodological self-identification of legal dogmatics as only discovering pre-existing content of legal institutions—I claim that it also holds normative attitudes towards interpreted legal concepts. A lot of theoretical effort of legal-dogmatic discourse concerns the evaluation, revision, and reformulation of legal concepts in order to make them fit best the normative system, effectively perform their function, or fulfill our sense of justice. Therefore, legal dogmatics also creatively re-invents legal institutions and thus the ameliorative project framework seems to be the right one for modeling legal-dogmatic discourse.

Furthermore, I want to point to the interdisciplinary perspective in which the two debates: philosophical and legal-dogmatic could benefit from one another. Firstly, classifying legal dogmatics as the ameliorative project poses explanatory value for legal theory, bringing together two—prima facie contradictory but jointly realized—approaches towards legal institutions and legal concepts: essentialism and constructivism. Moreover, equipping legal-dogmatics with methodological self-awareness could contribute to the quality and scope of achieved results. Secondly, since legal debate plays an important role in shaping legal, and thus social, institutions, with proper methodology it can crucially contribute to the general philosophical program of conceptual engineering when it comes to social constructs.

Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir

Money Holders and Worthiness

We commonly think of money as carrying value. In fact, the exchange value of money is considered to be a defining feature of it. What we perhaps less often think about is that in order for money to function, it needs to be carried by people. In other words: the carriers of money are defining features of it as well. Carrying, of course, does not have to take the form of literal carrying of cash; it can be on the form of a credit card or even an online banking transaction. But money does need to be owned, or at least temporarily held (borrowed), by various people, and used.

If we consider these carriers, what may be noticed is that we put certain restrictions on them. The value of money does not only consist in the trust we put in the institution or system backing up the currency, but in the idea that “not just anyone” can acquire money “just like that”. Money is meant to be (somewhat) scarce and in demand, which translates into merit-based ideas about what it takes to be worthy of owning or carrying large amounts of it. For example, in the movie *Ek Hazarachi Note* (1000 Rupee Note), directed by Shrihari Sathe, a poor widow unexpectedly acquires a large sum of money on the form of 1000 rupee notes. She subsequently runs into trouble when trying to spend her treasure because she is not considered a credible and worthy owner of such money.

Approved methods to acquire money may vary somewhat; we may acquire it through hard work, selling products, donations, or inheritance, but what they all share is an element of perceived worthiness. Money is awarded to those who have earned it, who are “rightful heirs,” who can prove their dire need for it, etc. Acquiring it through sheer luck (winning the lottery or finding a treasure by happenstance) must be an anomaly for the system to work. In this talk, I consider how methods for acquisition of money are connected to social group membership and perceived worthiness of the money holder or carrier, and how both factors are relevant to the value of money itself. Is the illusion of a merit-based system that we keep returning to in human pursuits essential to sustaining monetary value?

Bill Wringe

Collective Obligations on Non-Agent Groups: Reconsidering the Argument from Phenomenology

The idea that there can be collective obligations falling on non-agential groups is very much a minority view, though one that has recently found some defenders (Chant 2015, Wringe 2016, Schwenkenbecher under review). One argument for this view which has been taken seriously by a number of authors – though not always endorsed by them – is that an adequate the phenomenology of cases which require several agents to combine requires us to recognize obligations falling on non-agent groups. (Wringe 2016, Schwenkenbecher, forthcoming; Collins 2019.)

In this paper I attempt to defend the argument from phenomenology against recent criticisms by Frank Hindriks (Hindriks 2019) and Gunnar Björnsson (Björnsson, forthcoming). Both accept that the moral phenomenology of certain kinds of situation that do not involve collective agents - for example, cases where a group of strangers need to collaborate to rescue one or more endangered individuals - can bring to light something that has an irreducibly collective dimension; but they suggest that this need not be an irreducibly collective obligations bearer. Hindriks argues that the

phenomenology is best accounted for by attributing to individual agents with a content that is irreducibly collective; while Bjornsson suggests that while the phenomenology of the kinds of situation in question may show individual obligations to be grounded in facts about a group that are irreducibly collective it does not show them to be grounded in an obligation on the collective.

I argue that both Hindriks and Bjornsson are mistaken. In response to Hindriks I argue firstly that what the phenomenology gives us in the situations is not simply the content of an obligation but also its bearer; and that his account assimilates situations where I am a member of a group of willing collaborators with ones where the possibility of collaboration is not a given. I also argue that groups of willing collaborators need not constitute collective agents. In response to Bjornsson, I argue that though the kinds of non-obligation involving facts he considers may explain what obligations fall on groups (and may also be relevant to explaining how obligations fall on individuals) they are not phenomenologically salient in the way that collective obligations are.

I conclude by considering how the considerations put forward by Bjornsson and Hindriks might affect arguments for non-agent obligations based on backwards-looking phenomenology – that is to say, on our emotional reactions to cases where groups have failed to act together.

Michael Wilby

Common Knowledge and Hinge Epistemology

Formulations of Common Knowledge (CK) typically generate a pair of problems: an epistemic problem (how can individuals come to share certainties that are transparent and ‘out-in-the-open’ between them); and a practical problem (how can shared certainties allow agents to rationally coordinate their actions – or, relatedly, come to share an understanding of the words they are using when communicating). The difficulties inherent in formulating a model of CK that is able to do justice to these two problems has recently led some philosophers to doubt whether there is any such thing as CK (e.g. Lederman 2019), or to argue that rationally coordinated action can easily occur in the absence of CK anyway (e.g. Blomberg 2016).

I argue that CK is an integral part of our folk psychology – there really are shared certainties that are not open to doubt, and that are ‘out-in-the-open’ and transparent between persons. I argue that these transparent certainties should be understood in terms of Hinge Epistemology (HE). Hinge Epistemology is the idea – drawn from Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty* – that certain propositions (common sense assertions, or ‘Moorean Propositions’, such as “Here is a hand”, “The world did not come into existence 5 minutes ago” or “ $2+2=4$ ”) lie beyond both doubt and knowledge: they are ungrounded and, in some sense, not fully formulated presuppositions that are implicit in our dealings with the world and with others.

Firstly, understanding CK as HE helps tackle the epistemic problem. It allows us to think of CK not as something that is generated by an evidential base – and having the epistemic status of an ordinary item of knowledge – but, rather, as something that operates as part of the framework of our thought. Hinge Propositions are the kind of propositions whose truth is so deeply interwoven into our mode of thought that they cannot be doubted without thereby undermining the whole framework.

Secondly, understanding CK as HE helps tackle the practical problem. The framework status of Hinge Propositions (their status as being like hinges upon which a door moves; or, to switch, metaphor, as being connected to the rules of a game), means that they can pivot between

epistemic and practical reasoning. They can have, that is, the kind of form that Millikan (1995) calls Pushmi-pullya representations.

I finish by arguing that this approach allows us to develop a clearer taxonomy of a range of phenomena. Hinge Propositions are heterogeneous - They might be perceptual-based (Here is a hand), memory-based (I held my hand up a moment ago), culture-based (every sane adult knows their own name), language-based (this colour – pointing at blood – is called ‘red’), or in some other way basic to a practice or community of knowledge (water boils, and doesn’t freeze, when held over a fire). GE Moore’s infamous “Here is a hand and here is another”, for instance, can be understood as a case of demonstratively-based joint attention; and understanding it as such might shed light on that psychological phenomena.

August Faller

How Do Social Groups Persist? Lessons from the NFL

Groups are a central feature of the social world. We form teams, clubs, bands...the list goes on. We also categorize people into, or identify with, groups like races, genders, and social and economic classes. In each case, it is important that these groups persist through time. But groups change their members over time. The norms governing groups can also change, for example as new laws are passed, or if a new position on the field is added. So, what makes a group the same group as it was yesterday? How do social groups persist?

Two features of groups make them an unusual case for a theory of persistence: (1) Puzzles of persistence actually happen to groups. (2) Groups often exist only by fiat. The first feature means that we have to take cases seriously that might be strange for persons, like fission and fusion cases—no “spoils to the victor” for social groups. The second feature of groups restricts the domain of viable views—it isn’t only up to the metaphysician whether a group exists. In particular, plausible accounts of persistence like the worm theory are ruled out.

In the first section I present some puzzles of persistence based on actual events in the American National Football League. These puzzles match the form of fission, fusion, and Ship of Theseus cases. In the second section, I argue that the stage theory of persistence is the best theory of the persistence of social groups. On this account, groups are located at a single time but persist by having temporal counterparts. The crucial premise is that other plausible accounts of persistence, like the worm theory, depend on spatial coincidence in order to explain fission and fusion cases, but there is no guarantee of coincidence for groups that only exist by fiat. In the final section, I reflect on the consequences of the stage theory for Haslanger’s “ameliorative” approach to social ontology and argue that the stage theory is a good match for this approach.

Franz Altner

Rethinking Responsibility of Structured Collectives

Under several well-established accounts of responsibility such as those of Strawson and Wallace adopting the stance of holding someone responsible is a question of fairness. Only agents who possess certain rational capacities and act intentionally should be blamed or praised for their actions. Agents who lack the rational capacities should be exempt from being held responsible or excused if they don’t act intentionally.

In recent decades, accounts of group agency such as those developed by French (1979) and List & Pettit (2011) have argued that certain groups should be viewed as agents that satisfy the conditions for fitness to be held responsible. There has also been a huge literature on the possibility of joint intentions by Gilbert (1992) and Tuomela (1995). Both results have been used to argue that groups can be the bearers of obligations and are blameworthy when violating an obligation that pertains to them.

In addition, something that is typically assumed but only rarely argued for (see Collins & Lawford-Smith (2016) for a notable exception) is that the scope of obligations that collectives are under is at least similar to the scope of obligations that bear on individuals.

In this talk, I attempt to show that this can't really be the case by taking a closer look at the practice of holding corporations responsible. I suggest that large, publicly traded corporations with a very specific purpose (generation of wealth) and a legally highly specified structure that ensures they serve this purpose, can convincingly argue that they are exempt from a large variety of obligations. Their inner structure does not allow for either the kind of 'reflective self-control' that Wallace has argued for or the kind of 'sane deep-self' that Wolf (1987) has defended. The arguments I will present for this thesis will be taken from the business ethics literature on share- and stakeholder orientation of corporations.

If these arguments succeed, they highlight the importance for philosophers to concentrate on the kind of structures that constitute certain groups in determining what they can be held responsible for. They also throw a new light on the question of whether groups bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals.

Italo Testa

A Habit Ontology for Cognitive and Social Sciences

Since the middle of last century individualist approaches, both methodological and ontological, have hegemonized social sciences (Lukes 1968), and have combined with intentionalist and representational models of action understood in terms of propositional attitudes individuated entirely in terms of what lies within the individual mind (Bhargava 1992). If we look at the genealogy of a different field of research such as cognitive sciences, we can realize that even their birth and development has been marked since the mid-1950s by a paradigm of cognition framed by individualism (Wilson 1999 and 2004), which has led classical cognitive sciences to privilege explanations of mental phenomena understood as internal units pertaining to the mind/brain of human individuals and its subcomponents.

More recently, a growing literature is drawing attention to the limits of both methodological and ontological individualism in the explanation of human behavior in the social sciences (see for instance Epstein 2016). On the other hand, post classical cognitive sciences and embodied cognition approaches are questioning internalist explanations of mindedness understood in terms of the causal effect of mental processes situated in the central nervous system (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991; Clark 1997, Chemero 2009; Noë 2009; Hutto and Myin 2013).

In this paper, I would like first to highlight the role that a pragmatic approach to cognition and action inspired by classical pragmatism, when appropriately understood, could play first in revealing deep affinities between what's separately happening in contemporary cognitive sciences and social sciences. In particular, I'll argue that the core of such a pragmatist approach is an ontological

framework based on the notion of habit. I will reconstruct this model as a form of motor social ontology based on the notion of habit. A habit ontology could make available a promising, externalist alternative to approaches whose internalist framework tends to reduce human action and cognition to an essentially individual phenomenon located at the level of internal representational processes. The habit model, in fact, can account not only for the constitutive role of action for cognition, and for the interactive character of action. Moreover, it offers a thick and externalist account of action as being both embodied in individual organisms and embedded in social practices, and as something that cannot be reduced to the occurrence of intentional internal phenomena but that is extended in the natural and in the social world we interact with. Finally, I will argue that such a pragmatist habit ontology is particularly useful as a cross-disciplinary model insofar as, by overcoming the dualism between routine and skilled action, it can help us to read anew the constitutive role that automation plays for action, and let us appreciate the importance of a still under-appreciated phenomenon that emerges both in cognitive sciences and social sciences, that is what I'll label the "two-sided" mode of interaction, its being both active and passive, spontaneous and receptive. Such a two-sided way of interaction can be captured by the notion of habit as social attractors, which could be particularly helpful in order to connect cognitive models of situated and extended cognition with socio-theoretical models of social practices and institutions.

Ludger Jansen

Social Entities without Explicit Establishment

Many paradigmatic social entities are established through explicit speech acts. These include marriages, the President of the United States, and money. Various authors identify different kinds of speech acts relevant for such an explicit establishment of social entities. While Searle stresses declarations, Gilbert rather cites commissive speech acts like promises or agreements. Not all social entities, however, are explicitly established. Both Searle and Gilbert mention and discuss various examples of such entities. These include cocktail parties, inflation, friendship, and language. The social sciences often address these two groups of social entities as "formal" and "informal institutions", respectively.

Both Searle and Gilbert want to extend their respective account to cover at least some entities that are not established explicitly. For Searle, institutional reality is rooted in collective intentionality – that is, according to Searle, in sufficiently many individuals having appropriate we-intentions for the ascription of a certain institutional status. These intentions are part of a complex neural-causal background that leads to role-conforming behaviour. For Gilbert, in turn, plural subjects are constituted by joint commitments – which, or so Gilbert claims, can arise without an explicit agreement, e.g., gradually by repeated interaction of the same kind.

I argue that both of these strategies are problematic. Gilbert's strategy faces the problem that it cannot explain how repeated action can have the same obliging power as an explicit agreement. While repeated interaction will indeed lead to certain expectations on the side of participants, these seem to be rather epistemic than deontic expectations. Searle's strategy fails for the opposite reason: If having appropriate neural-causal background is sufficient for the ascription of an institutional status, it is difficult to explain how this can possibly come along with the transfer of deontic powers.

The paper argues that an adequate social ontology has to do justice to both formal and informal institutions, i.e., of those social entities that are explicitly established and those that are not. An

explicit establishment comes along with the immediate transfer of deontic powers and the possibility of codification. This is, however, not possible without an explicit establishment. Without an explicit establishment, no such transfer of deontic powers is possible. Instead of leading to obligations, matching we-intentions lead to matching dispositions of their bearers to act accordingly. Analogously, repeated interaction will primarily lead to action dispositions, not to joint commitments. Only secondarily, duties can be attached to the action patterns in questions. These duties will be derived from moral norms, while the explicit establishment of social entities brings about social norms.

Carolina Flores

Belief is a Social Kind

I argue that belief is a social kind. The looping effect applies to belief ascriptions, so that whether someone believes that *p* is not independent of whether that belief is ascribed to them; and, in defining what belief is, we must make reference to social factors, so belief is constitutively socially constructed (see Haslanger on social construction).

First, belief ascriptions can and are used to get targets to align their broad pattern of behavior with their assertions (as McGeer, and others who endorse the regulative view of folk-psychology, rightly note). This occurs through aspirational ascriptions, like when I tell my flatmate, who is lounging on the couch on election day “You believe that voting is important”, with the goal of getting him to vote. In such cases, the pattern of behavior of the target of the ascription does not in fact fully match the behavioral profile of someone with that belief; but such ascriptions are an effective tool in making them conform more closely to that pattern. In this way, ascribing beliefs turns others into believers – a classic case of Hacking’s looping effect.

Second, I argue that we have the concept of belief to target an important class of attitudes: those that can be changed by appeal to evidence and argument. I argue, first, that this is an important joint in carving out attitude types. Second, I argue that belief ascriptions track this closely enough that we have reason to think they are meant to carve at this joint.

In particular, when we take someone to believe that *p*, we take a whole range of practices to be appropriate: giving evidence that bears on *p*, expecting them to respond to that evidence appropriately, being disappointed when they don’t, and doling out criticism and praise depending on whether they respond to that evidence. In slogan form: if a subject believes that *p*, then it is appropriate to take the epistemic participant stance towards them. Though there may be some belief ascriptions where we think others are incapable of changing their minds, those support such a different pattern of interaction – one where we see this aspect of the other’s mind as something to be managed and controlled - that we should classify them as members of a different attitude kind (dogmas).

If this claim about the concept of belief is right, then we must make reference to appropriate patterns of interaction with the agent in defining what beliefs are. This makes belief constitutively socially constructed.

I finish by exploring two important consequences of the view that belief is a social kind. First, debates about whether there are beliefs that take cognitive science as the ultimate court of appeal are fundamentally misguided. Second, there is space for ameliorative projects targeting our

concept of belief: to improve the concept of belief, we need to think about how we want to coordinate, especially in the context of epistemic interactions.

Teemu Toppinen

Making a difference and robustly demanding goods

It often seems that we ought to perform some action, ϕ (e.g., vote, or refrain from eating factory-farmed meat) despite the fact that our individual actions seem extremely unlikely to make any morally relevant difference (win the election, save a chicken's life, etc.). This is a striking problem for act-consequentialists who would like to explain the normative status of our actions in terms of their difference-making properties (e.g., Nefsky 2017, Budolfson 2018). The problem may also be more general. For instance, it is not clear whether we can explain our moral duties, in cases of the relevant sort, in terms of complicity (e.g., Martin 2016), the moral significance of which may also depend, in the end, on our individual actions making some relevant difference (e.g., Budolfson 2016).

I propose that it is much easier for our actions to make a relevant difference than has usually been realized. The key is to appeal to a suitable selection of robustly demanding values (Pettit 2015) in our value theory. This move is not ad hoc – it is independently plausible that our value theory is to be enriched in the relevant ways. For instance, enjoying safety requires not just escaping harm in the actual world, but doing so in a wide selection of merely possible worlds. Likewise, enjoying respect or solidarity, say, requires not just receiving a certain kind of assistance and support in the actual world, but having access to such "thinner" goods in a wide range of possible worlds. Whether our actions violate such robustly demanding values is not simply a matter of the probabilities of the relevant thinner goods being sacrificed. It would be terribly wrong to secretly point a revolver with one bullet in its cylinder at someone, spin the cylinder, and then pull the trigger. It would not be equally bad to do this with a massive revolver the cylinder of which had, say, 1 000 000 chambers. Yet it would be terribly wrong to do this. Why? Plausibly, because doing so would risk a person's life for no good reason. Playing with someone's life in this way would fail dramatically in terms of "producing the goods" of safety and respect, despite the very small chance of anyone being harmed.

This idea can be applied also in the contexts of collective impact. For instance, even assuming that my eating factory farmed meat is extremely unlikely to cause animal suffering and death, it still makes the world less safe for animals, and lacking in terms of respect and solidarity for them. This gives us reason, also (but not only) in the act-consequentialist framework, for refraining from eating factory-farmed meat. Plausibly, the relevant reasons are also weighty enough in order to counter-balance the trivial pleasures of eating meat. Similar considerations may support, in many contexts, participation in collectively significant (in)action: voting, ditching the car and going by bike instead, etc.

Otto Kyyrönen

'Practices' or 'Forms of Praxis'? Proposing a Conceptual Refinement for Sally Haslanger's Ideology Critique

Sally Haslanger (2017a; 2018) argues that we should criticize 'cognitivist' conceptions of ideology and, instead, concentrate on the role played by social practices. In Marxist terms (absent from Haslanger's own discourse), cognitivist conceptions are categorized as ones that primarily understand 'ideology' as a 'phenomenon of consciousness' (Koivisto & Pietilä 1996). Haslanger's argument can thus be understood to promote, expressed still within Marxist terminology, a rupture in relation to the 'consciousness discourse' – a form of talking and thinking that does not grasp its own relation to social practices of which it is itself constituted. In this sense, Haslanger's argument can be considered as a step – in fact, a leap – towards the right direction of contesting ideological practices and thus ideological formations as well.

In my presentation, I propose that not only Haslanger in particular but also critical theory in general should adopt the concept of 'praxis', as it would immensely benefit any ideology-critical project similar to the one outlined by Haslanger. The concept of praxis – formulated initially by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (see 1975) and elaborated on later in Antonio Gramsci's (1971) prison notebooks (see Haug 2000; Haug 2001) – signifies a rupture in relation to such understandings of both ideology and society that explain the two causally with reference to subject-object relations. In fact, Haslanger appears to have one such explanation latent in her own text, as she (2017a, 16) writes that ideologies are "technēs that produce or sustain injustice by guiding us to enact unjust practices. If racism is an ideology, in this sense, then it partly constitutes social practices that give people reason to act in racist ways". In other words, Haslanger places the 'semiotic' technē before material practices and explains the latter with reference to the former. Even though Haslanger (2017a, 17; see 2017b, 158) later states that "the racist technē is both a product and a source of racism", such 'slippages' suggest that Haslanger is still operating on enemy ground, that is, on a 'cognitivist' terrain. The concept of praxis would consequently finalize her departure from cognitivist premises.

The adoption of the concept of praxis would also refine Haslanger's views regarding the difference between ideological and anti-ideological forms of praxis. One such view is presented by Projekt Ideologie Theorie (1979; Haug 1983; Rehmann 2013), who argue that it is primarily our hierarchical social system, constituted of alienated forms of praxis, that is ideological. This is why Projekt Ideologie-Theorie define the ideological as 'socialization from above', as opposed to the cultural (i.e. anti-ideological) defined as 'socialization from below'. I argue that these concepts would make Haslanger's (2017a, 19; see 2017b) own argument, according to which "social change requires changes in our practices", more intelligible and comprehensive, therefore benefiting the whole field of critical theory.

Asya Passinsky and Asya Passinsky

Money as Metaphysically Reflexive

A prevalent view within social ontology is that money is 'reflexive' or 'self-referential' in roughly the sense that something is money only if it is recognized or accepted as money. This view has been endorsed by Searle, Thomasson, Tuomela, and Hindriks, among others. However, somewhat surprisingly, it is hard to find arguments in favor of the view in the literature. In this paper I articulate a new metaphysical version of the reflexivity thesis, and then advance two arguments in support of the view.

Proponents of the view that money is reflexive standardly take reflexivity to be a conceptual phenomenon, rather than a metaphysical phenomenon. Thus, they claim that it is the concept of

money that is reflexive or self-referential, rather than money itself. I suggest that the reflexivity thesis is better cast in metaphysical terms, using the notion of metaphysical grounding. In particular, I propose that the thesis be cast as follows: Money is metaphysically reflexive in the sense that facts of the form 'x constitutes money' are fully grounded in facts of the form 'x is recognized or accepted as constituting money.'

I then put forward two arguments in support of the view that money is metaphysically reflexive. The first is an argument from antirealist sentiments. There is a widespread sentiment that money is in some sense fictional or imaginary. This sentiment is conveyed well by a cartoon in the New Yorker, with the caption "Sure, money may be imaginary – but at least it's got everybody imagining it" (Issue of July 22, 2013). The view that money is metaphysically reflexive, I argue, can account for these antirealist sentiments. The second argument concerns performativity. As many have noted, performative utterances such as declarations and decrees can, under appropriate circumstances, bring money into existence. The metaphysical reflexivity view, I argue, offers a satisfying explanation of why money can be created in this way.

Rebekka Gersbach

The Market: between Social Practices and Economic Transactions

I want to propose that in order to understand markets we need to understand the two fundamental forms of human interaction – social practice and economic transaction –, their relation, and entanglement. The core of the market is constituted by transactions, which are made possible by the legal framework of subjective rights – property rights and freedom of contract, more specifically. Transactions differ from social practices in that they have a different, weaker kind of normativity for the agents, and they realize the subjective and individual ends of the agents. In contrast, social practices requires of the participating agents that they can justify their ends and actions to other participants on the basis of the social practice. If we look at specific markets, we can identify layers of both kinds of interaction but also how their different normativity creates a tension between the two that cannot be easily resolved. The interesting question that then needs to be raised is how we can understand the relation and tension between the two kinds of interaction. If we look at current debates in metaethics and related fields, we find that the two forms of interaction are played out against each other but hardly ever put in relation to one another. For instance, we need to consider how economic transaction can both undermine (good) social practices and liberate agents from (oppressive) social practices. Whereas social practices are necessary to regulate markets and economic transactions, they can also lead to considerable distortion and unwanted inefficiencies.

My talk will consist of three parts: I will first introduce the two kinds of interaction: economic transaction and social practices and argue why I hold them to be categorically distinct. Second, I will discuss some examples of markets where we find different ways of how the two forms of interaction are both present. Third, I will examine how we should approach the question of their relation given that they stand in considerable normative tension.

Brian Epstein

On the metaphysics of words

While some philosophers regard linguistic entities such as words to be private psychological states, most theories of words regard them as social at least in the sense that they are products of social activity. My aim in this paper is to analyze words using insights from social ontology more generally. To do so, I make use of the grounding-anchoring model of the metaphysics of social entities. My particular focus in this paper will be to analyze the relation between words and their tokens: what are the conditions that must be met in order for something to be a token of a particular word?

I begin by arguing against approaches that attempt to give a direct answer to the question “what are words?” and in particular against approaches that look for other sorts of entities (forms, ordered pairs, continuants, mathematical structures, etc.) that replace or reduce words to something else. This sort of reductive or eliminative analysis sometimes aims to allay worries that an entity (like words) are not “sui generis” entities, but rather are really just instances of other things that we are already ontologically committed to. I argue against this worry. While certain kinds of entities may usefully be understood as instances of other kinds, this tends to be the exception, and the “sui generis” worry is mostly the product of adherence to an unnecessarily spartan approach to metaphysics.

The application of the grounding-anchoring model to analyze words involves four aspects, all of which begin with crude hypotheses and then iterate: (1) Which facts about words we are interested in; that is, which facts we should inquire into the grounding conditions of; (2) What are the grounding conditions of these facts; (3) what are the anchors or metaphysical sources of these grounding conditions (or frame principles), and (4) what are the schemas taking the anchors and generating the frame principles.

The facts I will concentrate on in this talk pertain to how words are tokened. Consider the words ‘cat’ and ‘dog’. (Here I take single-quotation to be a technique for referring to words.) One token of the word ‘cat’ is the following mark: cat. (Call this M-cat-1). Another token is this mark: cat (i.e., M-cat-2). Another two tokens are particular acoustic blasts made by an American speaker who uttered “cat cat” at 10:30am today (AB-am-cat-1 and AB-am-cat-2). Another two are particular acoustic blasts made by a British speaker who uttered “cat cat” at 10:40am today (AB-brit-cat-1 and AB-brit-cat-2). All of these—M-cat-1 through AB-brit-cat-2—are tokens of the word ‘cat’. And suppose we have analogous tokens of the word ‘dog’—M-dog-1 through AB-brit-dog-2.

These tokenings can be seen as a simple set of facts about the words ‘cat’ and ‘dog’: M-cat-1 is a token of ‘cat’ at time t, AB-am-cat-1 is a token of ‘cat’, etc. Inquiry into grounding conditions for such facts involves examining the grounds for each individual fact, as well as the similarities and differences among the grounds for all the facts in that set. In this paper I discuss and systematize these in order to draw conclusions about their grounding conditions. It may seem tempting, for instance, to give independent answers to the question of what grounds facts about ‘cat’ from what grounds facts about ‘dog’, but on reflection, there will be general features of acoustic blasts uttered by American speakers, or those uttered by British speakers, or those of printed words, that explain why tokens of different words are tokens. (For instance, if there are tolerances as to how inaccurately a word can be printed and yet be a token of a particular word, those apply across words rather than just to a particular word.) By considering sets of tokening facts like these in

connection to one another, we can refine which questions about grounding conditions ought to be addressed.

To make headway on the grounding conditions, I consider not only intuitive data (such as whether it seems plausible that a mark having the shape CAT formed by a wave washing against a beach a token of the word 'cat') but also the potential anchors for these grounding conditions. These include the variety of functional roles that word tokens are set up to perform, including roles in communication, in the preservation of information over time, and in mental activity (where there are syntactic, phonological, and lexical functions). Anchors also include ongoing practices as well as regularities in the environment. Determining the grounding conditions for something to be a token of a word involves balancing intuitive data about grounding conditions and assessing how various options could get set up by these potential anchors.

This inquiry leads us to reject both an orthographic treatment of words, in which words are simply forms to which semantic content is attached, as well as Kaplan-style theories of words as continuants. Instead, I begin to develop a more textured account of the nature of words and their tokens.

Laura Perez

“A (Visual) Case for Institutional Corruption”

Legal measures and transparency systems are designed to enable social institutions to fulfill their missions fairly and justly. Their purpose is to combat and to prevent institutional corruption. On every continent, collectives of experts on a range of topics have been combating corruption. Among widely varied aspirations, one typically recurs: to execute a minimal standard of transparency. But still, we can ask: “Might there be something constructive and valuable about institutional corruption?” An ethical consideration of institutional corruption would be obliged to ask: “Are there morally justified acts of institutional corruption?” In the philosophical studies of the subject, morally justified corruption is known as noble cause corruption. It refers to circumstances under which acts of institutional corruption are motivated by the desire of doing good. Consider, for example, noble cause corruption in a political organization in which members of a political party hide from the media compromising information about their candidate. Their aim is to influence the electorate to vote for their candidate. If the opponent were to win, their country would enter into a period of blatant oppression and social injustice. Hiding information is, in this reasoning, for the sake of good.

In this paper, I make the case for those who cannot follow social norms or the law by examining representations of corrupt settings, settings, for example, photographed in a series titled *Tepito ¡Bravo el Barrio!* [Tepito, Cheers to the Neighborhood!] (2007) by Francisco Mata Rosas; this is followed by a debate on the transparency of photographic representations. In particular, I argue that a moral or a legal study might not be the most useful way to study acts of corruption within oppressive and unjust institutional settings. Instead, I draw on documentary photography to outline a perceptual view of institutional corruption. To do so, I weigh Seumas Miller's (2017) and Shuddhabrata Sengupta's (2011) discrepant views on institutional corruption and transparency, along with texts by chroniclers Fabrizio Mejía (2007) and Alfonso Hernández (2004) about Tepito, the low-class neighborhood located in Mexico City.

Katrina Haaksma

Identity, Justice, and Social Construction: a Realist, Externalist approach to Transracialism

Rachel Dolezal, a white woman who famously chose to present herself socially as though she were black, presents a difficult case for social ontology. The story sparked significant social backlash, prompting accusations of racism, exploitation, and cultural appropriation of the highest degree. Dolezal's supporters argue that her self-identification as black simply demonstrates that the social construct of race can be transcended through selective self-presentation. Others claim her transracialism is morally wrong and does material harm to racial minorities in her community. These contentions interrogate the boundaries of social identity, igniting a conversation at the nexus of social constructivism and social justice. In one interview during the media storm following her exposure as a white person, Dolezal famously responded to a reporter who asked, "Are you African-American?" by saying she "didn't understand the question." What does the question, "Do you occupy social category X?" mean, in an externalist sense? I give a normative explanation from the position of Haslanger's realist social constructivist metaphysics of race, and I draw on Ásta's "conferralist" framework to explain the nuance of cases like Dolezal's. Then, to address the ethical considerations of racial self-assignment, I'll delineate some of the concepts, terms, and distinctions in José Medina's critical race theory to talk about justice at the level of social cognition. I set the current narrative of transracialism as a locus on which to apply these concepts, in order to understand what is objectionable about these cases. I conclude by offering a realist, externalist, social constructivist account of transracialism that addresses the ethical dimensions of racial identity claims as well as the phenomenon of "passing" in cases of transracialism.

Gunnar Björnsson

Ways of being implicated

An agent can be morally implicated in a harm even though the harm would have occurred without that agent. Thus, Arnie might be to blame for the death of his victim even though Beth was ready to kill the victim should Arnie decide not to.

Some such cases of redundancy seem to be well understood if we take blameworthiness to require, not that the agent controlled whether something happens, but that the harm happened because of the agent, explained by the agent's lack of regard for what is morally important, say. In spite of Beth's presence, the victim actually died because of Arnie's disregard for his life. But other cases seem less well understood that way:

First, consider cases of collective harm. For example, a great many people share blame for the current level of climate threat, but we can't say of each of them that the threat level is what it is because that person didn't care enough.

Second, consider cases involving a significant individual contribution to an ongoing harmful process, a process that would have caused the same harm without that contribution. Suppose that underage Charlie is out to buy hard liquor and get drunk, have several willing sellers, but decides to buy from Diane. It then seems that Diane is not only to blame for selling—her contribution to Charlie's process of getting drunk—but also implicated in Charlie's ensuing intoxication and in what bad might happen as a result. But exactly because Charlie was going to get drunk either way, it seems problematic to say that the intoxication or badness happened because of Diane.

Third, consider cases involving agents who would have been willing to contribute to a certain harmful process but never had the opportunity. Suppose that as a result of getting drunk, Charlie stole a car and had a deadly accident. I've already said that Diane is implicated. But the same seems true, though to a lesser extent, of the people who were willing to sell Charlie alcohol but were not asked. Because of what happened, they should feel something like guilt because of their willingness. But it seems false to say that he got drunk, lost control, and killed himself because of them.

It is natural to conclude from these cases that agents can be the proper target of blame, and blame-like attitudes, for outcomes that did not happen because of those agents. In this talk, however, I argue that, in each of these three cases, the agents in question can be seen as implicated in relevant explanations of the outcomes. Specifically, the agents are implicated in explanations that invoke the quality of will of groups of agents. The idea has been defended for the case of collective harm: climate catastrophe threatens because we haven't cared enough. Here it is extended to the latter two kinds of cases: Charlie got drunk and died because people were willing to sell him alcohol, and both Diane and the potential sellers are implicated in that explanation.

Anne Schwenkenbecher

Do group agents resemble psychopaths? (And if so what does that mean for collective moral responsibility?)

Many philosophers think that groups can be considered moral agents of sorts, provided they are structured in the right way. Corporations and states are amongst the most common examples for moral group agents. While scholars argue that these kinds of groups can be rational agents, there are very few who think that we can speak in a meaningful way about group agents having emotions. In that regard group agents seem to resemble human psychopaths, who are usually thought to lack important emotional capacities. Where human agents are concerned, the lack of empathy in particular is regularly considered to diminish an agent's capacity for moral reasoning and their moral responsibility. Nonetheless, we tend to ascribe moral responsibility to group agents such as corporations. Should this discrepancy worry us? Should it encourage us to be more open to arguments about group agents' emotions? Or else, does it undermine the idea of group responsibility? I will suggest that for a group to enjoy the epistemic advantages of moral emotions it is sufficient that its members have the right kind of shared, interlocking emotions. As such, group agents can be fully-fledged moral agents in the absence of group-level emotions.

Ouzilou

The social dynamics of social scientific knowledge

Some authors have claimed that the social trajectory of social scientific knowledge is peculiar. For example, Hacking's concept of « interactive kind » (IK) and Giddens' thesis of « double-hermeneutic » nature of social scientific knowledge (DH) have been elaborated, among others, in order to elucidate this specificity. More precisely, the « looping effect » (Hacking, 1999), which characterizes IK, refers to a specific kind of interaction between a category and people who are classified as belonging to this category: the first arc of the loop is one in which the individuals being categorized react to being categorized and act accordingly; this response on the part of the

categorized individuals causes social scientists to revise and adjust their original categorization, prompting thereby the second arc of the loop. Similarly, DH refers to the mutual interpretative interplay between social science and those whose activities compose its subject matter (Giddens, 1984).

I aim at focusing on two aspects of these kinds of social dynamics. First, I want to show that both DH and IK are too much focalized on the epistemic aspect of social loops and adjustments. After distinguishing epistemic and moral reasons-based revisions, I claim that both can operate simultaneously, that this intertwining can distort the social science research itself and therefore affect the social trajectory of theoretical contents. Second, using Haslanger's distinction between « manifest concepts » (concepts we take ourselves to be applying or attempting to apply) and « operative concepts » (concepts that best capture the distinctions as we draw it in practice), I explore different kinds of social dynamics which can affect the concepts conveyed by social sciences. I finally propose an illustration of both aspects of this analysis, i. e. the intertwining between moral and epistemic factors on one side and the modification of a manifest concept without change in the operative concept on the other, by examining some studies of what is called «cultural racism» (Michaels, 1992).

Åsa Burman

Collective responsibility for implicit bias

The current debate on implicit bias and moral responsibility focuses primarily on individuals and their behavior – is a person morally responsible for having implicit bias; for manifesting it; or for not acting on the knowledge that she most likely is biased? This individualistic tendency also shows up in suggested solutions: Personal intervention is by far the most common type of solution. The question of collective moral responsibility for implicit bias, however, has hitherto been overlooked: Can we as a collective – a nation, club, or as board of directors of an organization – be held morally responsible for implicit bias in individuals? And can I qua group member, say in a hiring committee, be held morally responsible for implicit bias in individuals? I answer in the positive. More specifically, I use a revised version of Christopher Kutz's account of complicity combined with a real example of gender bias in entrepreneurial funding to argue that both collectives and individuals qua group members are sometimes morally responsible for implicit bias in individuals.

I also argue that a "collective turn" is needed in the implicit bias debate. There are at least three reasons for this. First, in many contexts where implicit bias is especially problematic, e.g. recruiting and ranking applicants, we are not only individual agents, but individual members of a group, say an HR department or a hiring committee. As an individual group member I might thus be partly morally responsible for our collective act of hiring a certain candidate. And the HR department or a hiring committee, i.e. the group itself, might be morally responsible for the collective act of excluding certain CVs from further consideration and for not hiring the right candidate. It is therefore central to assess collective responsibility – both the responsibility of individual group members and the responsibility of the group – for implicit bias.

Second, collective action, in addition to individual action, is needed to reduce implicit bias in individuals and the distorting effects it has on our perceptions and judgments. For example, making and implementing policy changes aimed at increasing the share of women in leadership positions in corporations require collective action, say a new law passed by the parliament. Furthermore, the main cause of implicit bias in individuals is most likely the effects of collective rather than individual

action, that is, how we create and maintain a certain type of society with its social norms, institutions, and structures. Third, implicit bias is in one important sense a societal rather than individual phenomenon. Jennifer Saul points out that the main cause of individuals having implicit bias is living in a sexist society.

These three reasons – the importance of collective responsibility and collective action in implicit bias contexts and implicit bias as a societal phenomenon – show that a collective turn is needed. In short, my main claim is that it is fruitful and indeed necessary to incorporate both collective action and collective responsibility for implicit bias in this debate.

Filip Buekens and Jp Smit

Signals in an equilibrium account of Institutions

We explore the role of signals in rule-based and equilibrium-based accounts of institutions. Signals, broadly conceived, are part of sender-receiver systems in which a sender signals the presence of a state of affairs to a receiver, who acts on the signal. Signaling requires that senders and receivers have at least partially shared interests and signals can coordinate actions of senders and receivers. Searlean status markers (indicators of status functions) represent signals in a rule-based account of institutions. Correlation devices function as signals in equilibrium-based accounts of institutions. In our paper, we explore some unexplored connections between current work in signaling theory and Francesco Guala's unified account of institutions in *Understanding Institutions* and our own incentive-based approach to institutions. Signals and markers, on the account we will defend, are important to explain the visible, almost palpable surface structure of institutions: the signs, markers, that surround us and guide our social lives. Equilibrium-based accounts appeal to a deeper explanatory level, describable in game-theoretical terms, of the underlying mechanisms that explain the function of institutions.

Dan López de Sa

Social Constructions: Produced by the Social vs Changeable by the Social

In recent literature, there are two very general ideas concerning what the social construction of something may be. One of these takes place in the context of debunking the presumption that certain features are inevitable as the result of (non-social) nature—as part of a general attempt of social critique and social change. The paradigm is often the case of being a certain gender: showing how certain aspects believed to be hardwired in how individuals are biologically constituted are not inevitable but can actually be altered and modified by social means is in many cases a significant aspect in fighting against the discrimination existing around these aspects. The other of these occur within the general context of articulating how the social produces certain other aspects of the social reality, like this bill's being a Euro note or that John Robert's the Chief Supreme Court Justice.

These two ideas—of being changeable by the social and of being produced by the social—are, however, orthogonal: things can be changeable by the social independently of whether they are produced by the social or not, and things can be produced by the social, independently of whether they are changeable by the social or not. And keeping the two ideas conceptually separate is a significant move in “conceptual ethics.” The notion of being produced by the social, independently

of whether also changeable or not, contributes to the legitimate project of articulating how the social is metaphysically structured in full generality. And the notion of being changeable of the social, independently of whether also produced or not, contributes to the legitimate different project of fighting discrimination existing around some changeable aspect (without entering in perhaps irresolvable debates about its nature). I close by saying something on the further question in “terminological ethics” as to which deserves better the label ‘social construction.’

Georg Theiner

The medieval political theology of “corporate agency:” A case study in historical social ontology

At the Council of Lyon (1245), Pope Innocence IV issued a decree that a corporation (*universitas*) can't be excommunicated (or condemned in general) because even though it is a person (this was granted in passing), it is a *persona ficta*, which doesn't have a soul. In this paper, I consider the backdrop and implications of Pope Innocence's ruling as offering a window into the complex history of how “corporate agency” was conceptualized and legally constructed within the framework of medieval political theology (for a classic study, see Kantorowicz 1957). I do so with the goal of sensitizing debates in social ontology to the historical contingency of certain intuitions that are all too frequently taken for granted by contemporary theorists. By attending closely to the use of mentalistic discourse by medieval jurists and philosophers to think corporations into existence, as it were, I hope to raise substantive complications for two related viewpoints: 1) recent social-psychological work on the putative causes and consequences of “anthropomorphizing” (aka “mind perception”), specifically as applied to group entities (e.g., Waytz et al. 2010; Arico et al. 2011); 2) the putative inference from corporate responsibility to corporate intentionality (see, e.g., Tollefsen 2015, Chaps. 5-6 for an overview).

Amin Ebrahimi Afrouzi

The Ontology of State Law

Many theorists have noted that ‘what law is’ depends, at least in one respect, on what is “adopted and accepted” in a given community as law. They go on to describe law variably as a function of habits of behavior (Bentham and Austin), social practices (Hart 1961, Dworkin 1986), social conventions (Postema 1982, 2012; Green 1999; Southwood 2011, 2017), and plans (Shapiro 2011). These different terms try to capture the feature of law that is socially constructed or “positive.” Much of this literature focuses on contrasting state law with moral (Hart 1961) and physical (Dworkin 1986) phenomena, which exist independently of intentional activity. As a product of intentionality, therefore, state law sits squarely at the center of social ontology.

However, it is not enough to say that state law is intentionally constructed, and I shall add that existing ontological phenomena, whether objective or subjective in their origins, both partly dictate appropriate intentional attitudes towards them and partly limit the possibilities of intentional construction. Thus, pace Dworkin and Shapiro, we must fully acknowledge that once intentionally constructed, ontologically subjective phenomena become congealed as a part of objective reality. Yet, pace mainstream theories of social ontology (i.e. Searle 1996), we must admit that ontologically subjective phenomena such as state law are limited both by the reality that exists independently of them (cf. Butler 1990, who denies this) and the reality that they constitute. This is

important because 1) even if we could solve the problems of collective intentionality, equating state law's ontology with intentional adoption and acceptance is a reductio at face value (cf. Searle 1996), and 2) in accounting for the normativity of state law, it would be too circular to say that our intentions are normatively bound by our intentions (cf. Butler 1990).

Following this observation, a tiered theory of law will start to emerge: the positive construction of state law is intentionally constructed in stages, wherein the existing ontological phenomena at every stage both partly dictates appropriate intentional attitudes towards them and partly limit the possibilities of further positive creation of those phenomena in that stage. In the remaining of the paper, I shall give content to the emerging skeletal sketch: exactly how state law limits or enables our intentionality, through what mechanisms can it be created and sustained, and to what extent these mechanisms are ontologically subjective.

Esa Diaz Leon

On how to achieve reference to covert social constructions

What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orientation, are socially constructed? Many scholars claim that social constructionism about a kind is a version of realism about that kind, according to which the corresponding kind is a social construction, that it, it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructionism, then, is a version of realism about a kind that asserts that the kind is real, and puts forward a particular view about the nature of the kind, namely, that it is constituted by social factors and practices.

Social constructivists about human kinds such as gender, race and sexual orientation often make an additional claim, namely, that these kinds are social constructions but they are typically believed to be biological kinds (that is, people are typically wrong about the nature of these kinds). Ron Mallon (2015) calls social constructions that are (falsely) taken to be biological kinds covert social constructions. This paper is about how we could have terms in our natural language that come to refer to covert social constructions.

Mallon (2015) presents a challenge to the view that our terms for race, gender, sexual orientation and other allegedly socially constructed kinds can refer to covert social constructions. In what follows I will introduce the challenge, and I will develop and defend a solution to the challenge on behalf of the social constructionist that is more successful than Mallon's own preferred solution, or so I will argue.